

HRVATSKA AKADEMIJA ZNANOSTI I UMJETNOSTI

UREDNICI

AKADEMIK TOMISLAV RAUKAR

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HRVATSKO KATOLIČKO SVEUČILIŠTE

KATOLIČKI BOGOSLOVNI FAKULTET

ZNANSTVENI SKUP

NIKOLA ŠUBIĆ ZRINSKI I SIGET 1566.

NICHOLAS ŠUBIĆ ZRINSKI AND
SZIGETVÁR 1566

Zagreb, 20. – 21. listopada 2016.

450. obljetnica Sigetske bitke

Sažetci radova / Summaries



HRVATSKI
institut za
POVIJEST



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CROATICA



Zagreb, listopad 2016.

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SAŽETCI RADOVA

EKSPANZIJA OSMANSKOG CARSTVA OD EUROPSKOG JUGOISTOKA PREMA SREDNJOJ EUROPI OD DRUGE POLOVICE 14. DO KRAJA 16. STOLJEĆA: CILJEVI I REZULTATI

PÁL FODOR

Nakon 1453. Ugarska je, kao i neke mediteranske i bliskoistočne zemlje, došla u središte pozornosti osmanskih turskih osvajačkih planova. No kako su one postupno došle pod osmansku vlast, Ugarska je došla na vrh popisa zemalja koje treba osvojiti. Razlozi za to bili su višestruki.

Vanjskopolitički čimbenici: od kraja 15. stoljeća Osmanlije se suočavaju s jasnijom mogućnošću ostvarenja osvajačkih planova zbog podjele u zapadnom svijetu koju je ostavio pad križarskog duha i političkog kapitala papinstva koji je stajao iza njega. Osmansku Portu ohrabrivalo je i to da su je na prijelazu stoljeća europske sile vidjele ne samo kao vjerskog neprijatelja nego i kao potencijalnog saveznika, kao jednog od igrača u europskoj borbi za moć, te su aktivno tražile njezino prijateljstvo.

Gospodarski čimbenici: veći dio osmanskih državnih sredstava i prihoda potjecao je s Balkana, a iako se, nakon osvajanja na Bliskom istoku, vrijednost tog područja smanjila, ono je zadržalo primarnu ulogu. Osmanlije su temeljito istraživali i bili su potpuno informirani o zemljama srednje Europe te su pretpostavljali da će njihova akvizicija biti financijski povoljna (ili da barem neće biti nezgodna).

Čimbenici koji se odnose na domaću politiku: najvažnijim se čini pritisak vojnika stacioniranih u Rumeliji. Po svemu sudeći, postojao je „Rumelijski lobi“, čiji zahtjevi i metode nisu bili kao oni osmanskih vojnih elita u Bosni i Ugarskoj u godinama prije Dugog rata 1593. – 1606. U oba slučaja prošlo je mnogo desetljeća otkako je pokrenut bilo kakav veliki carski pohod protiv Ugarske ili Hrvatske. Vojnici, želeći nadarbine i plijen, a čiji se broj povećao prisutnošću dobrovoljaca, bili su sve nestrpljiviji čekajući nova zauzimanja teritorija odakle će širiti svoje napade na sve više i više novih područja svježih za eksploataciju. Sulejmanovo okretanje Zapadu također je bilo inspirirano javnim raspoloženjem osmanskog društva. Njegovi su podanici bili bolesni i umorni od desetljeća ratova protiv muslimana; njegovi vojnici željeli su se boriti za europske teritorije koji su obećavali bogatiji plijen.

Ideološki razlozi: Džihad, nalog za sveti rat, nije bio prvi od njih, iako sve više dokaza upućuje na to da ga je Sulejman osjećao kao osobnu obavezu. Od

kraja 15. stoljeća osmanski sultani smatrali su se potomcima osvajača Aleksandra Velikog, a to uvjerenje postupno je postalo državnom ideologijom. No još važnije postalo je bizantsko nasljeđe. S osvajanjem Carigrada 1453. sultani su postali nasljednici bizantskih (rimskih) careva tvrdeći da su, kao „tursko-rimski padišasi“, jedini gospodari svijeta, baš kao što su nekad bili rimski i istočnorimski carevi. Tako se Sulejman od prvog trenutka usmjerio prema Italiji i Karlu V., koji ju je također želio steći; njegova mašta bila je opčinjena osvajanjem Italije i svjetskom dominacijom. To je razlog zašto je Sulejman smatrao svojom obavezom postići kontrolu nad carskim gradom (*sedes imperii*) kako bi obnovio Rimsko Carstvo i uspostavio treći Rim.

No na putu prema Italiji, Rimu ili Beču stajala je frustrirajuće tvrdoglava zemlja nazivana *Ungurus*, koja je već više od jednog stoljeća ne samo odolijevala nego i prilično uvjerljivo uzvraćala napade. Iz tog razloga, Ugarska je zauzimala posebno mjesto u osmanskoj politici i mašti. Ona je postala smrtni neprijatelj na isti način na koji je samo Osmansko Carstvo postalo najveći neprijatelj Ugarske u ranom 15. stoljeću. Kao organizatori križarskih ratova, Mađari su stalno težili za eliminacijom Osmanskog Carstva i islama. U njihovim očima susjedna Ugarska postala je jedina snaga otpora, simbol cijelog kršćanskoga svijeta, a od 1453. preuzela je ulogu koju je prethodno igrao Bizant. Dakle, poraz Ugarske bio je preduvjet za osvajanje Rima i ostvarivanje svjetske dominacije.

Očito je da je napad na Ugarsku 1521. bio dio te globalne strategije. Ako se znaju vojne akcije koje su Osmanlije provodili u srednjoj Europi u prvoj polovici 16. stoljeća, kao i imperijalne ideologije koje su ležale iza njih, trebalo bi biti slijep da se ne vidi da je, za razliku od ostale tri bojišnice (Iran, Indijski ocean, Sredozemlje), osmansko vodstvo smatralo ugarsku bojišnicu najvažnijom. Čini se da je Sulejman smatrao da ima ekonomsku i vojnu snagu s kojom će napasti latinski svijet u nadi da će uspjeti.

Proboj na Zapad doista je počeo obećavajuće. Osvajanje Budima nije uspjelo u početku, ali Beograda jest. Unatoč neočekivanim domaćim poteškoćama, do kraja 1524. sultan je naredio novi pohod na Ugarsku (koji je bio odgođen zbog dugog boravka Ibrahim paše u Egiptu). Trijumf na Mohaču raspršio je bilo kakve dvojbe, ali i temeljito zaveo vladara. To ga je dovelo do uvjerenja da mu od tada ništa i nitko neće biti u stanju stajati na putu, što ga je opet sve češće dovodilo do toga da situaciju iščitava na pogrešan način. Čak ga je i neuspjeh dvije opsade Beča (1529., 1532.) i rastuća potreba za pojačanjima na drugim bojištima samo privremeno odvratio od povratka

provedbi svojega velikog plana. Trebalo mu je mnogo godina da shvati da se preračunao i da je precijenio svoju snagu. Nakon pobjeda na iranskom bojištu 1530-ih godina, kao i na mediteranskom bojištu protiv cara Karla V., Sulejman se opet usmjerio prema srednjoj Europi. Godine 1541. osvojio je Budim i uspostavio prvu osmansku pokrajinu u Ugarskoj kako bi svoje opskrbe putove doveo bliže Beču. Prvotno je planirao u cijelosti uključiti Zapoljin mali dio zemlje i pohvatati vođe proturske stranke, ali nakon stjecanja ugarskoga glavnog grada njegove su se namjere promijenile. Vlast nad Prekotisjem i Erdeljem nominalno je predao Ivanu Žigmundu Zapolji i njegovim čuvarima. Kralj Ferdinand također je izrazio interes u istočnom dijelu Ugarske vjerujući da je to učinio kao ugarski legitimno izabrani vladar i nositelj Svete krune. U takvom spletu moći budućnost Prekotisja i Erdelja ovisila je o rezultatu neizbježnog sukoba između dviju velikih sila – sukoba koji bi odlučio i o sudbini cijele srednje Europe.

Prvi čin borbe održao se 1542., kad su njemačke carske trupe opkolile osmansku Peštu i doživjele ponižavajući poraz. Iduće godine sultan će ponovo marširati na Beč. Iako je ostvario bitan napredak tijekom pohoda, nije uspio osvojiti Beč kao svoj glavni cilj. To nije obuzdalo njegov entuzijizam, međutim u drugoj polovici 1544. počeo se pripremati za povijesni pohod, veći nego onaj prije. Ipak, 12. travnja 1545. on je zaustavio te dugotrajne i vrlo skupe pripreme tvrdeći da je pohod „odgođen“.

Još uvijek nije posve jasno zašto je donio tu odluku. U svakom slučaju, u ljeto 1547. Sulejman je potpisao ugovor s habsburškom braćom u kojoj je inzistirao na fikciji da cijela Ugarska pripada njemu, iako je prihvatio Ferdinandovu *de facto* vlast na područjima koja su doista bila pod njegovom kontrolom. Sulejmanov „veliki plan“, osvajanje Ugarske i Zapada, već je propao na bojnopolju mnogo godina ranije, možda na kraju 1520-ih ili početkom 1530-ih; sad se tek radilo o pečačenju njegovih neuspjeha njegovim službenim pečatom. Kad je krenuo na svoj posljednji ugarski pohod 1566., njegov jedini cilj moglo je biti ograničenje štete: s osvajanjem Sigeta i Gyule pokušao je, s jedne strane, stabilizirati kneževinu Erdelj koju je stvorio 1553. – 1556. te, s druge strane, osmansku vlast u Ugarskoj i Hrvatskoj. Bio je uspješan, ali to je bilo daleko od njegovih izvornih namjera. To je razlog zašto sam smatrao da se i sultanova konačna pobjeda 1566. i sama utvrda Siget mogu smatrati neuspjehom osmanskih ambicija da postignu univerzalnu vlast.

HRVATSKA I OSMANSKO CARSTVO OD SREDINE 15. DO KRAJA 16. STOLJEĆA

NENAD MOAČANIN

Posljedice provala u 15. stoljeću za hrvatske su zemlje bile teže negoli sama osvajanja. Valja naglasiti da nije posve točna predodžba kako pustošenje automatski igra ulogu uvoda u osvajanje. Nekad je tako bilo, no i onda kad na najvišoj razini vojnopolitičkog planiranja nije razmatrano osvajanje nekog područja ipak je vrlo često dolazilo do provala. Pri tome je osnovni motiv bio gospodarski (iznimno velika uloga plijena, posebice roblja), a s druge strane postojalo je i ideološko utemeljenje u šerijatu (neislamske, pa i heretičko-islamske zemlje kao „kuća rata“, *darülharb*). Pljačkaške provale najčešće se imenuju *gaza*, što je pojam još iz staroarapskog predislamskog doba. Ponekad se *gaza* miješa s pojmom džihad (*cihad*), no u striktnom smislu džihad je obrambeni rat i iziskuje opću mobilizaciju (*nefir-i ʿam*), a to u slučaju *gaze* (koja može, ali i ne mora prethoditi osvajanju) nije slučaj.

U praksi se model pustošenje/osvajanje temeljio na nepisanom pravilu: ako je određeno područje devastirano do te mjere da više ne donosi znatnijih prihoda, onda ga se može, pa i treba, trajno okupirati kako bi se rekoloniziralo i postalo sposobno donositi drugu vrstu prihoda, sada u vidu spahijskih nadarbina kao dijela proizvodnje u agraru. No i tada se češće radilo o pritisku spahijskog „lobija“ (konkretno rumelijskog), a samo povremeno o izravnoj odluci na najvišoj razini piramide vlasti. To je uglavnom vrijedilo u panonskim i peripanonskim predjelima u kontekstu općeg sukobljavanja s Ugarskom, no u jadranskome zaleđu mnogo manje, s obzirom na znatnu ulogu transhumantnog stočarstva te zbog okolnosti da se vlaški demografski i gospodarski kapaciteti, takvi kakvi su bili, nisu tako brzo i lako iscrpljivali. Pa ipak je novostvorena osmansko-bosanska ratnička kasta, kojoj možemo pribrojiti i hrvatske konvertite, vrlo snalažljivo uspijevala pronaći koristi i u razmjerno nepovoljnim okolnostima (prisvajanjem najbolje zemlje i preusmjerenjem glavarine u novcu spahijama umjesto državnoj riznici).

1. Sukladno rečenome, i najveći se oružani sukob s dalekosežnim posljedicama, dakle Krbavska bitka 1493., dogodio u kontekstu gazijskog djelovanja. Možda je jedna od posljedica bila i ta da je 1494. u Edirnama zabilježena nazočnost jednog „hrvatskog poslanstva“ koje se ondje našlo kad i ugarsko, ali odvojeno. Budući da u tom trenutku Porta nije planirala osvajanje na sje-

verozapadnom krajiškom području, teritorijalno-političke promjene nisu uslijedile. Nije došlo ni do inače čestog slijeda događaja, a to je da nositelji vlasti i stanovništvo pogođenog područja izjave da se pokoravaju sultanu. Takav je slučaj međutim obilježio prvu fazu širenja Carstva na hrvatskome jugoistoku, a to je osmanska ekspanzija na prostoru između Neretve i Cetine (1470. – 1516.). Ofenzivni nalet nije posebno poticala Porta, no kako su mjesni hrvatski vojno-politički čimbenici popuštali pritisku, osmanske su snage ovdje-ondje i zauzimale pojedina uporišta. U razdoblju vladavine Bajazita II. (1481. – 1512.) i Selima I. (1512. – 1520.) radilo se o nekoj vrsti gotovo spontane ekspanzije na lokalnoj razini (velika uloga većim dijelom proturski orijentiranih Vlaha, rušenje hrvatske tampon-zone prema mletačkim posjedima u kontekstu čestih mletačko-turskih ratova). Dugoročnija stabilizacija granice do koje je došlo 1537. posljedica je likvidacije ostataka kraljevskih uporišta u jadranskome zaleđu kao ciljanoga osvajanja u širim okvirima Sulejmanova ratovanja u Ugarskoj. Oko 1525. pojavila se tako privremena ustrojbeno jedinica Hrvatski vilajet sa sjedištem u Sinju ili (vjerojatnije) Drnišu, da bi se s padom Klisa uklopila u novoosnovani Kliški sandžak kao njegova prethodnica. Do 1500. godine na sličan je način pokoren prostor od Livna do Kamengrada, gdje desetljećima nije bilo čvrsto definirane vlasti.

2. Tipološki je donekle slična, ali „zakašnjela“ ekspanzija na središnjem sektoru granice između Une i Kupe. Nakon stabilizacije granice između Drave i Save početkom pedesetih godina 16. stoljeća, na tom je području nastavljeno osvajanje sve do devedesetih. Hrvatsko plemstvo nije više moglo uspješno braniti svoje posjede, a prepustiti utvrde kralju nije htjelo. Bosanski „lobi“ očekivao je nove posjede. Međutim veći dio novoosvojenog teritorija Osmanlije nisu mogli rekolonizirati zbog sve čvršćeg habsburškog vojnokrajiškog sustava, pa je najvećim dijelom to ostao prostor ničije zemlje. Mjestimice su ipak pripadnici pokrajinske vladajuće elite prisvojili obradivu zemlju, pa je i to onemogućilo uspostavu redovitog sustava. Napokon je i velik dio „lobista“ izginuo pod Siskom 1593., što je na paradoksalan način ojačalo položaj lokalne elite (odžakluk timari kao element u pravcu feudalizacije). Na tom se području dugo pokušavalo osnovati vojno-upravnu jedinicu, i to prvo u Ostrošcu, pa Petrinji, te čak konačno nakratko 1594. u Sisku, da bi konačno sjedištem sandžaka postao Bihać.

3. Nakon pada Jajačke banovine na području današnje sjeverozapadne Bosne najvjerojatnije je formiran još jedan vilajet, što se može pretpostaviti

na temelju činjenice da se Banja Luka ne pojavljuje u popisima do oko 1540., a tek potom onamo se seli sjedište Bosanskog sandžaka. Nije isključena ni mogućnost da je cijelim tim prostorom zapovijedao kapetan Gradiške (kapetanija je osnovana 1535.), koji se 1540. predstavlja kao *Croatie et portu Zawy dominus*. Nije bilo automatski nužno da se na području koje je temeljito opustošeno, a protivnik se povukao, odmah osnuje makar i privremena upravna jedinica poput vilajeta, ako za to nije bilo preduvjeta kao što su kakva-takva naseljenost, odnosno veće strateško značenje. Srebrnička je banovina pala 1512., ali je zadugo taj prostor ostao nekom vrstom ničije zemlje.

4. U panonskim je predjelima između Save, Drave i Dunava ritam puistošenja/osvajanja/pretvaranja u redovite upravne jedinice tekao razmjerno „uredno“, kako je već bilo spomenuto u vezi s ofenzivom na Ugarsku u ranom razdoblju vladavine Sulejmana I. Zakonodavca. Interes „rumelijskog lobija“ našao je snažnu potporu u međunarodnoj političko-strateškoj situaciji jer se situacija za uspješan udar protiv Habsburgovaca i pokoravanje čitave Ugarske činila iznimno povoljnom (Francuska, protestantizam). Specifičnost je osvajanja na tom prostoru ta da u prvo vrijeme (najkasnije do 1537.) uvođenje osmanske uprave nije realizirano „u dubinu“, kako zbog nesigurnih ratnih prilika, tako i zbog „rezervne“ opcije da barem ponešto treba predati kralju Ivanju Zapolji. Do početka četrdesetih godina 16. stoljeća u izvorima susrećemo vilajet Srijem, pa i vilajet Srijem (koji uključuje i kadiluk Osijek) i Požega. Znakovito je da u nesigurnim uvjetima još nema raspodjele prihoda spahijama nego je sve još sandžakbegova nadarbina. Jednako kao i u slučaju okupirane ugarske Transdanubije i područja do Tise, i ove su upravne jedinice smatrane „nerentabilnim“. Uz pritisak spahijskog staleža, pohodi i osvajanja nakon dvadesetih godina bili su motivirani imperijalnom ideologijom ostvarenja svjetske dominacije, koja je nametala ekspanziju i u nepovoljnim okolnostima te uz pomanjkanje jasne strateške vizije.

5. Ocjenjujući sveukupne posljedice zbivanja i procesa koji će djelovati od sredine 15. do kraja 16. stoljeća, naglasio bih da je, unatoč dojmu kako su promjene u svim segmentima života bile u negativnom smislu spektakularne, dramatične i uglavnom svedive na čistu destrukciju, narav tih transformacija kudikamo kompleksnija. One su prije svega ostalog dovele do oblikovanja parametara na jednoj novoj povijesnoj „pozornici“ prema kojima će se u sljedećim stoljećima odvijati novovjekovna nacionalna integracija praćena novim tonovima u artikulaciji hrvatskog identiteta.

NA PERIFERIJ I SVIJETA ISLAMA: OSMANSKA POLITIKA NA ZAPADNOJ GRANICI 1463. – 1593.

FAHD KASUMOVIĆ

Paradigma centar – periferija u društvenim i humanističkim znanostima utjecajna je konceptualna platforma koja se rabi pri izučavanju brojnih političkih, ekonomskih, socijalnih i kulturalnih fenomena na internacionalnoj razini te unutar različitih političkih entiteta. Autori koji su se bavili spomenutom problematikom iznijeli su mnoštvo vrijednih stavova kojima su obogatili naše razumijevanje sadašnjosti i prošlosti, a jedna od važnijih svakako je ideja da države i društva imaju svoje centre i periferije, među kojima se uspostavlja interakcija koju u pogledu odnosa moći odlikuje asimetričnost – postojanje odnosa dominacije i subordiniranosti.

Polazeći od navedenih ideja, cilj ovog rada jest davanje doprinosa boljem razumijevanju dinamike odnosa centar – periferija u osmanskome i islamskom civilizacijskom kontekstu. Budući da je navedena problematika slojevita i kompleksna, praktični razlozi uvjetovali su ograničavanje istraživačkog interesa na bitan segment unutar spomenutog okvira – politiku centralne osmanske vlasti u zapadnobalkanskim pograničnim sandžacima Bosna, Hercegovina, Zvornik i Klis u vremenu od pada Bosanskoga Kraljevstva (1463.) do Bitke pod Siskom (1593.) i zaustavljanja nadiranja Osmanlija na sjeverozapadnim granicama Carstva.

Glavni dio ovog rada počeo bih s dva praktična pitanja: Na koji je način centralna osmanska vlast poimala krajišta i granice? Kakvo je mjesto u pogledu odnosa moći imalo pogranično područje u političkim horizontima centralne vlasti?

U carskim osmanskim naredbama i javnim osmanskim registrima za krajište ili krajinu rabili su se izrazi *serhad* (tj. *serhat*), *uc* i *kenâr*, dok se granica/međa označavala nazivima *hadd* (pl. *hudûd*) i *smur*. Navedene je izraze moguće pronaći u povijesnoj građi koja se odnosi na zapadnobalkanske sandžake u cijelome periodu koji je predmet razmatranja u ovom radu.

Međutim, osmanske vlasti nisu precizno definirale teritorij koji predstavlja određeno krajište, tako da se ne može znati gdje je počinjala unutrašnjost države, a gdje je završavao serhat. Na osnovi dostupne građe primjećuje se da se termin serhat uglavnom susreće u dijelovima određenih sandžaka koji su bili relativno blizu granici (npr. u Bosanskom sandžaku u drugoj polo-

vini 16. stoljeća). Pri tome treba imati u vidu da se u razdoblju 1463. – 1593. godine osmanska granica na sjeverozapadnom Balkanu više puta pomicala. Također, važno je napomenuti i da je u određenim situacijama cijeli teritorij jednog sandžaka mogao biti označen izrazom *serhat*, kao što je npr. zabilježeno u slučaju Požeškog sandžaka.

U svakom slučaju, državni centar i udaljena pogranična periferija bila su u političkom pogledu dva pola koja su u pogledu odnosa moći bila potpuno različita: centar je bio dominantan, dok je periferija bila subordinirana. Međutim, politička i prostorna perifernost pograničnih područja nije ujedno značila i njihovu beznačajnost: granica, u širem smislu, i pogranično društvo imali su ključnu ulogu u obrani i ofenzivnim pothvatima, a samim tim i važno mjesto u političkom diskursu centralne vlasti – doduše primarno kao objekt, a ne kao subjekt osmanske politike.

Bitna implikacija važnosti koju su osmanski politički subjekti pripisivali pograničnim područjima bila je odlučnost spomenutih da osvojene teritorije integriraju u osmanski državni i društveni sustav. Zbog toga je važno ispitati mehanizme pomoću kojih je centar nastojao kontrolirati periferiju te probleme s kojima se suočavao u postizanju navedenog cilja.

Temeljna odlika osmanske strategije uspostavljanja i održavanja kontrole u razdoblju koje predstavlja predmet izučavanja u ovom radu jest postojanje upravnog sustava koji je u osnovi imao vojnički karakter. Navedena kvalifikacija vrijedi i u povijesnom kontekstu zapadnobalkanskih pograničnih područja u 15. i 16. stoljeću te se, između ostalog, ogleda u postojanju klasnog društvenog sustava u kojem su državne službe i rukovođenje bili rezervirani za vojničku klasu, dok su pozicije krupnih državnih dužnosnika, kao što su naprimjer provincijski namjesnici, istovremeno podrazumijevale ovlasti na vojnom i upravnom polju.

Održavanju kontrole nad periferijom pridonosili su pripadnici sudsko-administrativnog aparata, čije administrativne ingerencije znatno premašuju predodžbe modernog čovjeka o poslovima koji su spojivi s funkcijom suca.

Također, kontrola pograničnih sandžaka teško bi bila zamisliva i bez velikog broja birokratskih službenika, koji su imali ključnu ulogu u odvijanju vojno-političke i administrativne komunikacije između centra i periferije.

Da bi se podmirile potrebe državnog aparata, bilo je potrebno uspostaviti odgovarajući sustav financiranja. U tom smislu, ključnu ulogu imalo je kontroliranje prirodnih resursa, na prvome mjestu golemih obradivih površina, nad kojima je uspostavljen državni nadzor.

S druge strane, nastojanja centra da uspostavi svoju viziju reda i poretka na zapadnobalkanskoj periferiji nisu se uvijek odvijala bez problema. Moguće je govoriti o zloupotrebama državnih službenika u implementiranju državnih propisa, odbijanju timarnika da se uključe u vojne pohode, poreznoj evaziji, zapostavljanju obrađivanja zemlje, depopulaciji, hajdučiji i sličnome. Dokumenti pokazuju da je vlast pribjegavala različitim mjerama kojima je bio cilj sprječavanje navedenih pojava: nesporno je da su one razumijevane kao ugrožavanje državnih interesa; uprkos tome, susretanje novih slučajeva tog tipa, iz desetljeća u desetljeće, ukazuje na to da ih se nije moglo potpuno iskorijeniti.

U biti, navedeni podaci važni su jer pokazuju da je i na zapadnobalkanskoj osmanskoj periferiji ranoga novog vijeka moguće iščitavati suprotnosti, pa i sukobe u odnosima centra i periferije, slično kao što se to primjećuje i na mnogim drugim stranama predmodernog svijeta.

Ako se imaju u vidu različitosti pozicija moći u odnosu centra i periferije, nastojanje centra da jače veže uz sebe periferna područja te otpori određenih skupina i pojedinaca na pograničnoj periferiji osmanskom „redu i poretku“, korisno je postaviti i pitanje: Jesu li težnje centra bile praćene fleksibilnošću i pragmatizmom u političkom odlučivanju? Primjećuju li se navedeni pristupi u naredbama koje se odnose na zapadnobalkanske pogranične provincije? U kojoj je mjeri fleksibilnost mogla pomoći održavanju dominacije centra?

Osmanska mogućnost prilagodbe okolnostima koje su vladale na zapadnobalkanskim terenima primjećuje se na više polja, a, između ostalog, i kad je riječ o financijskoj politici. Radi dokazivanja spomenute teze, navest ću nekoliko podataka o ubiranju vlašskog poreza, tzv. filurije, iz kojih se vidi prilagođavanje vlasti, odnosno dinamično vođenje politike.

Naprimjer, u primarnim dokumentima susreću se slučajevi u kojima je centralna vlast polovinom 16. stoljeća odlučila smanjiti iznos novčanog poreza nekih vlaških domaćinstava u Bosanskom sandžaku. Opravdanje navedenog postupka signifikantno je: navedeni nisu mogli podnijeti ranije nametnute iznose; bježali su te je bilo istaknuto da ih je potrebno pridobiti određenim ustupkom (*istimâlet virilüp*) kako bi se vratili na svoja prijašnja mjesta. Održavanje naseljenosti zemlje bilo je važan cilj vlasti, što zbog financijskih razloga, što zbog službi koje je spomenuto vlaško stanovništvo obavljalo u korist države.

Zapravo, samo postojanje filurije kao poreza u zapadnobalkanskim sandžacima predstavlja prilagođavanje lokalnim uvjetima, jer navedeni porez

nije bio mjera koja je vrijedila u cijelom Carstvu nego se radilo o specifikumu određenih područja u državi.

Dinamičan odnos i prilagođavanje zahtjevima vremena i prostora primjećuje se i po pitanju ukidanja i ponovnog zavođenja filurije. Centralna je vlast u skladu s promijenjenim potrebama nastojala ukinuti filuriju krajem 20-ih i početkom 30-ih godina 16. stoljeća. Međutim, odustala je od te namjere zbog problema koji su izbili na terenu i bježanja stanovništva: filurija je vraćena u udaljenim sandžacima (npr. Bosna, Hercegovina, Klis), dok u drugim, koji su smatrani sklonjenijim (npr. Zvornik), nije došlo do vraćanja navedene daće.

Također, fleksibilnost se primjećuje i u tome što iznos pune vlaške filurije nije bio isti na svim mjestima u kojima je ponovno uspostavljena obveza spomenute daće: u udaljenim graničnim mjestima porez je bio niži, dok su u unutrašnjosti vrijedili nešto viši iznosi.

Navedeni podaci pokazuju da je fleksibilnost u vođenju osmanske porezne politike moguće pratiti na sinkronijskoj razini, što se ogleda u tome da su istovremeno u različitim područjima bili na snazi različiti propisi o naplaćivanju poreza, kao i na dijakronijskoj razini, tj. u prilagođavanju okolnostima koje je pred centralnu vlast donosilo vrijeme. Štoviše, politika prilagođavanja pridonosila je održavanju osmanske dominacije te je moguće govoriti o njoj kao o integralnom dijelu osmanskog koncepta politike.

Na koncu, može se zaključiti da je u osmanskopolitičkom diskursu zapadnobalkanska periferija, u razdoblju 1463. – 1593., bila politički objekt, područje kojim se vlada, kao što se vlada i stanovništvom koje ga naseljava, dok je aktivni subjekt i simbol vlasti, onaj koji donosi odluke, bio – sultan. Navedena koncepcija i retorika društveno su konstruirane kako bi se učvrstio vladarski legitimitet. No, u pozadini, brojne odluke centralne vlasti donosili su zapravo visoki državni dostojanstvenici koji su se nalazili u službi sultana.

Paralelno s tim, odnos centar – periferija odlikuju i mogućnosti za komunikaciju i interakciju između centralne vlasti i provincijskog stanovništva. Ali, one, ipak, nisu mogle proizvesti promjenu javnog diskursa o autoritetu „pravednog vladara – dobročinitelja“.

Također, nasuprot zastarjelim narativima o inertnim orijentalcima, analiza primarnih osmanskih izvora pokazala je da su politiku osmanskog centra prema zapadnobalkanskoj periferiji u nizu slučajeva odlikovali pragmatizam i fleksibilnost, što je bio rezultat nastojanja političkih aktera centralne vlasti da se očuva i stabilizira vlast osmanske države na strateški važnim sjeverozapadnim granicama – periferiji svijeta islama.

PROTUTURSKI SPISI I TRAŽENJE POMOĆI NA EUROPSKIM DVOROVIMA

TOMISLAV RAUKAR

Pojam turske opasnosti pojavljuje se u razvoju hrvatskih društava, prije svega u dalmatinskim gradovima, u drugoj polovici 15. stoljeća, napose nakon uključivanja srednjovjekovne Bosne u okvir Osmanskoga Carstva 1463. godine. Osmanskom širenju nastojao se suprotstaviti Matijaš Korvin osnivanjem Jajačke i Srebrničke banovine (1463./1464.), ali je unatoč tome potkraj 60-ih godina 15. stoljeća turski pritisak na hrvatski prostor postajao sve jačim.

Ugroženost turskim provalama prema područjima dalmatinskih gradova u drugoj polovici 15. stoljeća u njihovu se razvoju prije svega iskazuje u književnom stvaralaštvu na latinskom i hrvatskom jeziku. U pjesničkoj zbirci šibenčanina Jurja Šižgorića *Elegiae et carmina*, objavljenoj u Veneciji 1477., nalazi se i *Elegija o pustošenju šibenskoga polja*, napisana potkraj 60-ih godina 15. stoljeća, koja iskazuje dubinu suprotnosti između komunalnog svijeta i turskog osvajača. Nešto kasnije, po svojoj prilici potkraj 15. stoljeća, Marko Marulić sastavlja *Molitvu suprotiva Turkom*, u kojoj ističe da stanovništvo gradova „tarpri nevolju svakdan od turskih ruk“. Pri tome valja istaknuti da su Šižgorićevim i Marulićevim stihovima osnovicom bili njihovi osobni dojmovi o pustošenju gradskih područja prilikom turskih provala, pa oni još ne sadržavaju nikakve programske značajke s točno određenim političkim ciljevima.

Dubinski prijelom u doživljaju turske opasnosti donosi tek teški poraz hrvatske plemićke vojske u sudaru s Osmanlijama na Krbavskom polju 9. rujna 1493. Premda se u sačuvanim vrelima nalaze veoma različite i proturječne procjene broja žrtava u redovima hrvatskoga plemstva i drugih sudionika hrvatske vojske, ipak se smije zaključiti da su ljudski gubici bili takva opsega da su zbog toga oslabjele otporne mogućnosti Hrvatskoga Kraljevstva. Ono se nakon krbavskoga poraza nalazilo nezaštićeno pred moćnim Osmanskim Carstvom, a takav zaključak pojačava i činjenica da su u tom času na ugarsko-hrvatskom prijestolju bili slabi i nedjelotvorni kraljevi iz dinastije Jagelovića, Vladislav II. i Ludovik II. U takvim okolnostima od kraja 15. i u prvoj četvrtini 16. stoljeća nastaje skupina političkih spisa, bilo da je riječ o pismima ili o govorima što su ih hrvatski uglednici držali na europ-

skim dvorovima, u kojima se tražila pomoć za Hrvatsku, ugroženu turskim pritiskom. I u protuturskim sastavcima odjekuje, dakako, osobni doživljaj autorâ teških posljedica turskih prodora, kao i u Šižgoričevu ili Marulićevu pjesništvu, ali je sada u njihovu središtu bila spoznaja da je Hrvatskoj nužna pomoć europskih vladara.

Većina protuturskih spisa i poziva za pomoć u tom je razdoblju bila upućena papama jer su samo oni raspolagali utjecajem koji je mogao okupiti kršćanske vladare i potaknuti ih na pružanje pomoći Hrvatskoj. U skladu s tim ninski je biskup Juraj Divnić 27. rujna 1493., dakle još u mjesecu Krbavske bitke, uputio pismo papi Aleksandru VI. Divnić opisuje bitku na Krbavskom polju i traži pomoć za Hrvatsku, ali pismu dodaje i europsku sastavnicu, upozoravajući papu da će Turci, ako Hrvatska bude svladana, bez teškoća prodirati prema Zapadu.

Kako je pomoć Hrvatskoj bila skromna, izuzevši papu Leona X., koji je 1515. i 1516. godine stanovitu količinu novca i ratne opreme poslao hrvatskom banu Petru Berislaviću, a Hrvatska sve ugroženija turskom prijetnjom, traženje pomoći u prvoj četvrtini 16. stoljeća postupno prelazi u prijetnju o mogućem podvrgavanju Hrvatske Turcima. Takve značajke ima govor modruškoga biskupa Šimuna Kožičića Benje *O opustošenoj Hrvatskoj* (De Coruatae desolatione), što ga je održao 1516. u Rimu pred papom Leonom X., u kojemu upozorava da su „naši ljudi primorani da s Turcima sklope mir ili savez i da im plaćaju danak“.

Takva su gledišta, u nastojanjima da na europskim dvorovima dobiju pomoć za Hrvatsku, zastupali i drugi hrvatski uglednici. Poslanik bana Petra Berislavića na dvoru pape Leona X. Splitsanin Toma Niger upozorava papu 1519. godine da će Hrvatska, ako ne dobije pomoć, biti primorana na podvrgavanje Turcima. Jednako tako i Marko Marulić, u *Pismu papi Hadrijanu VI.* (1522.), ističe da će Turcima nakon pokoravanja Hrvatske biti otvoren put prema Zapadu, kako je to još 1493., nakon Krbavske bitke, upozoravao i Juraj Divnić.

Svi pokušaji hrvatskih uglednika da preko papinstva osiguraju pomoć europskih vladara Hrvatskoj, a time i mogućnost otpora turskom pritisku i njezin opstanak, uglavnom su bili bezuspješni. Zbog toga hrvatski velikaš Bernardin Frankapan odlazi 1522. godine na njemački državni sabor u Nürnbergu i pred Habsburgovcem, nadvojvodom Ferdinandom, drži *Govor za Hrvatsku* (Oratio pro Croatia), u kojemu je zatražio pomoć, ali i upozorio da će Hrvati, ako ta pomoć izostane, „ili primiti ponude turske i tako se pod-

ložiti ili će ostaviti svoju postojbinu“. Kako ni Marulićevo upozorenje u *Pismu papi Hadrijanu VI.* ni govor Bernardina Frankapana u Nürnbergu, oba iz 1522. godine, nisu utjecali na postupke europskih vladara niti su promijenili težak položaj Hrvatske, protuturska pisma i govori hrvatskih uglednika u tijeku prve polovice 16. stoljeća postupno iščekavaju iz političkog djelovanja u Hrvatskoj.

PLEMENITI PROGNAJCI ZA OSMANSKE UGROZE I PREOBRAZBA SREDNJOVJEKOVNIH HRVATSKIH ZEMALJA U JEDINSTVENO KRALJEVSTVO

IVAN JURKOVIĆ

Osim gospodarskog razvoja i razvoja odnosa zaraćenih strana na hrvatskim granicama s Osmanskim Carstvom (od 1463. godine), vrlo važan čimbenik koji je utjecao na sposobnost otpora Osmanlijama i njihova lakšeg napredovanja jest priroda političkih i strateških odnosa kršćanskih sila – u prvom redu odnosa između dvorova u Beču i Budimu te, premda u manjoj mjeri, odnosa tih dvorova s Venecijom. Prvo je razdoblje (od pada Bosne 1463. do bitke na Mohaču 1526.) tih odnosa obilježeno napetostima između ugarsko-hrvatskih kraljeva (Matije Korvina i Jagelovića) i Habsburgovaca, koji su isticali svoja prava na kontrolu teritorija potrebnih za uspješan otpor Osmanlijama. Nakon izumrća Jagelovića Habsburgovci su konačno izabrani (1527.) kao nova dinastija Ugarske i Hrvatske, ali je odmah po izboru uslijedio građanski rat, što je dodatno oslabilo sposobnost Kraljevstva da se odupre Osmanlijama. Stanje se dijelom popravilo tek nakon 1545. godine, kad je postignuta nagodba sa Zapoljama, koji su vladali istočnim dijelom Ugarsko-Hrvatskoga Kraljevstva.

Do Mohačke bitke, osobito u vrijeme Jagelovića, vladari su ustvari dozvoljavali hrvatskim političkim predstavnicima (Saboru, plemstvu) prilično veliku autonomiju u vođenju vanjske i unutarnje politike, što je dovelo do situacija u kojima su različite europske (i svjetovne i crkvene) vlasti pomagale otpor Osmanlijama u hrvatskim zemljama. No, izbor Ferdinanda Habsburškog 1. siječnja 1527. u Cetinu u određenoj mjeri, što se tiče osmanske ugroze, Hrvatskoj naštetio, jer su druge kršćanske države automatski „shvatile“ kako je izborom Ferdinanda za vladara bio riješen i problem obrane Kraljevstva. Stanje se dodatno pogoršalo izbijanjem spomenutoga

građanskog rata, što je dovelo do daljnjih teritorijalnih gubitaka. Hrvatska je ipak preživjela, iako kao ostatak nekoć moćnog Kraljevstva, jer je ovisila o velikim susjednim habsburškim područjima koja su bila sposobna financirati sustav obrane i jer su njome upravljali članovi dinastije sposobne da reorganizira sustav obrane na novim temeljima. Taj je sustav postupno usporio te na koncu i zaustavio osmansko napredovanje.

Unatoč činjenici da je razdoblje osmanskog napredovanja na prostorima hrvatskih zemalja bilo jednom od najdramatičnijih epizoda u povijesti Hrvatske, a koje je dovelo do gotovo potpunog prekida kontinuiteta gospodarskog i društvenog razvoja, to je razdoblje bilo i razdobljem ujedinjavanja tih zemalja u posebnu političku cjelinu pod imenom Kraljevine Hrvatske, Dalmacije i Slavonije. Taj se proces može promatrati na nekoliko razina: spajaju se političke, upravne i vojne ustanove (prije svega funkcije banova, sazivanja i rada saborâ, formiranja zajedničkih vojnih zapovjedništava i postrojbi), potom se pomiče središte srednjovjekovne Hrvatske na sjever prema Slavoniji te se širi političko (hrvatsko) ime po Slavoniji / na Slavoniju.

Spajanje državnih ustanova započelo je još u doba kralja Matije Korvina (1458. – 1490.), kad je 1476. staru praksu imenovanja dvojice odvojenih banova – jednoga za Hrvatsko-Dalmatinsko, a drugoga za Slavonsko Kraljevstvo – zamijenio praksom imenovanja jednoga bana za oba kraljevstva. Jagelovići su kombinirali dvije mogućnosti: jedna je bila imenovanje jedne osobe, a druga imenovanje dvije osobe, ali istovremeno kao banove oba kraljevstva i uz njihovu punu jurisdikciju nad cijelim teritorijima. Tijekom 16. stoljeća upravo je način imenovanja banova koji su prakticirali Jagelovići postao pravilom i kod Habsburgovaca.

Druga državna institucija važna za to pitanje bili su sabori. Tijekom Korvinove vladavine ni slavonski ni hrvatski sabori nisu se redovito sazivali. Oni su se češće sazivali u razdoblju Jagelovića, ali uvijek odvojeno. Prvo zajedničko zasjedanje saborâ održano je 1533. u Zagrebu na poziv kraljeva opunomoćenog upravitelja Petra Keglevića. No, nakon tog saziva zajednička zasjedanja saborâ još uvijek nisu postala jedinim načinom njihova rada. Posljednje zasebno zasjedanje Hrvatskoga sabora održano je u Steničnjaku 1558. i tek nakon te su godine sazivani isključivo zajednički sabori Hrvatsko-Dalmatinsko-Slavonskoga Kraljevstva.

Vojna je organizacija samo djelomično slijedila proces ujedinjenja hrvatskih zemalja. Vojna je krajina dakle bila organizirana tako da je više ili ma-

nje slijedila tradicionalnu podjelu Hrvatske i Slavonije, ali je u određenim trenucima bivao imenovan jedan vrhovni zapovjednik za obje krajine, nazivan kao „generalni kapetan cijele vojne granice južno od Drave“.

Sljedeća promjena koja je ukazivala na proces integracije jest pomicanje središta Hrvatske nakon pada Knina (1522.). Logičan je izbor pao na Bihać, sljedeći kraljevski grad koji je još uvijek pripadao Hrvatskoj. No već u tridesetim godinama 16. stoljeća Zagreb je (dakle, grad u Slavoniji) sve više postajao središtem i Hrvatske i Slavonije te je kao takav ostao i tijekom sljedećih stoljeća. Zagreb je službeno priznat i kao glavni grad u dekretima zajedničkoga Hrvatsko-slavonskog sabora u kojima je navođen kao *metropolis regnorum Croatiae et Slavoniae*.

Posljednji element procesa integracije jest hrvatsko ime koje se sve češće počelo upotrebljavati i na području srednjovjekovne Slavonije. To je bio postupan proces, koji je već kasnih dvadesetih i ranih tridesetih godina 16. stoljeća rezultirao time da se cijelo područje južno od rijeke Kupe tretiralo kao Hrvatska (*partes transcolapiane que Croatia dicitur*). U 1544. godini dodatno je ojačan takav odnos prema nekadašnjim južnim slavonskim područjima administrativnom podjelom Zagrebačke županije, koja je imala, uza svoju slavonsku, i hrvatsku stranu, a linija razgraničenja bila je na Kupi. Paralelno s tim procesom događao se proces širenja glagoljaške liturgije prema sjeveru. Na širem planu, dokumenti iz cijeloga 16. stoljeća svjedoče da je ime Slavonije počelo gubiti svoj status, nekoć jednak onom hrvatskom. Sličan proces dogodio se s uporabom imena Hrvat kao etnonima, koje je postalo uobičajeno i za osobe rodom iz Slavonije.

Svi ti elementi koji svjedoče o procesu integracije Hrvatske i Slavonije u formalnu političku cjelinu izravno su povezani s migracijskim krizama druge polovice 15. i prve polovice 16. stoljeća. Slavonska područja sjeverno od Kupe i Save bila su privlačna useljenička područja podjednako i hrvatskim plemićima i običnom puku od samog početka osmanske opasnosti. Naime, ustrajno su se valovi prognanika, izbjeglica i kasnije prebjega pojavljivali na tim prostorima tijekom druge polovice 15. i tijekom čitava 16. stoljeća. Ti su doseljenici, osobito članovi raseljena plemstva, nosili sa sobom i određene „političke“ tradicije, kulturu, zajedničke običaje i jezične utjecaje. Oni su donijeli i jak osjećaj vlastita identiteta te je sve navedeno, u kombinaciji s činjenicom da je stanovništvo u oba kraljevstva u osnovi pripadalo istoj široj etničkoj zajednici, omogućilo integraciju.

DEMOGRAFSKE PROMJENE NA DANAŠNJEM PROSTORU HRVATSKE OD POLOVICE 15. DO KRAJA 17. STOLJEĆA

ANĐELKO AKRAP

Od druge polovice 15. do prvih desetljeća 18. stoljeća na hrvatskom društvenom prostoru ratovi velikih imperijalnih sila, razaranja, prisilne migracije, sužanjstvo te učestalije gladi i epidemije drastično su poremetili tijekove razvoja i ostavili duboke tragove u svim sastavnicama demografskog, društvenog, gospodarskog, političkog i kulturnog života. Dosadašnja istraženost razvoja hrvatskoga društvenog prostora od druge polovice 15. do kraja 17. stoljeća ukazuje ne samo na zaustavljanje temeljnih razvojnih procesa već i na retrogradne procese. Hrvatske zemlje u tom vremenu rascijepljene su teritorijalno, ali i interesno, između Mlečana, Osmanlija i Habsburgovaca. Habsburška politika u upravljanju Vojnom krajinom ostavila je dalekosežne posljedice jer je, uz ostale dezintegrativne čimbenike koji su bili na putu integracije, novodoseljeni narod stavljala u sferu svojih interesa. Danas rijetko naseljena područja nisu bila takva i prije.

Temeljne demografske, gospodarske i društvene tendencije prije i u tijeku dugotrajnih sukoba na hrvatskom društvenom teritoriju od druge polovice 15. do početka 18. stoljeća upućuju da je moguće, općenito, uočiti dva demografska smjera kretanja: približno do druge polovice 15. stoljeća demografski porast, primjeren onom vremenu, i nakon toga depopulaciju ili vrijeme raspućivanja i velikih izmjena stanovništva. Općenito, europsko se stanovništvo brzo povećavalo u 16. stoljeću, rast su usporili glad, kuga i rat u 17. stoljeću, a brzi je porast ponovno uslijedio od sredine 18. stoljeća; no, ukupan se broj stanovnika u tom razdoblju gotovo svuda utrostručio, a gradovi su rasli još brže. Povijesna demografija bilježi naglašen porast broja stanovnika u razdoblju 1450. – 1650., a upravo je to vrijeme na hrvatskom društvenom prostoru karakteristično po najvećim demografskim gubitcima.

U situaciji kad raspoložemo procjenama broja stanovnika za Europu i njezine pojedine države možemo ih usporediti s promjenom broja stanovnika na današnjem prostoru Republike Hrvatske. Gospodarsko nazadovanje, demografska stagnacija i raspućivanje pojedinih područja, prisilne migracije unutar današnjeg teritorija Hrvatske i prema srednjoj Europi te kolonizacije i izmjene stanovništva bitno obilježavaju povijest hrvatskih zemalja od druge polovice 15. stoljeća, jačim ili slabijim intenzitetom, do prvih deset-

ljeća 18. stoljeća. Što pokazuje usporedna slika promjene broja stanovnika u razdoblju 1500. – 1700. godine u Hrvatskoj i europskim zemljama? Polazimo od procjene prema kojoj je na prostoru Republike Hrvatske 1500. godine bilo 1,010.000 stanovnika, a 1700. godine 644.500 stanovnika. U tom razdoblju u svim je europskim zemljama i zemljopisnim područjima zabilježen porast broja stanovnika, a istovremeno je (1500. – 1700. godine) na današnjem hrvatskom državnom teritoriju broj stanovnika smanjen za 36,2% (ili za 30,5% ako prihvatimo procjenu broja stanovnika za 1500. godinu V. Stipetića).

Uspoređujući promjene broja stanovnika 1500. – 1700. godine na današnjem prostoru Hrvatske s istim u drugim europskim zemljama, dobili smo demografske okvire u kojima se može kretati ukupan broj iseljenih, odvedenih u sužanjstvo, broj umrlih zbog učestalijih gladi i epidemija te poginulih u ratovima. Uz relativni porast broja stanovnika 1500. – 1700. godine kao u skupini država na europskom istoku ili europskom zapadu, na prostoru Republike Hrvatske bilo bi 1700. godine između 750 i 800 tisuća stanovnika više. No, u račun valja uključiti i useljene u Hrvatsku. Naime, ratovi od polovice 17. stoljeća, s kulminacijom od osamdesetih godina do kraja istog stoljeća, rezultirali su povlačenjem Osmanlija s današnjega hrvatskog državnog teritorija i velikom izmjenom stanovništva između teritorija današnje Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine. Dakle, da nije bilo useljavanja na današnji prostor Republike Hrvatske, broj bi stanovnika 1700. godine bio i manji od 644,5 tisuća.

Ostaje pak otvorenim pitanjem koliki je udio doseljenih od polovice 15. stoljeća do kraja 17. stoljeća u broju stanovnika 1700. godine. Držimo kako možemo procijeniti da je od ukupnoga broja stanovnika zatečenog 1700. godine na prostoru Republike Hrvatske barem oko 30% useljenika iz Bosne i Hercegovine. Razumljivo je da za broj useljenog stanovništva treba povećati gubitke stanovništva na prostoru Republike Hrvatske 1500. – 1700. godine. Ako odbijemo procijenjeno useljeno stanovništvo, dolazimo do podatka da se 1700. godine na prostoru Republike Hrvatske nalazilo najmanje oko 1 milijun stanovnika manje od broja koji je trebalo očekivati.

Kritičkom valorizacijom objavljenih historiografskih istraživanja u demografskom kontekstu iznijet ćemo okvirne/orijentacijske procjene o činiteljima pada broja stanovnika na današnjem hrvatskom državnom prostoru. Tijekom prethodne analize obuhvatili smo razdoblje 1500. – 1700. godine, jer najranije za 1500. godinu raspoložemo pouzdanom procjenom broja sta-

novnika za današnji prostor Hrvatske. No, osmanski prodori i osvajanja i s njima povezane pojave započeli su intenzivnije već od polovice 15. stoljeća, stoga ćemo navesti procjene činitelja demografskog zaostajanja od 1450. godine. Demografske gubitke nastale osobito tijekom druge polovice 15. stoljeća ne možemo zanemariti, iako u našu procjenu ukupnih demografskih gubitaka 1500. – 1700. godine nisu uključeni. Najintenzivnija iseljavanja i odvođenje u sužanjstvo dogodili su se od polovice 15. do kraja 16. stoljeća, pri čemu se ne mogu zanemariti ni vrlo dinamična migracijska kretanja povezana s osmanskim teritorijalnim gubitcima od druge polovice 17. stoljeća do prvih desetljeća 18. stoljeća. Ukupni demografski gubici „iznad europskog prosjeka“ u razdoblju 1500. – 1700. kvantificirani su po pojedinim sastavnicama za razdoblje 1500. – 1600. godine. Na temelju prethodno navedenih pretpostavki iznijet ćemo okvirne procjene o činiteljima hrvatskoga demografskog pada s napomenom da se one uklapaju u demografske okvire. Procjenjujemo da se od kraja 15. do 16. stoljeća iselilo oko 500.000 osoba: oko 100.000 u Gradišće i Moravsku (Češka, Slovačka); oko 100.000 na prostor današnje Slovenije (Kranjska, Štajerska, Koruška), dakle u Austrijske zemlje i Donjoaustrijske pokrajine; oko 300.000 u čitavu Italiju (oko 200.000 zapadnojadranska obala – od Furlanije na sjeveru do Brindizija na jugu). Na prvi pogled procjene broja iseljenih mogu se učiniti pretjeranim, međutim novija istraživanja upućuju na razmjerno velika iseljavanja prema zapadnoj obali Jadrana. Osim toga, uspoređujući s procjenom da se iz Hrvatske prema prekomorskim zemljama krajem 19. i početkom 20. stoljeća iselilo između 400 i 500 tisuća osoba, dakle u samo tridesetak mirnodopskih godina, i prethodna se procjena čini prihvatljivijom, tim više jer se radi o zamjetno dugom, a k tomu i ratnom razdoblju. Kritičkom valorizacijom raspoloživih podataka o odvedenim u sužanjstvo tijekom razmatranog razdoblja procjenjujemo da je s današnjega hrvatskog državnog prostora odvedeno u sužanjstvo između 250.000 i 300.000 osoba.

Na temelju raspoložive/objavljene historiografske građe za razmatrano razdoblje, nije moguće napraviti okvirne procjene broja umrlih uvjetovanih ratovima zbog učestalijih epidemija i gladnih godina u odnosu na europski prosjek. Usto se ne mogu napraviti ni okvirne procjene broja poginulih u ratovima. Komparativnim pristupom potvrdili smo stavove starije i novije hrvatske historiografije da je to razmatrano razdoblje za Hrvatsku karakteristično po velikim demografskim gubitcima. Gledano iz europskoga pro-

stornog i demografskog konteksta, tako veliko demografsko zaostajanje u odnosu na sve europske zemlje može se razumjeti tek ako imamo u vidu da se radi o relativno malom prostoru gdje su se gotovo neprekinuto vodili veliki i „mali ratovi“. Sažeto: Na malom dijelu europskog prostora, koji smo sveli na pojam hrvatski društveni prostor, od druge polovice 15. stoljeća do početka 18. stoljeća, zbog sukoba triju velikih imperijalnih sila – Osmanskog Carstva, Mletačke Republike, Habsburške Monarhije – i s njima povezanih pojava, dogodili su se veliki demografski gubitci.

MIGRACIJE I DEMOGRAFSKE PROMJENE NA HRVATSKOM PROSTORU U 16. STOLJEĆU: PRIMJER SANDŽAKA KLIS I KRKA

KORNELIJA JURIN STARČEVIĆ

Područja koja su na hrvatskom prostoru u 16. stoljeću činila osmanske sandžake Klis i Krka (teritorij između rijeka Zrmanje i Cetine te današnja Lika) trajno su osvojena uglavnom između 1520. i 1537. godine. Navedena su područja doživjela intenzivne demografske promjene, ne samo u vrijeme provala akindžija i osmanskih osvajanja krajem 15. i početkom 16. stoljeća nego i tijekom cijelog perioda osmanske vlasti. Te su se promjene ponajviše očitovale u intenzivnim emigracijama autohtonog katoličkog stanovništva i rekolonizaciji depopuliranih područja posve novim stanovništvom, u manjoj mjeri muslimanskim vojničkim, a u većoj vlaškim pravoslavnim, uslijed čega je, u odnosu na kasnosrednjovjekovnu, znatno izmijenjena sociokulturna i etnokonfesionalna struktura navedenog područja. Nakon stabilizacije osmanske vlasti i brojnost se katoličkog vlašskog stanovništva tijekom 16. stoljeća povećala, osobito u Zagori, gdje je bila jača nazočnost ranijeg domicilnog pučanstva.

Na temelju podataka iz osmanskih poreznih popisa sačuvanih za sandžake Klis i Krka (iz godine 1528./30., 1540., 1550., 1574. i 1604.) te na temelju informacija iz osmanskih *mühimme deftera* koji se čuvaju u glavnom osmanskom arhivu u Istanbulu (*Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi*), u radu se rekonstruira demografska situacija u nahijama (odnosno administrativno-sudskim jedinicama) navedena dva sandžaka tijekom 16. stoljeća i evidentiraju se promjene u demografskim kretanjima između popisnih godina. Također se pokušavaju otkriti glavni smjerovi migracija zahvaljujući bilješkama popisivača

u poreznim popisima i zapisima u drugim relevantnim izvorima. U radu se nadalje pozornost posvećuje obilježjima osmanske rekolonizacijske politike, naporima koje je vlast ulagala da repopulira prostor i krajnjim učincima poduzetih mjera. Razrađuje se teza da su Osmanlije provodili sustavnu rekolonizacijsku politiku naseljavanja Kliškog i Krčkog sandžaka kao pograničnih sandžaka prema Mletačkoj Republici i Habsburškoj Monarhiji kako bi u vojnom, gospodarskom i političko-administrativnom smislu stabilizirali svoju vlast. Državno poticane migracije stanovništva iz dublje osmanske unutrašnjosti prema rubnim dijelovima Kliškog i Krčkog sandžaka vidljive su tijekom cijelog 16. stoljeća. Pritom se osmanska vlast u velikoj mjeri koristila vlaškim stanovništvom, koje je bilo vrlo prikladno za život na nemirnoj granici zbog ratničkog ustroja vlaških džemata, odnosno katuna, orijentiranosti na transhumantno stočarstvo i velike pokretljivosti. Vlaškom stanovništvu u pograničnim područjima osmanska je vlast dodjeljivala porezna izuzeća, a vlaškim starješinama nadarbine (timare), te ih na taj način stimulirala na naseljavanje na opustjela i nemirna područja. K tome, Osmanlije su provodili politiku naseljavanja stanovništva i s protivničkog teritorija (politika davanja „jamstva“ ili istimaleta), a ne samo iz dublje osmanske unutrašnjosti. Podanike s protivničkog teritorija nagovarali su na preseljenje i prihvaćanje osmanske vlasti te su im jamčili određena prava, poput plaćanja poreza filurije, nekih poreznih olakšica za obavljanje poluvojnih dužnosti i provođenje samouprave. Istraživanja poreznih popisa pokazala su da su se tako zbivale reverzibilne migracije stanovništva koje je obitavalo na navedenim prostorima prije dolaska Osmanlija.

Iako je posljedica uspostave osmanske vlasti na hrvatskim teritorijima koji će ući u sastav Kliškog i Krčkog sandžaka bila izuzetna prorijeđenost stanovništva, cijelo područje nije bilo jednako depopulirano. To zaključujemo na temelju prvog osmanskog poreznog popisa koji je započeo 1528., a završen 1530. godine. Najveća je bila depopulacija područja sjeverozapadno od Zrmanje (nahija Lika), dok je na području između Krke i Cetine bilo dosta kontinuiteta u naseljenosti s predosmanskim razdobljem jer su tu ostale brojnije zajednice starosjedilačkog stanovništva.

Lika je bila gotovo pusta sve do sredine 16. stoljeća. Razloga za to bilo je, dakako, više, a najvažniji su konstantna nesigurnost zbog upada protivničkih vojnih jedinica i uskoka iz Senja, koji su trebali spriječiti Osmanlije da zadrže osvojeni teritorij. Tada su u Lici bile aktivne tek dvije utvrde – Udbi-

na i Gračac, u kojima je bilo smješteno muslimansko vojničko stanovništvo, pa je zbog nedovoljnog broja vojnika teško bilo uspostaviti učinkovit nadzor nad prostranim teritorijem nahije. Preostale utvrde iz predosmanskog perioda bile su tada još porušene i zapuštene, što se u popisima i eksplicitno navodi. Drugog stalno naseljenog civilnog stanovništva još nije bilo jer se podno utvrda još nisu razvila gradska naselja, a nije bilo ni stalno naseljenog seljaštva. Naseljavanje Like središnja je vlast nastojala provesti između 1550. i 1575. godine, u vrijeme istaknutih bosanskih i kliških sandžakbegova Malkoč-bega Karaosmanovića i Ferhad-bega Sokolovića. U naredbi koja je upućena kliškom sandžakbegu Ferhad-begu u mjesecu redžepu 967. / ožujak – travanj 1560. godine sultanski dvor zapovjedio je da se naseli i oživi 70 ruševnih utvrda koje se nalaze u nahiji Lika i Krbava. Repopulacija je dala rezultata jer je u detaljnom poreznom popisu s početka 17. stoljeća na području Like i Krbave bilo popisano oko 720 kuća kao poreznih jedinica – 600 u Lici i 120 na Krbavi – raspoređenih u otprilike sedamdesetak sela. Kad je područje bilo dovoljno demografski i gospodarski oporavljeno, konačno je, 1580. godine, osnovan i novi sandžak – sandžak Krka. Novodoseljeno stanovništvo bilo je uglavnom vlaške provenijencije, a pristizalo je najčešće iz sandžaka Hercegovina, koji je bio migracijsko ishodište Vlaha prema zapadu.

U komparaciji s Likom, demografska slika bila je nešto povoljnija na južnim dijelovima između rijeka Zrmanje i Krke. Tamo su, prema popisu iz 1528.-30. godine, obitavali takozvani „Vlasi zemlje Istre“ (*Eflakan-i vilayet-i Istra*) ili istarski Vlasi. Nije točno poznato kad su se Vlasi iz Istre doselili na navedeno područje, ali je sasvim moguće da je to bilo na samom početku osmanske vladavine. Vrlo je vjerojatno ta zajednica izbjegla u Istru u vrijeme provala akindžija i osvajanja, zajedno s drugim hrvatskim stanovništvom, a potom se vratila pod osmansku vlast zbog nepovoljnih prirodnih uvjeta u Istri. U popisu iz 1528.-30. evidentiran je i određen broj sela za koja ne postoji opaska da su naseljeni Vlasima Istre, iako je nesumnjivo riječ o vlaškom stanovništvu. Za dio tog stanovništva možemo ustvrditi da se doselio iz prekodinarskih nahija Uskoplje, Srb i Unac jer su u popis unesene određene zabilježske. Na navedenom području novodoseljeno vlaško stanovništvo iz Istre i prekodinarskih nahija Uskoplja i Unca izmiješalo se s malobrojnim preostalim autohtonim stanovništvom, koje je činilo pretežno katoličko stanovništvo. Vlasi Istrije bili su vrlo nestalan element u osmanskom vojno-krajiškom sustavu i demografskoj politici naseljavanja pograničnih teritorija jer

su se više puta vraćali na osmanski teritorij i odlazili s njega na mletački i habsburški ostavljajući prazan prostor, na koji se doseljava posve novo stanovništvo. Većina novodoseljenika bila je uglavnom pravoslavne vjere jer se u to vrijeme osnivaju dva pravoslavna manastira na navedenome prostoru (Krka, Krupa). Mirno razdoblje nakon Ciparskog rata pozitivno se odrazilo na demografski rast jer je naseljenost nahija između Zrmanje i Krke znatno porasla, a nastaju i prva urbana naselja sa statusom varoši: Skradin, Vrana, Velin, Nadin, Karin, Ostrovica, Obrovac, Zemunik.

Za najjužniji odsječak hrvatskog prostora u Kliškom sandžaku, onaj na potezu između rijeka Krke i Cetine, može se reći da je bilo područje gdje je preostalo najviše domicilnog stanovništva i gdje je postojalo dosta kontinuiteta u naseljenosti s predosmanskim razdobljem. U pet nahija 1528.-30. godine u *icmal* defteru upisana su bila 44 sela s 1.189 poreznih jedinica. Radilo se mahom o većim selima, u kojima se stanovništvo bavilo uglavnom ratarenjem. Ta činjenica također učvršćuje tezu o autohtonom stanovništvu jer se novodoseljeno stanovništvo uglavnom bavilo pastoralnom ekonomijom. Naseljenost između Cetine i Krke tijekom 16. stoljeća stalno je rasla. Osmanskim popisom s početka 17. stoljeća na cijelom području zabilježeno je 266 sela te oko 3.700 poreznih kuća. Klasična osmanska uprava u obliku timarsko-spahijskog sustava tu se posve stabilizirala. Na tom je području nastalo i nekoliko važnijih urbanih naselja (kasaba) kao što su Sinj, Vrlika, Drniš, Klis, Hrvace, naseljenih muslimanskim civilnim stanovništvom. Na tom je području zabilježen i veći udio muslimanskog stanovništva u ruralnoj sredini. Proces islamizacije jače je zahvatio cetinski i vrlički kraj te okolicu Klisa, gdje su zabilježena sela sa zapaženim udjelom muslimanskog stanovništva.

OSMANSKI IZAZOV I MLETAČKI ODGOVOR U DALMACIJI U VREMENU SIGETSKE BITKE

JOSIP VRANDEČIĆ

Mlečani su osvajanjem Dalmacije početkom i tijekom 15. stoljeća postigli dva važna geostrateška cilja na Jadranu: osiguravanje pomorske komunikacije prema Levantu i osvajanje komunalnih čvorišta za trgovački prodor na Balkanu na kojemu su se natjecali s Firentincima i Dubrovčanima. Nakon što je Venecija uspjela ostvariti navedene ciljeve, početkom 16. stoljeća suo-

čila se s osmanskom prijetnjom u zaleđu dalmatinskih komuna. Pad Knina, Skradina, Ostrovice i Klisa naglasili su svijest o obrambenoj osjetljivosti dalmatinskih komunalnih društava koja su postala žrtvama osmanskog širenja izvana i mletačke pasivnosti iznutra. Nakon osvajanja pokrajine početkom 15. stoljeća mletački je pragmatični funkcionalizam oduzeo nekad bogatoj komunalnoj eliti ulogu u profitabilnim sektorima poput solana i brodarstva, koji su uzdigli dalmatinske komune tijekom anžuvinog razdoblja, i usmjerio je u niskoprofitabilno poljodjelstvo, koje je osmanskim osvajanjima izgubilo proizvodni potencijal. Venecija je na Jadranu uvijek bila privržena kolonijalnom modelu nakupine pomorskih trgovačkih postaja koji su preferirali i Portugalci, za razliku od španjolskog i osmanlijskog modela, koji je težio osvajanju prostora. Dolaskom Osmanlija taj je mletački kolonijalni model „carstva trgovačkih postaja“ dodatno izložio dalmatinske gradove pogibelji od visokog koeficijenta urbanosti, uslijed koje je gradsko stanovništvo činilo više od 50% stanovništva, dok je u svim predmodernim društvima od Engleske do Kine taj broj uvijek iznosio oko 80% u korist sela. Početkom 16. stoljeća u Dalmaciji i Mletačkoj Albaniji živjelo je oko 100.000 stanovnika, ali je nakon rata Svete lige njihov broj pao na najniži zabilježeni minimum od samo 60.000 stanovnika.

Iz mletačkog je kolonijalnog modela trgovačkih postaja proizišla kriza vojne politike u Dalmaciji. Defanzivna strategija proizlazila je i iz političkog modela aristokratske demokracije koji je nametnuo borbu između različitih interesnih frakcija, od kojih su, u pravilu, siromašniji naginjali ratu, a bogatiji miru. Strateška kriza proizlazila je i iz karaktera aristokratske republike koja, osim trgovačke zajednice interesa, nije mogla naći prikladniji model protonacionalne ili vjerske integracije kako su to tražile predmoderne europske države.

Suočeni s osmanskim izazovom tijekom 16. stoljeća, Mlečani su prionuli zahtjevnom procesu vojne revolucije koji je osobito došao do izražaja u preoblikovanju zidina dalmatinskih gradova *alla moderna*. Navedena bastionska tranzicija po načelu *trace italienne* omogućila je učinkovitu modernizaciju urbanističkih sklopova i sačuvala dalmatinske gradove od pada pod osmansku vlast. Vojna revolucija došla je do izražaja i u ostalim obrambenim sektorima: vatrenom naoružanju – pogotovo topništvu, ustroju profesionalnih i lokalnih vojnih postrojbi, modernizaciji brodovlja i ratnoj taktici. Vojna je revolucija najvažniji europski, a time i dalmatinski, ranonovovjekovni proces

zahvaljujući kojem je zaustavljeno osmansko prodiranje na Zapad, o čemu su Malta i Siget zorno svjedočili. Navedena vojna reforma imala je odraz i na preobrazbu društva, koje je postalo ovisnije o njegovoj upravnoj i vojnoj središnjici.

Premda su plodovi vojne revolucije u Dalmaciji vidljivi tek za Kandij-skog rata, njezini počeci sežu do Rata Svete lige (1537. – 1540.), kad je Republika odlučivala o svojim urbanističkim prioritetima. Pad Nadina i Vrane 1538. godine potvrdio je uspješnu osmansku strategiju potiskivanja Mlečana u preostala jadranska sidrišta. Stoga je glasoviti veronski vojni inženjer Michele Sanmicheli još za rata 1537. godine u Zadru počeo graditi peterokutni bastion Ponton uz glavna gradska Vrata od *terraferme*, a pred kraj života, 1555. godine, izgradio je zidno platno pred kopnom. Ujedno je projektirao i dovršio tvrđavu sv. Nikole na ulazu u Šibenski kanal koja je branila Krešimirov grad s mora. Energični je Sanmichelijev nasljednik Sforza Pallavicino 1567. – 1569. u Zadru srušio predgrađe – Varoš – pred gradskim kopnenim vratima i sagradio izdvojeni urbanistički otok Forte, koji se svojim masivnim kamenim klijestima ispriječio prema kopnu. Ti su glasoviti talijanski vojni inženjeri, kao i njihovi prethodnici, poimali bastionsko graditeljstvo kao egzaktnu znanost koja uključuje matematička, posebno balistička, znanja, odnosno projektiranje koje će omogućiti duboku obranu i križnu vatru kako bi se neprijatelja držalo daleko od bedema.

Gradnjom tog prostranog otoka ispred gradske jezgre, opkoljena paralelnim kanalima između luke i morske strane, otpočela je nova faza mletačko-osmanskog sukoba, ona borbe kita i slona – najjačih stvorenja u svojim odijeljenim područjima. Pod tim je modernim kamenim otokom mletačka flota mogla naći zaklonište na putu prema Levantu. Nakon toga osmanske je snage u Dalmaciji, kao i u Panoniji, čekala druga, zahtjevnija faza napada na nove tranzicijske, bastionske komplekse građene prema načelima vojne revolucije *alla moderna*, niskih, nasutih i ispruženih zidina koje osmanska konjica i pješništvo nisu mogli impresionirati.

Pallavicino u Zadru nije ostavio samo masivni Ponton nego i dalekosežnu politiku „spaljene zemlje“, koja je nalagala da se sva ekstramuralna urbana infrastruktura, osim nekoliko glavnih dalmatinskih luka dostatnih za komunikaciju s Levantom, ima razoriti kako u slučaju pada ne bi poslužila neprijatelju. U zaleđu su dalmatinskih gradova Osmanlije utvrđivali osvojenе gradiće koje su pojačavali ljudstvom i opremom. Poticali su naseljavanje

stanovništva, gradnju islamske vjerske i svjetovne infrastrukture i islamizaciju koja je počela hvatati korijenje u dalmatinskom zaleđu. Mlečani su se stoga tijekom 16. stoljeća morali ograničiti na navedenu defanzivu u sklopu široke politike neutralnosti kojom su se nastojali sačuvati od habsburškog i osmanskog stiska. Navedena Pallavicinijeva doktrina da se u Dalmaciji mogu braniti samo pomorski gradovi ostala je dugo prisutna u svijesti mletačke elite, koja je zazirala od pokrivanja dodatnog izvanjskog prostora. Ciparski je rat još snažnije inaugurirao fortifikacijsko redizajniranje dalmatinskih gradova jer im je iskustvo stečeno u napadima na Obrovac i Skradin tijekom prethodnog rata pokazalo da se na njemu ne mogu održati. Vojna će inicijativa u Dalmaciji prijeći na mletačku stranu tek tijekom Kandijskog rata.

SIGETSKA BITKA I DUBROVČANI

VESNA MIOVIĆ, MLADEN GLAVINA

U Državnom arhivu u Dubrovniku pohranjeno je nekoliko interesantnih spisa koji se tiču bitke za Siget. Budući da je riječ o spisima koji govore ponajprije o sultanu Sulejmanu Veličanstvenom i njegovu sinu Selimu, potrebno je najprije, ukratko, objasniti narav odnosa Osmanskog Carstva i Dubrovačke Republike.

Dubrovačko-osmanski odnosi bili su specifični po tome što su Dubrovčani sultanu plaćali harač, a ipak su zadržali visok stupanj slobode. U osmansko-dubrovačkim međudržavnim ugovorima pisalo je da u Dubrovnik može doći tko god želi, bilo s kopna, bilo s mora, bio sultanov prijatelj, bio neprijatelj. Razlozi činjenici da je jedan osmanski haračar zadržao slobodu bili su posve pragmatični. Osmansko Carstvo trebalo je vješte i sposobne trgovce, a dubrovački trgovci bili su upravo takvi. Neutralna dubrovačka luka pružala je Osmanlijama mogućnost da trguju sa zapadnim kršćanskim zemljama i u vrijeme kad s njima ratuju. I najvažnije od svega, Dubrovčani su bili odlično informirani, a Carstvu su trebale informacije o zapadnom kršćanskom svijetu. Ovdje je „dubrovačka neutralnost“ bila ključna riječ, a bez slobode i odriješenih dubrovačkih ruku ona na prosto nije bila moguća.

Što se tiče zapadnih kršćanskih zemalja, i one su se koristile neutralnom dubrovačkom lukom i dubrovačkom informiranošću o Osmanskom Carstvu. Postavivši se na takav način između istočnog i zapadnog svijeta, Dubrovčani

su profitirali, a glavni izazov bio im je da se održe stalno potvrđujući svima važnost svoje uloge. Diplomacija je dakle imala pune ruke posla.

Okosnica dubrovačke diplomacije na Istoku bili su takozvani „poklisari harača“, dvojica plemića koji su jednom godišnje nosili harač u Istanbul i tamo obavljali diplomatske i konzularne poslove. Povremeno su na scenu stupali i takozvani „poklisari dara“, koji su posjećivali sultane prigodom njihova odlaska na ratište. Cilj posjeta bio je potvrditi lojalnost u tim posebno osjetljivim trenucima i ojačati naklonost kako sultana, tako i njegovih vezira.

Poklisari dara posjećivali su sultana Sulejmana na svim njegovim ratnim pohodima, pa tako i 1566. Na sjednici Senata u lipnju te godine odlučeno je da će plemići Junije Pozza i Ivan Palmotta otići u Beograd i tamo dočekati osmansku vojsku. Dobili su vrlo opširne upute kako će se ponašati kad se susretnu sa sultanom i članovima carskog vijeća i što će kome reći i pokloniti.

Pozza i Palmotta u Beograd su odnijeli 30-ak srebrnih plitica i 50-ak komada skupocjenih tkanina, što su bili uobičajeni darovi za sultana, vezire i druge osmanske uglednike na putu na ratište. Pred Sulejmana su stupili u Zemunu, posljednjih dana lipnja. Poklonili su mu 4 plitice i 24 komada atlasa i damasta, čija je ukupna duljina iznosila 140 metara. Iznimno toga puta uslijedio je još jedan dar. Poklisari su u Beograd donijeli i 20 velikih pozlaćenih svijeća, 40 kutija tvrdih bombona začinjjenih korijanderom, sjemenkama pipuna, pinjolima i anisom, oko 70 kilograma limuna, 380 kilograma slatkih naranača te 380 kilograma kiselih, to jest ljutih naranača. Tu je još bilo 20 boca *violeppa*, to jest *gūlaba*, slatkog osvježavajućeg pića od ruže, koje se rabilo i u medicinske svrhe, a pilo se i kao zamjena za vino. Polovina svega toga pripala je sultanu, a ostalo njegovim vezirima i defterdarima.

Dubrovčani nikad prije i nikad kasnije nisu sultanu poklonili agrume, bombone i osvježavajuća pića. Nema sumnje da su 1566. godine mislili na Sulejmanovu visoku životnu dob i na bolesti od kojih je patio. On je zaista bio naklonjen Dubrovniku i može biti da ga se dojmila činjanica da mu je otamo doneseno više od 800 kilograma agruma. Reklo bi se na prvi pogled da su mu Dubrovčani bili potpuno odani, međutim baš je pod Sigetom razotkrivena njihova uobičajena dvostruka igra. Tamo je stiglo pismo kapudan-paše, to jest admirala osmanske flote Piale-paše, s teškim optužbama protiv Republike. Paša je tvrdio da njegov pohod na južnu Italiju nije bio dovoljno uspješan samo zato što su Dubrovčani na vrijeme upozorili tamošnje gradove na opasnost koja im se sprema. Sultan i veziri reagirali su burno.

Dubrovnik je upozoren da više ne smije slati vijesti na Zapad i od njega je zatraženo da Osmanlijama stavi na raspolaganje majstore i materijal za gradnju četiri broda.

Pod Siget je odmah otišao poklisar Mato Stay da pokuša izvući Republiku iz neugodne situacije. Pojediniosti o njegovu poslanstvu nisu sačuvane. Jedino je poznato da je i on sultanu odnio voće i bombone. Stay je bio dubrovački građanin, a moguće je da je izabran zato što vlasti nisu htjele slati plemića direktno na ratište. Na odredište je morao stići otprilike sredinom rujna, dakle u vrijeme kad je sultan Sulejman već bio mrtav, a bitka za Siget okončana.

U svakom slučaju, Stay se našao na izvorištu informacija i sigurno je da je u Dubrovnik donio točne i pouzdane novosti. Podrazumijevalo se da će one biti proslijeđene na Zapad, prije svega papi i španjolskom potkralju Napulja. To se međutim nije dogodilo. Dubrovački opis Sigetske bitke jako nedostaje u ovom izlaganju, a razlozi zašto ga nema poznati su. Zbog iznimno velike opasnosti koja im je zaprijetila, Dubrovčani su na neko vrijeme obustavili slanje vijesti o Osmanlijama. Opasnost je iznikla iz zategnutih odnosa Republike i kapudan-paše Piale-paše.

Naime, nakon neuspješne opsade Malte u ljeto 1565. godine, Piale-paša je nastavio ratovati protiv kršćanske flote na području između tog otoka i južne Italije. U ljeto 1566. bio je u dubrovačkim vodama i baš je otamo na ratište pod Sigetom poslao spomenuto pismo protiv Dubrovčana. Poharao je nekoliko dubrovačkih otoka. U Dubrovniku je zavedeno opsadno stanje, očekivao se osvetnički napad na grad, ali to se ipak nije dogodilo. Situacija je bila teško rješiva jer je dubrovačko upozorenje talijanskim gradovima bilo nemoguće opravdati. Naime, vijesti iz Dubrovnika u Napulj u to je vrijeme nosio stanoviti Vives, rodom iz Barlette. Moguće je da ga je zarobio Piale-paša i da se na taj način našao u Istanbulu, gdje je prihvatio islamsku vjeru i postao prevoditelj Porte za talijanski jezik. On je do najsitnijih pojedinosti opisao na koji su način Dubrovčani napuljskom potkralju dopremali vijesti o Osmanlijama.

Koncem rujna i početkom listopada 1566. potkralj Napulja teško je zamjerio Dubrovčanima što mu više ne šalju vijesti i sigurno je da je pritom mislio na Sigetsku bitku i na kretanje osmanske flote. Dubrovački poklisar odmah je krenuo na put u Napulj, a dužnost mu je bila da objasni da su Dubrovčani zbog prevelike opasnosti obustavili slanje vijesti na Zapad.

U isto to vrijeme na tajnoj sjednici Senata donesena je odluka da će plemići koji se usude Zapadu, to jest Španjolskoj i papi, slati vijesti o Osmanlijama biti kažnjeni gubitkom plemstva i globom od 1.000 zlatnika. Građanima je za takve aktivnosti određena smrtna kazna.

Nekoliko dana kasnije glavni sultanov kušač hrane donio je u Dubrovnik ferman Selima II. u kojem ih službeno obavještava da je stupio na vlast. Takve obavijesti preko fermana, to jest sultanove naredbe, bile su sasvim uobičajene. Dva mjeseca kasnije u Dubrovnik je stigao sultanov prevoditelj Ibrahim s još jednim fermanom (osm. tur. *zafernâme*) u kojem Selim II. obavještava pod kakvim je okolnostima stupio na vlast i ratničkim tonom opisuje pobjede osmanske vojske. To je jedini dosad pronađeni dokument Državnog arhiva u Dubrovniku u kojemu se ukratko opisuje bitka pod Sigetom i pogibija Nikole Šubića Zrinskog.

PODRIJETLO VELIKAŠKOG RODA ZRINSKIH

DAMIR KARBIĆ

Obitelj knezova Zrinskih (mađarski *Zrínyi*), kojoj je pripadao Nikola IV., sigetski heroj, igrala je važnu ulogu i u hrvatskoj i u mađarskoj povijesti, posebice u njezinim političkim, vojnim i kulturnim sferama tijekom ranoga novog vijeka. U tom razdoblju Zrinski su pripadali najvišem sloju aristokracije Ugarsko-Hrvatskog Kraljevstva, i u njegovu hrvatskom i u njegovu ugarskom dijelu, zamjenjujući na određeni način središnju vlast koja se nalazila izvan zemlje. Budući da su bili među najvećim zemljoposjednicima, trošili su znatna financijska sredstva za protuosmansku obranu te gospodarski i kulturni razvoj. Zbog uloge koju su igrali u tom razdoblju, kao i njihovi preci u srednjovjekovnom, pripadnici te obitelji imali su i izuzetan položaj u kasnijem razdoblju kao uzori za formiranje nacionalnog i političkog identiteta u obje zemlje, te su kao takvi bili predmet širokog interesa povjesničara.

S muške strane, knez Nikola IV. bio je izravan potomak staroga hrvatskog aristokratskog roda, knezova Bribirskih, koji potječu iz 11. stoljeća i koji će u 14. stoljeću uzeti rodovsko ime Šubići. Sama obitelj knezova Zrinskih počela je izgrađivati svoj zasebni identitet od 1347., kad se knez Grgur II. Bribirski i Ostrovički uime svojeg nećaka, kneza Jurja IV. Bribirskog (kasniji Juraj I. Zrinski), pokorio kralju Ludoviku Anžuvincu nakon dugog razdoblja neposlušna i zamijenio s kraljem njihov tvrđavni grad Ostrovcu za

Zrin u srednjovjekovnoj Slavoniji. Tim činom knezovi Zrinski privremeno su se udaljili od područja svojega ranijeg političkog djelovanja, srednjovjekovnog Kraljevstva Hrvatske i Dalmacije, gdje su se njihovi preci tijekom 13. i u prvoj polovici 14. stoljeća digli do gotovo vladarskog položaja, i započeli graditi svoj položaj unutar politike i društva srednjovjekovne Slavonije i Ugarske. Ipak, knezovi Zrinski nisu potpuno prekinuli veze ni sa srednjovjekovnom Hrvatskom i njezinim političkim životom ni sa djedovskim sjedištem i posjedima u Bribiru. Sudjelovali su u dinastičkim ratovima između Anžuvina i Luksemburgovaca na kraju 14. i na početku 15. stoljeća, kad su, kao i njihovi rođaci koji su još živjeli u Bribiru, podržavali kraljicu Mariju i njezina supruga kralja Žigmunda. Tijekom tih događaja oni su započeli i povećavati svoje preostale posjede u Bribiru zaključivši ugovor o uzajamnom nasljeđivanju s jednim od svojih srodnika u Bribiru, podbanom Jakovom, koji je pripadao grani Banića, odnosno Nikolića roda Šubića, a čije su posjede u Bribiru i njegovu kneštvu naslijedili nakon Jakovljeve smrti 1456. godine. Čak i ranije od trenutka nasljeđivanja, knezovi Zrinski bili su prisutni u Bribiru i smatrani su zasebnom granom roda s pravom sudjelovanja u upravi bibrirskoga grada i kneštva zajedno s glavama ostalih obitelji (grana). Takav slučaj spominje se 1451., kad je knez Pavao II. Zrinski zajedno s podbanom Jakovom iz grane Banića, knezom Ugrinom iz grane Ugrinića, knezom Petrom iz grane Obradića i knezom Pavlom iz grane Stojnića, odnosno Markovića, kao predstavnik roda prosvjedovao pred kninским kaptolom protiv napada nekih neprijatelja na njihove posjede i sam Bribir. Drugi sličan slučaj, jedini u kojem je pripadnost knezova Zrinskih rodu Šubića izravno izrečena od nekog među njima, povezan je s knezom Nikolom III., ocem kneza Nikole IV., koji je 1514., zajedno s ostalim glavama rodovskih ogranaka (Juraj Krivčić, Krsto Krivčić, Stjepan Ugrinović, Petar Obradić, Juraj Stojić *ceterique nobiles de genere Subyeh*), obećao da će nastaviti podržavati i štititi franjevački samostan u Bribiru i druge samostane koje su osnovali članovi roda. To obećanje prihvatila je generalna uprava reda, a upravo je knez Nikola III., koji se u tom dokumentu naziva Comes Nicolaus Slubyth de Zrin, pismom franjevačkoga generalnog ministra 1517. obavijestio o tome. Pripadnost rodu inače su i knezovi Zrinski potvrdili trajnom uporabom heraldičkih simbola roda (orlova krila).

S majčine strane, knez Nikola IV. pripadao je drugoj hrvatskoj aristokratskoj obitelji, knezovima Krbavskim od roda Gušića, s kojom je obitelji

obitelj knezova Zrinskih već i ranije ostvarila više bračnih veza (knezovi Krbavski sami po ženskoj liniji bili su potomci predaka knezova Zrinskih, a od njihova preseljenja u Slavoniju gotovo svaka generacija ušla je u neki brak s pripadnicima knezova Krbavskih). S majčine strane, knez Nikola IV. bio je povezan i s Frankapanima, drugom hrvatskom aristokratskom obitelji, i s Nelipićima, obitelji knezova Cetinskih, dok je s očeve strane potjecao i od knezova Blagajskih (a također ponovo i od Frankapana). Sve te obitelji, uključujući samu obitelj knezova Zrinskih, pripadale su najvišem sloju hrvatske aristokracije i samom vrhu aristokracije Ugarsko-Hrvatskoga Kraljevstva općenito, ali njihove međusobno povezane bračne strategije svjedoče da su njihovi glavni politički i posjedovni interesi još uvijek bili ograničeni na područja srednjovjekovne Hrvatske i Dalmacije i južna područja srednjovjekovne Slavonije. Ipak, to će se jako promijeniti upravo u razdoblju kneza Nikole IV., kad će se obitelj razviti u aristokratsku obitelj mnogo šireg utjecaja i interesa, ostvarujući i bračne veze s mađarskim, češkim i austrijskim obiteljima sličnog statusa i interesa.

PROMJENE U PROSTORNOM RASPOREDU POSJEDA I UTVRDA ZRINSKIH U 16. I 17. STOLJEĆU

DRAGUTIN FELETAR

U ovome radu bit će popisana barem većina posjeda i utvrda koje su bile pod upravom (ili vlasnosti) obitelji Zrinski u 16. i 17. stoljeću te će se utvrditi promjene u prostornom rasporedu. To je doba kad je Hrvatska zbog osmanskih osvajanja svedena na *reliquiae reliquiarum*. Dakle, na dinamiku posjedovnih odnosa, uz mijenjanje aktivnosti i pozicije Zrinskih u tadašnjem društvu, velik utjecaj imale su i stalne ratne prilike i promjene granica. S obzirom na činjenicu da su Zrinski posjedovali oko petine teritorija tadašnje Hrvatske, a imali su i znatne posjede u južnoj Ugarskoj, promjene na gruntnovnoj karti Zrinskih bile su stalne i mnogobrojne, kako u broju i veličini (značenju) pojedinih posjeda i utvrda, tako i u njihovu prostornom rasporedu. Zato se istraživanje pokazalo kao mukotrпно i dugotrajno, pa rezultati koje ovdje iznosimo nisu nikako konačni, a niz postavki nije čvršće dokazan. Rad se oslanja uglavnom na dosadašnja istraživanja Josipa Adamčeka, Geze Palffyja, Szabolcsa Varge, Nataše Štefanec, Milana Kruheka, Darka Varge, Hrvoja Petrića i Dragutina Feletara.

Dinamiku stjecanja posjeda Zrinskih i promjene u prostornom rasporedu na tlu Dalmacije, Hrvatske, Slavonije i Ugarske može se pratiti kroz nekoliko karakterističnih razdoblja ili etapa. Razdoblje roda Šubića Bribirskih (1. etapa) vezano je za posjede u Bribiru, Ostrovici i širem šibenskom zaleđu. Od župana bribirskih Vukila i Marmonje Šubića s početka 12. stoljeća, pa sve do Grgura X. Krivčića na kraju 15. stoljeća, rod Šubića stekao je ugled i posjede koji su ga svrstali među vodeće plemićke obitelji tadašnje Dalmacije i Bosne – bili su knezovi bribirski, trogirski, kninski, splitski, kliški, pa i banovi hrvatski i bosanski (žena Tvrtka I. bila je iz roda Šubića).

Već u tom razdoblju počinje i penetracija moći Šubića prema središnjoj Hrvatskoj. Razlog je bilo širenje utjecaja i na dijelove Hrvatske i Slavonije, ali i zbog pojave osmanske opasnosti s istoka. Presudan korak prema širenju u Pounje i susjedne krajeve učinio je Juraj III. Šubić (ili Juraj I. Zrinski), koji je 30. srpnja 1347. kupio utvrdu Zrin. Zbog gubitka dalmatinskih posjeda krajem 15. i početkom 16. stoljeća, to se razdoblje (2. etapa) može ocijeniti i kao gubljenje središnje pozicije Zrinskih u korpusu hrvatskoga plemstva. Ipak, posjedi u Pounju, gdje su Zrinski sagradili nove i proširili stare utvrde te kovali novac u rudniku srebra u Gvozdanskom, bili su vrlo važni za pozicioniranje u tadašnjim strukturama plemićkih obitelji i vlasti.

Martirij pounjskih imanja završio je praktički već polovicom 16. stoljeća, iako su Zrinski formalno branili Zrin sve do 1592. godine. Naime, Osmanlije su Dubicu osvojili već 1538., a Kostajnicu 1556., dok se i u slavonskom međurječju 1552. granica pomiče na zapad sve do Kloštra Podravskog i Čazme. Zbog gubljenja pounjskih posjeda, rodu Zrinskih prijetio je krah, ali se to nije dogodilo. Tada se javlja Nikola IV. (1510. – 1566.), koji rod Zrinskih ne samo da podiže iz pepela nego ga uzdiže do najmoćnije plemićke obitelji tadašnje Hrvatske i Ugarske.

Po rezultatima koje je priskrbio svojoj obitelji, Nikola IV. bio je očito najvažniji član roda Zrinskih u njegovoj povijesti. Osnovicu za renesansu stvara mu njegov otac Nikola III. Zrinski, koji se oženio Jelenom Karlović iz znamenitoga roda kneževa Krbavskih (Gušići Kurjakovići). Nikola III. sklapa 20. veljače 1509. s Ivanom Karlovićem ugovor o međusobnom nasljeđivanju. Bio je to vrlo mudar potez jer – kako piše ugarski povjesnik Ferenc Szalamon – „Zrinski tada pripadaju drugoj ligi regionalne aristokracije“. Dovoljno je reći da su kralju Korvinu na početku 16. stoljeća Karlovići osiguravali 200 opremljenih konjanika, Frankopani 100, Blagajski 50, a Zrinski tek 20 viteza.

U tom razdoblju (3. etapa) Zrinski 1531. dobivaju Karlovićeva imanja Medvedgrad, Susedgrad, Lukavec i okolice te posjede oko Vrbovca, Rakovca i Dubrave. Bila je to solidna odskočna daska za daljnje širenje, koje je značaki proveo Nikola IV.

Istovremeno (4. etapa) Zrinski dobivaju i velika imanja ivanovaca u jugozapadnoj Slavoniji. Tu je posjede imao Vranski priorijat (sjedište je do 1312. bilo u Marči), a početkom 16. stoljeća tamo su funkciju svjetovnih upravitelja obavljali Zrinski, pa su nakon ukidanja ivanovaca 1528. godine dobili velika imanja u Pakracu i okolici te u Božjakovini. Konačno kralj Ferdinand 18. siječnja 1541. daruje Pakrac zauvijek Nikoli IV. Zrinskom (no Pakrac je već 1543. pao u ruke Osmanlija i tu je bilo sjedište Pakračkog sandžaka).

Do najvećeg širenja posjeda Zrinskih došlo je povezivanjem s velikaškom obitelji knezova Krčkih Frankopan polovicom 16. stoljeća (5. etapa). Nikola IV. ženi se Katarinom Frankopan 1543. godine (koja mu je rodila 13 djece, a sedam kćeri bilo je udano za najpoznatije ugarske vlasteline). Već 1544. Nikola IV. sklapa ugovor o nasljeđivanju sa Stjepanom III. Frankopanom, koji obnavlja 1550., te odmah dobiva imanje oko Ozlja, Dubovca, Grobnika, Bakra, Hreljina i okolnih krajeva. Stjepan III. Frankopan umire bez nasljednika 1577. godine, pa tada Juraj IV. Zrinski dobiva nova imanja oko Ribnika, Severina, Broda na Kupu te u Vinodolu i okolici.

Usporedno sa širenjem na frankopanska imanja, Nikola IV. Zrinski kao glavni organizator obrane od Osmanlija i uspješan vojnik sam kupuje nove posjede ili ih dobiva za zasluge u ratu ili obavljanju banske i drugih dužnosti (6. etapa). To su ponajprije posjedi u sjevernoj i južnoj Ugarskoj. Zbog dugova za držanje vojske i vođenje obrane, kralj daruje 1546. Nikoli IV. Zrinskom Međimurje, a on gradi velebni dvorac u utvrđi Čakovec i tamo seli svoje sijelo. Stvara i Legradsku kapetaniju te utvrđuje granicu na Muri koju Osmanlije nikad nisu uspjeli trajnije probiti. Nikola IV. i njegovi nasljednici proširuju Zrinsku kneževinu na posjede u Ugarskoj, pogotovo oko Körmennda (s velikim vlastelinstvom Monyorökerek), Čurgova, Breznica te Sigeta i Svetoga Lovrenca u Šomođu i Baranji.

Širenje zrinskih posjeda završavaju posljednji Zrinski u drugoj polovici 17. stoljeća (7. etapa). Temelji tog širenja udareni su već za Nikole IV. Sigetskog, jer je kao kapetan Sigeta upravljao golemim poreznim kotarima u Šomođu, Baranji i Slavoniji. Potom je njegov praunuk Nikola III. velikom zimskom vojnom 1664. potaknuo pitanje ponovne podjele posjeda u tom po-

dručju. Doista, dokumenti govore o posjedima Adama Zrinskog (odnosno njegove majke Sofije Löbl) u tom području sve do pogibije 1691. godine. Radi se o velikim imanjima oko Sigeta, Pečuha, Mohača, Belog Manastira i Kneževih Vinograda te u sjeveroistočnoj Slavoniji. Koliko su se stvarno Zrinski mogli koristiti tim posjedima u zadnjoj fazi osmanske okupacije, treba istražiti (ti su krajevi oslobođeni uglavnom oko 1690. godine).

Tijekom navedenih sedam uvjetnih etapa širenja, imanja Zrinskih proširila su se u gotovo sva područja Hrvatske i južne Ugarske. Samo na području „ostatka ostataka“ Hrvatske, dakle nakon stabilizacije granica mirom na Žitvi 1606. godine, posjedi Zrinskih prostirali su se na oko 3.350 km². To znači da su zauzimali oko 19,9% tadašnje Hrvatske, čija se površina smanjila na ukupno oko 16.800 km². Posjedi Zrinskih bili su nešto gušće naseljeni nego ostali krajevi Hrvatske, pa se procjenjuje da je na njima živjelo oko 170.000 stanovnika ili oko 26,6% (procjenjuje se da je tada u Hrvatskoj živjelo oko 640.000 stanovnika). Zrinski su izborili pravo da se stanovništvo iz njihovih posjeda može preseljavati (na nova imanja ili drugamo), ali i doseljavati s drugih područja. To je dodatno intenziviralo velike migracije stanovništva uglavnom od jugoistoka prema sjeverozapadu, koje je izazvano osmanskim osvajanjima. Posljedice tih migracija i miješanja stanovništva osjećaju se još i danas.

Veliki posjedi Zrinskih praktički su funkcionirali kao zaokružena upravna i gospodarska cjelina (kneževina), čak neko vrijeme i sa svojim novcem. Zrinski su organizirali za ono vrijeme vrlo moderno gospodarenje, čak bi se moglo reći da su bili preteče merkantilizma. Glavni prihodi nisu se alimentirali iz agrarne proizvodnje nego iz trgovine. Zrinski su bili najveći trgovci stokom i žitaricama, pa drvom, solju i drugim proizvodima. Samo sa znamenitih sajmova stokom u Legradu gonilo se do vlastite zrinske luke u Bakru i više od 20.000 grla godišnje te izvozilo u Veneciju. Često se na taj promet nije plaćao porez caru (jer je on opet dugovao za izdržavanje vojske), što je izazivalo velike napetosti. Preko zrinskih imanja vodio je karavanski put od Čakovca preko Božjakovine, Dubovca, Severina, Broda, Delnica i Lovki na Hreljin i Bakar. Drugi po važnosti prihod ostvarivao se od rudarstva i metalurgije, ranije u Gvozdanskom, a potom u Medvedgradu i osobito u Čabru. U čabarskoj metalurgiji radilo je i više od 300 kovača, a željezarska roba izvozila se u Veneciju. Zrinski su uredili i prvi makadamski put preko hrvatskoga prometnog gorskog praga, koji je od Čabra vodio preko Gerova,

Lasca i Kamenjaka prema Grobniku i luci u Bakru. Treći izvor prihoda bile su brojne mitnice te arende od iznajmljenog zemljišta, mlinova, brodova i skela te raznih prava na trgovanje. Tek na četvrtom mjestu bile su razne vlastelinske daće, među kojima je bila najvažnija daća u vinu (gornica).

Rad je opremljen primijenjenim kartama.

MIGRACIJE ZRINSKIH I STRATEGIJE ODRŽANJA RODA U VRIJEME NIKOLE IV. ZRINSKOG

NATAŠA ŠTEFANEC

Došavši na prostor Pounja i Zrinske gore polovinom 14. stoljeća, Šubići Bribirski zatekli su plodne zemlje, naseljene posjede i izdašne rudnike. Pod novim imenom ubrzo je započela nova, iznimno uspješna etapa povijesti roda, koja je okončana 1670-ih. Tu se etapu okvirno može podijeliti na dvije faze. U prvoj fazi, koja je trajala do 1550-ih, glavno sjedište Zrinskih bilo je u Pounju. U drugoj fazi težište se pomaknulo na sjeverniji hrvatsko-slavonski prostor (Vinodol, Ozaljsko i Ribničko vlastelinstvo i sl.) te na nekoliko ugarskih vlastelinstava, od kojih se, uz vlastelinstva Vép i Monyorókerék, najvažnijim pokazalo Čakovečko vlastelinstvo, nazivano i Međimurje (*Murinsel*, *Muraköz*).

Prva faza: Zrinski u Pounju i na obroncima Zrinske gore do 1550-ih

Zrinski su vrlo uspješno svladali izazove preseljenja u Pounje i na obronke Zrinske gore. Otegotne okolnosti te prve velike migracije, među koje spada i sustavna osmanska prijetnja od polovine 15. stoljeća, prebrođene su zahvaljujući i bogatim rudnicima. Petar II. Zrinski u ožujku 1463. od kralja Matije dobio je regal za kopanje rudače, bez obveze plaćanja posebnih naknada za tu povlasticu. Već je i sam Petar provodio dane stražareći na Uni, a to su činili i njegovi nasljednici idućih stotinjak godina. Rudnici su im bili presudno važni. Omogućivali su financiranje jake privatne vojske, ali i bogaćenje, odnosno prikupljanje kapitala u gotovini, koji je kasnije poslužio za stvaranje novih pozicija na sigurnijem sjeveru.

Nikola III. Zrinski (†1534.) nastavio je politiku svojega oca te je, uz dozvolu vladara, čak uspio otvoriti kovnicu vlastitog novca (1529.). Ipak, on je i prvi koji je počeo razrađivati rezervni plan. Sredinom 1520-ih ponudio je

nadvojvodi Ferdinandu da preuzme obranu nekih njegovih utvrda (Novigrad i Dobra Njiva), a pokušao je i zamijeniti dio posjeda za sigurnije zemlje u Istri. Sklapao je separatna primirja s Osmanlijama, koji su preko njegove zemlje odlazili pljačkati druga vlastelinstva. Optužbe za nelojalnost kršćanstvu opravdavao je teškim okolnostima i pokušajima održanja svojega roda. Nakon njegove smrti ojačali su osmanski napadi na Pounje, a pala je i prva utvrda na Uni, Dubica (1538.).

Njegov sin, Nikola IV. Zrinski (1508. – 1566.), potpuno se fokusirao na nalaženje izlaza iz Pounja. S Osmanlijama više nije šurovao. Odmah je založio rudnike i talionice (1534.), jer se time oslobodio vođenja kompliciranog poslovanja i dobivao gotov novac. Do 1550-ih je nastavio kovati vlastiti novac, što je do tada bila uhodana aktivnost. Budući da se prihvatio zahtjevne banske dužnosti (1542. – 1556.), gotovina mu je bila nužno potrebna za financiranje vojnih pothvata, posebno u vremenima u kojima je banska plaća uglavnom kasnila. Umjesto upravi i očuvanju posjeda u Pounju i na Zrinskoj gori, okrenuo se vojnim aktivnostima i pokušajima da očuva rod. Namjere je uspješno realizirao do 1550-ih kroz niz važnih i dalekosežnih poteza.

Druga faza – udaljavanje Zrinskih od Pounja i stjecanje novih posjeda i društvenih veza

1. Nikola je bansku dužnost prihvatio u vrijeme nakon pada Dubice, kad obitelj još nije bila dovoljno osigurana na sigurnijem sjeveru. Jedno od mogućih rješenja za očuvanje središnjih posjeda Zrinskih u Pounju bila je pojačana vojna i obrambena aktivnost. U konkretnom slučaju, preuzimanje banske službe značilo je da Nikola Zrinski svoje posjede neće morati braniti samo privatnom vojskom. Preko pozicije bana mogao se izravno koristiti vojskom Kraljevstva.

2. Sukladno strategiji svojeg oca, Nikola IV. naveliko je radio na obiteljskim ugovorima o nasljeđivanju s uglednim velikašima u Kraljevstvu. Jedan takav ugovor sklopio je još Nikola III. s Ivanom Karlovićem Krbavskim 1509. (i 1527.) godine. Budući da je bio oženjen s Ivanovom sestrom Jelenom, ugovorio je da rod koji prvi izumre svoje posjede ostavlja onom drugom rodu. Smrću bana Ivana 1531. godine Zrinski su dobili znatne posjede u Pounju i središnjoj Hrvatskoj. Sličan ugovor Nikola IV. Zrinski sklopio je nakon ženidbe (1543.) s Katarinom Frankopan. Uglavio ga je početkom veljače 1544. godine s Katarininim bratom Stjepanom Frankopanom Ozaljskim. Dopune

ugovoru uslijedile su 1550., kad su Zrinski stekli Stjepanove posjede Ozalj, Dubovac, Grobnik, Bakar i Hreljin, a zatim i 1562. Nakraju, Zrinski su Stjepanovom smrću 1577. naslijedili velike posjede te bogate grane Frankopana. Time su stekli sigurnu bazu u sjevernim krajevima.

3. Nikola IV. koristio se i znatnim kapitalom u gotovini, prikupljenim zahvaljujući rudnicima i kovnici. Uzeo je u zakup brojne posjede Vranskog priorata i financirao veliku vlastitu vojsku. Godinama je sam financirao banske izdatke, a taj je dug naplatio kad mu je kralj Ferdinand I. predao na uživanje Čakovečko vlastelinstvo u zamjenu za neisplaćene banske plaće (1546.). Radilo se o strateški najvažnijem dobitku Zrinskih.

4. Pomak Zrinskih na sjever pojačao je i zamjenom imanja s Petrom Erdődyjem, slijedom prijateljstva i (inače poništenih) zaruka svojega sina Jurja IV. i Petrove kćeri Ane. Nikola je, ugovorom o zamjeni iz veljače 1557. godine, dobio vlastelinstvo Monyorókerék u županiji Vas (*Željezo, Casterferrei*) s gradovima Monyorókerék i Vörösvár te vlastelinstvo Csurgó u županiji Zala s gradovima Csurgó, Csatar i Paka. U zamjenu je dao Medvedgrad u Zagrebačkoj i Rakovac u Križevačkoj županiji te golemu svotu od 10.000 forinti i mužar vrijedan 1.000 forinti. Zamjena je funkcionirala do 1613., kad je poništena. Do tada su Zrinski već bili ugledna, utjecajna i u visokoj politici nezaobilazna obitelj u cijelom Ugarskom Kraljevstvu.

5. Osmanski napadi u Pounju baš su se tih ključnih 1550-ih dodatno intenzivirali. Zrinski je, stoga, sve svoje utvrde u Pounju i na Zrinskoj gori predao u kraljevske ruke, čime je, *de facto*, odustao od njihove obrane. One se od tada vode u sustavu tzv. *Nove kranjske i hrvatske krajine od Bihaća do Siska* (prema dokumentima iz 1559.). Godina 1560-ih i 1570-ih vode se u sustavu Hrvatske krajine, ali izvan kapetanija, kao segment tzv. *zrinskih utvrda*. Da je Nikola IV. uzmaknuo u zadnji mogući čas, svjedoči i skori pad većeg dijela zrinskog Pounja pod Osmanlije, od Kostajnice (1556.) do Lješnice (1558) i Krupe (1565.). Još su neko vrijeme opstali samo posjedi oko Zrina i Gvozdanškog, koje je do nesretne 1577./8. branio kranjski zapovjednik.

6. Osim navedenog, Nikola IV. Zrinski povukao je još jedan sudbinski potez. Zahvalio se na banskoj časti (naslijedio ga je Petar Erdődy) te je preuzeo hijerarhijski nižu i neugledniju dužnost kapetana Sigeta (1561. – 1566.). Njegov sin Juraj IV. također će sin mu Juraj IV. svoje su brojne kćeri i sestre pouđavali u važne obitelji (Batthyány, Nádasdy, Bánffy, Thurzó, Teleky,

Perény, Homonay, Thurn, Lenković, Forgách itd.), a i sami su se oženili plemkinjama iz aristokratskog vrha (češka obitelj Rožemberk, austrijska obitelj Stubenberg). Posjedovna moć stečena složenom migracijom obitelji na sigurniji sjever bila je tako kompletirana društvenim vezama diljem Ugarskoga Kraljevstva i šire.

NIKOLA ZRINSKI, HRVATSKI BAN I BRANITELJ TVRĐAVE SIGET 1566. GODINE

ANĐELKO MIJATOVIĆ

Knez Nikola Zrinski, potomak stoljećima najstarijih hrvatskih velikaških rodova knezova Bribirskih Šubića i već više od jednoga stoljeća poznatoga velikaškog roda Zrinskih, hrvatski ban (1543. – 1556.), glasoviti ratnik i iskusni protuosmanlijski strateg, tajni kraljevski savjetnik, kapetan Sigeta i vrhovni kapetan Zadunavlja u jugozapadnoj Ugarskoj, magister kraljevskih tavernika u Ugarskoj i član Dvorskoga ratnoga vijeća, jedan je od najuglednijih hrvatskih velikaša i jedan od najslavnijih povijesnih osoba u hrvatskoj i mađarskoj političkoj i vojnoj povijesti srednjega i novoga vijeka te jedan od najuglednijih ljudi svoga vremena u Habsburškoj Monarhiji. Tu nadasve povijesnu osobu moglo bi se prikazivati s više polazišta, u ovoj prigodi bit će govora samo o njezinoj ulozi u pružanju otpora osmanlijskim osvajanjima.

Rođen je u prvoj polovini 1508. godine od oca Nikole i majke Jelene u Zrinu u Pounju, gdje knezovi Bribirski Šubići od 1347., aktivno sudjelujući u hrvatskoj povijesti, izgrađuju svoj novi velikaški identitet pod imenom knezova Zrinskih, čiji su brojni pripadnici kroz stoljeća izginuli u obrani domovine ili su pogubljeni zbog obrane njezinih interesa.

Kad je Nikola Zrinski rođen, hrvatske su zemlje, u sastavu zemalja ugarske krune sv. Stjepana od 1102., branjene na Cetini, u dolini Vrbasa i na Spreči te u Mačvanskoj banovini. Stasao je i djelovao u najtežem razdoblju hrvatske prošlosti, u vremenu hrvatskoga uzmicanja s navedenih obrambenih pozicija sve do Virovitice i Čazme 1552., kad su ih Osmanlije osvojili, te u ozračju gubitaka djedovskih i vlastitih posjeda u osmanlijskim osvajanjima.

U trenutku traženja novoga vladara, nakon pogibije češkoga i hrvatsko-ugarskoga kralja Ljudevita II. 1526. na Mohačkom polju, Nikola III., otac Nikole Sigetskoga jedan je od izbornika austrijskoga nadvojvode Ferdinanda Habsburgovca za hrvatskoga kralja 1. siječnja 1527. u Cetinu. Iste godine, s

dvadesetak godina, spominje se i Nikola Zrinski kao privrženik kralja Ferdinanda i sa starijim bratom Ivanom zdušno ratuje protiv pristaša hrvatsko-ugarskog kralja Ivana Zapoljskoga (1527. – 1540.). Dvije godine kasnije, 1529., kao dvadesetdvoгодиšnjak, u vrijeme prve osmanlijske opsade Beča, istaknuo se u borbi s Osmanlijama te ga je španjolski kralj i rimsko-njemački car Karlo V. Habsburgovac nagradio konjem i zlatom. Kao ratnik, zapovjednik i strateg vojujuće Hrvatske svoga vremena, Nikola Zrinski Sigetski potvrdivao se skoro četiri desetljeća u obrani hrvatskih i ugarskih zemalja pred osmanlijskim osvajanjima.

Prema Osmanlijama vodio je aktivnu obranu, na njihova pustošenja njegovih posjeda napadao je i pustošio područja pod njihovom vlašću. Na vrhuncu moći raspolagao je gradovima i posjedima od Bakra u Primorju do Pounja, današnje zapadne Slavonije, Međimurja i Zadunavlja. U njegovo vrijeme rod Zrinski postaje jedan od ključnih velikaških rodova u Hrvatskom Kraljevstvu, Ugarskom Kraljevstvu i Habsburškoj Monarhiji, sve do konačnog zatora toga roda u drugoj polovini XVII. stoljeća.

Krajem 1542. godine, tridesetčetverogodišnji Nikola Zrinski, već iskusen ratnik i tada jedini muški pripadnik svoga roda, postao je dalmatinsko-hrvatsko-slavonski ban, u najteže razdoblje 16. stoljeća u Hrvata. Do tada, Osmanlije su zauzeli područje južno od Velebita, Krbavu (1527.) i Liku (1528.) do Pounja u sastavu Kraljevine Hrvatske te područje Kraljevine Slavonije do Osijeka, Našica, Požeštine, Cernika i Novske uključno. Dok Osmanlije napadaju s tisućama i desetinama tisuća ratnika, hrvatske i kraljevske snage broje se u stotinama i rijetko u tisućama. Osobito je radio na izgradnji obrane hrvatskih zemalja, poticao je gradnju i popravak utvrda, u njih smještao posade i opskrbljivao ih hranom itd. Godinama nije dobivao obveznu kraljevu novčanu potporu, troškove obrane i ratovanja snosio je godinama sam, pa je i davao ostavku na povjerenu mu bansku čast.

Poznatiji su bojevi Nikole Zrinskoga protiv Osmanlija: za Zrin (1540.) i Peštu (1542.), kod Šomolja (1543.), Konjšćine (1544.), Varaždina (1553.), za Siget i Bobovac i Korotnu (1556). Za vrijeme borbi 1556. Osmanlije su osvojili dva grada Zrinskoga – Kostajnicu (16. srpnja), „glavna vrata Hrvatske“, kako se nazivalo tu tvrđavu, s razlogom se sumnjalo u izdaju, i Novi u Pounju, povjereni obrani kraljevskih snaga. Povrijeđen takvim nepovoljnim zbivanjima i gubitkom posjeda u Pounju, ne dobivanjem pripadajuće potpore za obranu i željan da se posveti svojim sjevernim posjedima, Zrinski se konač-

no potkraj 1556. odrekao banske časti, nakon 14 godina njezina obnašanja, a vladar ju je prihvatio na Božić iste godine. Kao dalmatinsko-hrvatsko-slavonski ban (1543. – 1556.) Zrinski je u vrlo nepovoljnim prilikama obranio i spasio ostatke hrvatskih zemalja od konačnoga osmanlijskog osvajanja.

Povlačenjem s banske časti, Zrinski više boravi na svojim sjevernim posjedima u Međimurju i Zadunavlju. Povjerena mu je obnova i opskrba Sigeta hranom, naoružanjem i drugim borbenim sredstvima, kad to, zbog stalne osmanlijske opasnosti, nije bilo lako. Iako je u veljači 1557. zapovjedništvo nad gradom predao novom zapovjedniku, Siget je i dalje bio njegova briga s raznim obvezama. Posebno je radio na obnovi fortifikacijskog prstena oko Sigeta. Sve je to dosta pridonijelo njegovu vrlo intenzivnom uključivanju u politički život Kraljevine Ugarske. Ujesen 1557. postao je magister kraljevskih tavernika u Kraljevini Ugarskoj, u listopadu 1561. kapetan Sigeta i 1563. vrhovni kapetan Zadunavlja. Kao sigetski kapetan osobito je vodio brigu o izgradnji i opskrbi tvrđave. Pod njegovim zapovjedništvom bile su i posade u okolnim utvrdama Bobovcu, Breznici, Barču, Izvaru i Csurgőu. Da bi onemogućio gradnju osmanlijske tvrđave u Podravskoj Moslavini, Zrinski je s još nekim kapetanima u ožujku 1562. prešao Dravu kraj Martincea i kod Podravske Moslavine porazio Osmanlije, porušio započete radove i zaplijenio dosta teškoga naoružanja i drugoga plijena.

Imenovanjem vrhovnim kapetanom Zadunavlja (1563.) Zrinski je u svojoj osobi objedinio čast sigetskoga kapetana i vrhovnoga zadunavskog kapetana koji je upravljao područjem između Blatnog jezera i Drave, s ovlastima državnoga vrhovnog kapetana na povjerenom mu području. Svim tim ovlastima Zrinski se izvrsno koristio da bi započetu gradnju sigetske utvrde dovršio u skladu sa suvremenim ratnim standardima i priskrbio sredstva za njezino uzdržavanje.

Svoje životno i domoljubno djelo Zrinski je zapečatio 1566. odlučnom obranom Sigeta, jednom od prekretnica u osmanlijskim osvajanjima u Europi i svijetu. Iako je mogao prepustiti zapovjedništvo drugome, to nije učinio, nego je, kao iskusan zapovjednik, poduzeo sve potrebno da bi uspješno obranio povjerenu mu tvrđavu. Siget je opskrbio naoružanjem i s dovoljno hrane za četiri mjeseca nadajući se da će mu kralj Maksimilijan II. sa svojom vojskom priskočiti u pomoć. Osmanlije su nadmoćnim snagama, s oko 90.000 – 100.000 vojnika i 200 – 300 topova, predvođeni sultanom Sulejmanom i velikim vezirom Sokolovićem, četrdesetak dana napadali Siget. Tvrđavu je

branila relativno mala skupina branitelja, njih 2.300 i nekoliko više, kako je zapisao tajnik Zrinskoga Franjo Črnko, većinom Hrvati, podanici Zrinskoga s njegovih posjeda iz Hrvatske i Zadunavlja; sa sigetskim građanima u tvrđavi se nalazilo ukupno 4.300 osoba. Zrinski je poduzeo sve što je jedan zapovjednik trebao poduzeti u sličnoj prilici, proglasio je ratne odredbe i dao potrebne upute posadi. Napadi na Siget počeli su 31. srpnja, a nastavljeni su s manjim ili većim intenzitetom, sve do njegova zauzimanja 7. rujna. Nakon što su 9. kolovoza napustili obranu Novoga grada, u Starom gradu branitelji su se održali do 19. kolovoza, nanoseći velike gubitke napadačima, ali i sami trpeći teška stradanja, kad su se, također s teškim posljedicama, povukli u najstariji dio sigetske fortifikacije, Tvrđavu. Tu su nastavili pružati otpor do 7. rujna, kad su s još živućim sigetskim građanima, u skućenom prostoru, izranjeni i iscrpljeni, bez hrane i vode, odbili sve pozive na predaju i sa zapovjednikom Zrinskim poduzeli ispad iz Tvrđave te, osim sedmorice, izginuli, dok su civili odvedeni u zarobljeništvo.

U borbama za Siget izginulo je veliko mnoštvo pripadnika osmanlijske vojske, od čega 25.000 pripadnika posebnih rodova janjičara i spahija, glavnih nositelja osmanlijskih osvajanja, a zadnjih dana obrane umro je i sultan Sulejman. Zbog tih i velikih logističkih gubitaka, osmanlijska vojska nije mogla napredovati prema Srednjoj Europi nego se povukla u svoja polazišta. Bila je to prva prekretnica u osmanlijskim osvajanjima, čemu je pridonijela žrtva Nikole Zrinskoga i sigetskih branitelja općenito. Ta najslavnija epizoda iz starije hrvatske i mađarske prošlosti, kad su sigetski branitelji odbili sve pozive na predaju i radije izabrali smrt, postala je epopeja i ostavila duboke tragove u svim oblicima društvenoga djelovanja i života u Hrvata i drugih naroda ugroženih osmanlijskim osvajanjima. Središnji lik svih tih zbivanja i manifestacija jest sigetski zapovjednik Nikola Zrinski, najslavniji ratnički lik u hrvatskoj povijesti, pojam i uzor domoljublja, ne samo u Hrvata i Mađara nego i u drugih naroda.

OPSADA SIGETA 1566. GODINE – OBAVJEŠTAJNA ORGANIZACIJA NIKOLE IV. ZRINSKOGA I DUH VREMENA

KREŠIMIR KUŽIĆ

Opsada utvrde Siget i pogibija grofa Nikole IV. Zrinskoga (1508. – 1566.), zapovjednika obrane grada, događaji su koje već 450 godina privlače pozor-

nost ne samo povjesničara, književnika i umjetnika. Jedna od neobrađenih tema jest obavještajno djelovanje i prosudbe Zrinskoga prilikom obrane Sigeta. Tome nasuprot analizirana su djela iz astrologije koja se bave vremenom oko 1566. godine.

Već iz prvih riječi u dnevniku Ferenc Črnka stječemo predodžbu o Nikoli kao razboritom vojnom zapovjedniku svjesnom važnosti pravovremenog izvješćivanja o neprijateljskim aktivnostima. Nema sumnje da je Nikola IV. nastavio održavati obavještajnu mrežu naslijeđenu od prethodnih zapovjednika. Njegove su uhode bile u Pečuhu i Osijeku, kao i u Sarajevu i Beogradu, a osim njih imao je doušnika i među Osmancima. Iz imena tih naselja otkriva nam se dubina područja interesa Zrinskoga. Iz ranog razdoblja njegove vojne karijere znamo da je Zrinski već imao uhodarsku mrežu, a istim se obavještajnim disciplinama služio i dok je bio hrvatski ban (1542. – 1556.). Iako je bavljenje uhodarenjem bilo za život opasno, ipak je uvijek bilo osoba koje su za novac prikupljale informacije s one strane granice.

Nikola IV. odlikovao se u još jednom detalju kao mudar zapovjednik i organizator obavještajnog djelovanja. Naime, ni u spomenutom dnevniku ni u drugim spisima s njegovim potpisom ne nalazi se nijedno ime ili podrijetlo uhode ili doušnika koji je bio dio obavještajne mreže. Iz toga se može zaključiti da su njegovi špijuni bili angažirani u duljem razdoblju, pa im je bila potrebna dugoročna konspiracija, a to u konačnici znači da su bili solidno plaćeni. Upravo novčana naknada za sve opasnosti kojima su bili izloženi bila je najosjetljiviji dio u konstrukciji obavještajne potpore vojnih aktivnosti. Svjestan toga, Zrinski je s pravom sugerirao da se u razdobljima mira smanji plaća vojnicima, ali i da se poveća uhodama.

Akcija prema Šiklošu odličan je primjer obavještajne pripreme i odlučnog zapovijedanja, a ujedno je i klasičan primjer akcije kojoj je temeljni cilj odvlačenje neprijatelja od glavnog cilja napada. Zrinski je preko vanjskih uhoda i vlastitih dubinskih izvidnika raspolagao preciznim pregledom stanja i ponašanja pridošlih osmanskih postrojbi, pa nije propustio zadati bolan udarac Sulejmanovim snagama. Time ne samo što je postigao odličan taktički uspjeh nego je izravno utjecao i na strateškoj razini i usmjerio djelovanje neprijatelja u pravcu koji je davao vremena da se prikupi glavnina carskih snaga.

Već je Ptolomej razlikovao dvije astrologije – *a. naturalis (doctrinalis)* i *a. divinatoria (iudiciaria)*, s tim da je prva proučavala vrste i kretanje nebeskih

tijela, a druga njihov utjecaj na Zemlju i živa bića, uključujući i čovjeka, u izravnom i neizravnom smislu.

Ne smije se zanemariti ni tradicijski ukorijenjeno vjerovanje o zlokobnom utjecaju pojave kometa. Kad su ih tijekom 1566. u nekoliko navrata uočili na nebu, odmah su se proširile glasine o nesrećama koje neminovno slijede čovječanstvu. Već prije M. de Notre Dame uzima pomrčinu Mjeseca iz studenoga 1565. kao najavu i predznak nevolja u 1566. U Elzašu su uočili neke fenomene oko Sunca koje su odmah povezali s boravkom turske vojske pod Sigetom.

U kolikoj su mjeri astrolozi uspjeli „proreći“ sve događaje povezane sa Sigetom? Priznati astrolog F. Giuntini navodno je preokao Sulejmanovu smrt. Na drugoj strani Europe T. Brahe, na temelju pomrčine Mjeseca 28. listopada 1566., najavio je skorbu smrt sultana Sulejmana, ali je ovaj već bio umro sedam tjedana ranije. Isto tako, pjesnik D. Venier i matematičar E. Ausonio napravili su horoskop za Sulejmana I. Prema njihovu zaključku, sultanu je godina 1566. trebala biti iznimno škodljiva.

Je li Nikola Zrinski bio pristaša proricateljske astrologije? To pitanje nameće podatak iz djela H. Rantzaua. Međutim, svi specifični detalji iz njegove biografije, a osobito Črnkovo svjedočanstvo, tu mogućnost svode na najmanju moguću mjeru. Cijeli niz odluka i postupaka Nikole IV. Zrinskog govori kako su bili duboko promišljeni i u konačnici racionalni. Oni nisu imali samo trenutačnu važnost, a nisu bili ni pasivni, tj. nisu proistekli iz djelovanja protivnika. Prije svega proveo je sve mjere logističke pripreme, a u okviru moralnog djelovanja otvoreno je iznio sve činjenice koje su pripadnici posade morali znati a da ne utječe na njihovu razinu motivacije.

Glavni krivac za pogibiju Zrinskog te stradavanje vojne posade tvrđave Siget i stanovništva grada bio je car Maksimilijan II. Njegova sposobnost za vođenje države i vrhovno zapovijedanje oružanim snagama Carstva bila je potpuno narušena neodlučnošću i nesposobnošću da preuzme racionalnu odgovornost te tvrdoglavim odbijanjem dobrohotnih savjeta od vodećih vojnih, političkih i crkvenih čelnika onih zemalja kojima je bio na čelu ili koje su mu bile saveznice. Jesu li se proročanstva, horoskopi i ostali iracionalni produkti školovanih pripadnika renesansnog intelektualnog društva odrazili na careve odluke, ne možemo decidirano tvrditi jer nismo raspolagali ispravom takvog sadržaja. No, kako smo vidjeli, neke „profecije“ sugestivno su „upozoravale“ na strašne posljedice koje mogu zadesiti neimenovanog

bečkog vladara te, 1566. godine. Za opisivanje toga vladara – Maksimilijana II. – cjelokupnoga njegova života i smrti, španjolskom poslaniku markizu de Almazanu bilo je dovoljno nekoliko riječi: „... Nesretnik je umro kako je i živio...“ – neodlučan, nesiguran i tvrdoglav. S druge strane, jedan obavještajac iz sigetske mreže ovako je za Zrinskoga rekao: „... dok bude svijeta slaviti će se njegova čast...“

UTJECAJ OPSADNOG RATOVANJA U OSMANSKOJ EKSPANZIJI PREMA SREDNJOJ EUROPI: SLUČAJ OPSADE SIGETA

KAHRAMAN ŞAKUL

U radu se analizira uloga osmanskog umijeća opsadnog ratovanja u ekspanziji prema srednjoj Europi na slučaju opsade Sigeta 1566. Osman-sko umijeće opsjedanja neodvojivo je od osvajanja novih teritorija u regiji. Osmanlije su imali dobar popis uspješnih opsada u novo doba vatrenog oružja od osvajanja Carigrada. Međutim, osmanske opsade nisu bile obilježene neprekinutim nizom pobjeda. Neuspješne opsade Beograda i Rodosa u eri Mehmeda Osvajača te poraz kod opsade Beča i Malte u razdoblju Sulejmana Veličanstvenog najpoznatiji su primjeri osmanskih neuspjeha u opsadnom ratovanju.

Očigledno, Osmanlije su naučili mnogo od tih neuspjeha s obzirom na to da su stalno poboljšavali svoje opsadne vještine. Osmanlije su bez sumnje uvježbavali svoje opsadne tehnike u Dugom Ratu s Habsburgovcima (1593. – 1606.) te u opsadama Bagdada (1638.-39.), Kandije (1648.-69.), Ujvara (1663.), Kameneca-Podolskog i kasnije Čahirina (1677. – 1678.). Osmanlije su se koristili zapaljivim bombama još u opsadi Rodosa (1520.) kako bi zastrašili branitelje. Spremno su prihvatili sačmu i usavršili cirkumvalacije (obrove) te izlomljene rovove uz dodatak reduta (zakloništa) cirkumvalacijama (obrovima). Pokušat ćemo staviti opsadu Sigeta u kontekst evolucije osmanskog opsadnog ratovanja.

Siget je odigrao važnu obrambenu ulogu u razdoblju 1541. – 1566. Nakon pada Ostrogona 1543. godine njegova glavna uloga bila je ugrožavati osmanske komunikacije s Budimom uz Dunav, čiji je istočni dio bio pod osmanskom okupacijom. Shvaćajući njezinu geostratešku vrijednost, Osmanlije su dvaput opsjedali tvrđavu: 1555. Tojgun-paša opsjedao je Siget, ali bez uspje-

ha. Sljedeće godine Hadim Ali-paša, budimski paša, nije ga mogao zauzeti ni nakon 45 dana opsade. Iako su te opsade bile neuspješne, one su pokazale smjernice carskoj vojsci pod vodstvom Sulejmana Veličanstvenog u konačnoj opsadi 1566. Primjerice, gore spomenuti Ali-paša nesvjesno je postavio svoj šator u dometu pušaka branitelja i suočio se sa smrtnom opasnošću. Stoga je brežuljak Semilihov izabran za Sulejmanov kraljevski šator zato što je bio izvan puščanog dometa.

Analiza faza osmanske opsade Sigeta nudi nam priliku da napravimo komparativnu analizu osmanskih opsada na duge staze. Usporedit ćemo i suočiti opsadu Sigeta (1566.) s opsadama u Dugom Ratu (1594. – 1606.), Ujvara (Érsekújvár, Nove Zamky), Kameneca-Podolskog (1672.) i Čihirina (1678.) kako bismo razumjeli njihovo mjesto i dugoročnu važnost za osmansku ekspanziju.

Tijekom izlaganja definirat ćemo etape obrane: opkoljavanje utvrde, bombardiranje i potkopavanje zidina, prelazak opkopa te zauzimanje utvrda na juriš.

Fokus će opet biti na ocjeni odgovarajućeg mjesta opsade Sigeta u osmanskom opsadnom ratovanju. Osmanlije su našli jake garnizone na Malti, Sigetu i Nicosiji 1565. – 1571. Oni nisu bili samo jaki nego i vrlo odlučni u nastojanju da se bore do kraja. Stoga su takve opsade bile skupe za Osmanlije zbog broja žrtava, vremena i opreme. U slučaju Sigeta, Nikola Zrinski bio je bitan faktor koji je pridonio epskoj obrani tvrđave. Grof Zrinski izgubio je svoja drevna alodijalna imanja u Hrvatskoj u ratovima s Osmanlijama, pa je morao steći nova u Ugarskoj. Budući da je znao da je Siget nezaobilazan za zaštitu njegovih posjeda, sam se imenovao zapovjednikom cijele transdanubijske granice (zapadne Ugarske) 1561. Dakle, za njega na kocki 1566. godine nije toliko bila obrana habsburških područja koliko zaštita njegovih vlastitih posjeda protiv nadirućeg neprijatelja.

To ne samo da objašnjava njegov beskompromisan otpor protiv osmanske opsade nego i jačinu fortifikacije, što je još jedan element koji određuje sudbinu osmanske opsade. Siget je sigurno jaka utvrda zbog fizičkih značajki regije. Moderne fortifikacije bile su skupe za održavanje. Stoga je održavanje Sigeta, poput drugih utvrda, bio uspješno zahvaljujući suradnji središta i lokalnih resursa. No presudno za dugi otpor protiv osmanskog opsadnog stroja bilo je pojačanje utvrde. Ugroženi osobni interesi tvorili su realnost života na granici – poput otkupa zarobljenika, međusobnih antagonizama i plaćenika – što je bilo složeno pitanje kod te opsade.

Konačno, operacija opsade ne može se svesti na svoje vojne/tehničke aspekte. Demonstracija političke moći (vojna parada, vojna glazba, pokazivanje zastava itd), vojni trikovi i špijunaža te pregovori također su dio pravilne opsade. Stoga ćemo u ovoj prezentaciji dati opis tih aspekata opsade Sigeta.

OPSADA SIGETA 1566. PREMA OSMANSKIM NARATIVIMA O POHODU

GÜNHAN BÖREKÇİ

Opsada i zauzimanje Sigeta 1566. bili su tema brojnih znanstvenih rasprava. Cilj ovog priloga jest pridonijeti znanstvenom korpusu obradom niza suvremenih osmanskih narativa o pohodu poznatih pod nazivom *Sigetvarnâme*.

Ti povijesni izvori, od kojih su neki bili tek nedavno objavljeni, otkrivaju važne informacije ne samo o pripremama osmanske carske vojske za pohod i o ratnoj strategiji protiv Sigeta nego i o smrti sultana Sulejmana I. tijekom zadnjih dana opsade i dolasku na prijestolje njegova sina, sultana Selima II. Osim toga, ti nam izvori omogućuju i neke kritične detalje o ratnim zarobljenicima, što je tema koja bez sumnje čeka daljnja istraživanja. Sve u svemu *Sigetvarnâme*, osobito oni koje su pisali sudionici pohoda, nuždan su izvor za izučavanje osmanske vojne i političke povijesti 16. stoljeća uopće, a posebno o osmanskom zauzimanju Sigeta.

Započnimo s *Nüzhət-i Esrârü'l-Ahyâr der-Ahbâr-ı Sefer-i Sigetvar (Ugodne tajne zadovoljnih ljudi iz vijesti o sigetskom pohodu)* Feriduna Ahmeda Beya. One drže iznimno mjesto među *Sigetvarnâme* zbog bogatog sadržaja i ilustracija. Ukrašen s 19 lijepih minijatura, koje se pripisuju dvorskom umjetniku Nakkašu Osmanu, taj opsežni rad s 305 listova napisan je najvjerojatnije autorovom vlastitom rukom, a dovršen je 1. siječnja 1569.; stoga se smatra najstarijim i najdetaljnijim svjedočanstvom očevica rata. Njegov autor, Feridun Ahmed, služio je u pohodu kao osobni tajnik velikog vezira Mehmed-paše Sokolovića (umro 1579.) i sasvim je jasno da je rad pisao za njega, s obzirom na to da u tekstu stalno daje mjesto prvenstva velikom veziru, a ne Sulejmanu ili Selimu II., obraćajući mu se svaki put vrlo laskavim jezikom.

Autor predstavlja Mehmed-pašu Sokolovića ne samo kao izvanrednog zapovjednika i državnika nego i kao utjecajnog političkog genija, praktički *king makera*.

Veliki je vezir, uostalom, i bio pravi zapovjednik tijekom pohoda na Siget vješto vodeći vojsku i opsadu. Osim toga, istaknuo se kao vjeran i vješt državnik mjerama koje je poduzeo odmah nakon smrti sultana Sulejmana. U razdoblju od 48 dana pažljivo je utro put za nasljednika, princa Selima, kako bi došao iz svoje pokrajine (sandžaka) i zauzeo osmansko prijestolje u gotovo bezbolnom procesu. Kao takav, Sokolović je bio jedina osoba kontinuiteta u vrhu osmanske dinastije u njezinu najkritičnijem trenutku. Zapanjujuće je da ga Feridun Ahmed prikazuje bez oklijevanja kao „posjednika veličanstvenosti i sreće” (Sahib-i devlet ü sa’adet), što je izraz isključivo rezerviran za sultane, ili ga prikazuje kako izdaje fermane kao da je bio sultan.

Druga kritična značajka *Nüzhet-i Esrâra* jest da pokriva događaje iz razdoblja 1558. – 1568. Ispod je tematski opseg rada koji se može sažeti u četiri dijela:

1) Pohod na Siget 1566.

Tekst počinje opisom diplomatske pozadine opsade Sigeta. Kao glavni razlozi za objavu rata navedeni su kršenje osmansko-habsburškog ugovora iz 1562. i neuspjeh oko okončanja sukoba u pograničnom području između dvaju carstava. Pripovijedanje o pohodu, sa svim njegovim fazama, zauzima oko pola teksta *Nüzhet-i esrara*. Teme su i događaji iz ovog odjeljka: neriješeni granični sporovi s Habsburgovcima za vrijeme velikog vezira Semiza Ali-paše i neuspjeh cara Maksimilijana – koji je naslijedio Ferdinanda 1564. i vladao do 1574. – da pravovremeno pošalje danak u Istanbul; Mehmed-paša Sokolović nasljeđuje Semiza Ali-pašu nakon njegove smrti te se donosi odluka da se ide u rat protiv Ugarske; odlazak sultana iz Istanbula u povorci nakon završetka ratnih priprema; zaustavljanja između Istanbula i Sigeta uz vojne, političke i dnevne događaje tijekom ožujka; razlog za izbor tvrđave Siget kao cilja pohoda; najnovije vijesti iz Ugarske; opsada tvrđave Siget sastavljena od četiri bastiona koja su branile snage pod zapovjedništvom Nikole Šubića Zrinskog; sultanova smrt noć prije pada tvrđave; mjere koje je poduzeo Mehmed-paša Sokolović kako bi zatajio vijest; stanje vojske i vladajuće elite; pisma poslana Selimu po glasniku; Selimov dolazak u Istanbul, prva svečanost njegova ustoličenja i njegov dolazak u Beograd; posljednja molitva za sultana Sulejmana u Beogradu; povratak novog sultana u Istanbul s vojskom po prisegu vjernosti od vladajuće elite; pobuna u vojsci zbog spora oko uobičajenog novčanog dara vojnicima prilikom sultanova preuzimanja vlasti.

Bogat sadržaj čini *Nüzhet-i Esrâr* nezamjenjivim izvorom za proučavanje osmanske političke i vojne povijesti u 16. stoljeću u cjelini, a posebno za povijest pohoda na Siget.

2) Bajazidov incident

U ovom dijelu Feridun Ahmed Bey navodi sve pohode sultana Sulejmana jedan po jedan te ih razmatra u restrospekciji, okrećući se događaju koji nikad nije mogao zaboraviti. „Bajazidov incident“ bio je zadnji rat jednog princa za nasljeđe u osmanskoj povijesti, a Feridun Ahmed pratio ga je na bojnopolju stojeći na strani Mehmed-paše Sokolovića. On pripovijeda događaj s mnoštvom detalja, kao i pohod na Siget, uključujući oba događaja kojima je svjedočio u službenu korespondenciju koju je napisao kao pisar. Jedinstvenost ovog poglavlja neupitna je zbog obilja informacija koje pruža o tom burnom događaju.

3) Primanje habsburškog i safavidskog poslanika

Ovaj odlomak bilježi primanje habsburškog poslanika kojeg je car Maksimilijan II. poslao na pregovore o novom mirovnom ugovoru kod Mehmed-paše Sokolovića i sultana, kao i relevantnu korespondenciju i pregovore. Osim toga, detaljno opisuje primanje safavidskog izaslanika Sahlulua u Edirnu i Istanbulu; Sahlulu je donio poruku sućuti šaha Tahmasbija zbog gubitka Sulejmana i čestitku Selimu zbog dolaska na vlast. Posebno je važan opis darova i govora dvojice poslanika, kao i večera njima u čast. Također se usput spominje vezirovo primanje mletačkog poslanika, koji je poslan radi službenih čestitki. Taj dio posebno je bitan za proučavanje osmanske političke i diplomatske povijesti.

4) Poslovi u Iraku i na Arapskom poluotoku

U ovom odlomku Feridun Ahmed pripovijeda o organizaciji vojnih pohoda za suzbijanje pobune u tim pokrajinama i mjerama koje su u tom smislu poduzeli Mehmed-paša Sokolović i Īskender paša, glavni upravitelj Bagdada i vrhovnog zapovjednika tih pohoda. Prije toga Ulyanoğlu, zapovjednik Arapskog Iraka (*Irak-ı Arab*), i njegovi pristaše podigli su pobunu smatrajući dolazak na vlast Selima II. kao političku priliku za sebe. Feridun Bey detaljno opisuje mjesta gdje se zaustavljao i gradove koji leže uz obalu Eufrata, pri čemu se vojska Īskender-paše tijekom ožujka odmarala. Autor

također posvećuje dužnu pažnju podjeli Jemena na dva teritorija (beglerbegluka). Feridun Ahmed navodi da je temeljio svoj rad na usmenom iskazu očevica pohoda. Tematski dijelovi teksta završavaju zaključenjem Iskender pašina pohoda. Zatim dolazi kratko objašnjenje Feridun Ahmeda o tome zašto je napisao knjigu i iz kojeg ju je razloga tako nazvao. Knjiga završava kolofonom (*ferağ kaydı*).

Postoje i drugi suvremeni osmanski radovi o pohodu na Siget pod pokroviteljstvom Sokolovića ili posvećenih njemu. Jedan takav rad pripada Agehî Mansuru Čelebiji, veteranu tog rata koji je svoju *Fetihnâme-i Kal'a-i Sigetvar*, kroniku pohoda u prozi, posvetio Mehmed-paši Sokoloviću. Osim nekih događaja koje nije obuhvatio Feridun Ahmed bey, Agehîjev rad posebno je važan jer opisuje i osmansko osvajanje Siklosa. Među radovima posvećenima Sokoloviću može se navesti i *Sigetvar Fetihnâmesi* Seyfija iz Istanbula, djelo napisano u stihu i prozi, koje je sada izgubljeno, kao i Merâhîjevo djelo *Fetihnâme-i Sefer-i Sigetvar. Heft Meclis* Gelibolulu Mustafe Alija također je posvećeno velikom veziru. Ali on nije sudjelovao u pohodu, zbog čega je više bio fokusiran na stilistiku nego na činjenice o ratu. Pišući u vrijeme financijskih i profesionalnih teškoća (oko 1573.), njegov je tekst eulogija Sokoloviću, na kojeg upućuje preko Şeyh Nureddinzâde Muslihiddina, člana Halveti reda. Zabavno je što je Ali na kraju svog rada eksplicitno izrazio očekivanje pisarskog položaja u palači. Treba spomenuti i druga dva djela napisana na osmanskom turskom o pohodu na Siget u vrijeme dok je Sokolović bio veliki vezir: anonimni *Heft Dastan* i Âşık Čelebijina *Sigetvarnâme*.

Nedavno nađeno djelo istaknutog osmanskog pjesnika iz 16. stoljeća, Bakija, računa se kao prva *Sigetvarnâme*, jer je završeno 26. rujna 1566. To kratko djelo pisano u stihu i prozi pruža još jedan sažetak događaja koji su doveli do posljednjeg pohoda sultana Sulejmana i zauzimanja tvrđave Siget pod zapovjedništvom Mehmed-paše Sokolovića.

Brojni osmanski pisci pisali su kronike tog doba tijekom kasnijih razdoblja, kao svjedoci opsade Sigeta, kao i događaja iz 1560-ih godina. Mustafa Selânikî bez sumnje pada na pamet prvi, jer je njegovo djelo vjerojatno najvažnije u ovoj skupini djela. Selânikî je služio u kampanji kao hafiz (onaj koji zna napamet Kur'an) iz škole u palači. Njegovo djelo slaže se s onim Feridun Ahmeda u temama kao što je opsada Sigeta, smrti sultana Sulejmana, dolazak na vlast Selima II. Ipak, on je bio svjedok tih događaja iz drugog kuta, što čini njegovo djelo vrijednim pažnje.

Nakraju, treba spomenuti i *Tarîh-i Sultân Süleymân*, ilustrirano djelo u stihu čiji je autor Şehnâmeçi Seyyid Lokman. To je službena kronika napisana na perzijskom s minijaturama Nakkâşa Osmana. Postoje sličnosti u obliku i stilu između tih minijatura i onih u *Nûzhət-i Esrârü*. Seyyid Lokman imenovan je službenim kroničarom (*şehnâmeçi*) 1569. na preporuku Feridun Beya. Zajedno sa svojim timom umjetnika i pod pokroviteljstvom Selima II., Seyyid Lokman pripremio je *Şehnâme-i Selim Han* i drugi svezak *Hümernâme*, a oba djela sadrže odlomke o pohodu na Siget ilustrirane minijaturama.

U konačnoj analizi, *Nûzhət-i Esrâr* Feriduna Ahmeda Beya čini se sveobuhvatnijim djelom s mnogo detalja kakvih nema u drugim suvremenim i gotovo suvremenim djelima napisanima o posljednjem pohodu sultana Sulajmana.

KOGA I ŠTO SLAVIMO? NIKOLA ŠUBIĆ ZRINSKI I SIGET U MAĐARSKOM POVIJESNOM PAMĆENJU

SZABOLCS VARGA

Zrinski je prešao velik put tijekom svog života, ali to nije ništa u odnosu na ono što se dogodilo nakon njegove smrti. Koliko je samo hrabrih ratnika pokopanih diljem svijeta čija imena ni ne znamo. Pomislimo samo na branitelje nebrojenih mađarskih i hrvatskih dvoraca i njihove zapovjednike koji su dali svoje živote u borbi protiv brojčano nadmoćnijih snaga. Sa Zrinskim nije tako. Čak i u to vrijeme ljudi su s uzbuđenjem čekali vijesti o opsadi Sigeta, a novine i grafike o njoj u roku od nekoliko tjedana postale su poznate u cijeloj Europi. Stanovnici njemačkih i talijanskih područja uglavnom su bili zainteresirani za planove Osmanskog Carstva i sudbinu ostarjelog sultana, ali u tom procesu šira javnost upoznala se i s imenima Zrinskog i Sigeta.

Prvi autentični podaci o opsadi iz izvješća su mladog komornika sigetskog junaka, Hrvata Ferenc Črnka, koji je preživio opsadu. Oslobođen iz zarobljeništva, Črnko je napisao povijest opsade na hrvatskom koju je na latinski preveo Samuel Budina iz Ljubljane (Beč, 1568.). Iste godine bila je dostupna i njemačka verzija, dok se 1569.-70. pojavila u dva izdanja na talijanskom jeziku. Drugi ključni suvremeni izvještaj jest *Mađarska povijest* koju je napisao Ferenc Forgách 1568. – 1573.; autorova mržnja prema Zrinskom gotovo izbija sa stranica latinskog teksta i kao takav on može postati samo

dio književnog kanona nakon što ju je znatno preradio njegov brat Imre Forgách.

Zahvaljujući stalnoj osmanskoj opasnosti, interes za Nikolu Zrinskog nije opao čak ni mnogo godina kasnije. Napredovanje Turaka u Ugarskoj i dalje je držalo Sveto Rimsko Carstvo u strahu, a njihova sve veća prisutnost i u istočnim i u zapadnim dijelovima Sredozemlja generiralo je isti strah i kod Talijana. Zrinski, pretvoren u junaka kršćanstva, pronašao je svoj put na jednom bakropisu osmišljenom kako bi privukao pozornost njemačke javnosti na nepovoljnu situaciju u Ugarskoj i mobilizirao je protiv Turaka (1582.). Djelo predstavlja sudbinu Ugarske kao alegoriju, prikazujući Hungariju, ženski lik koji nosi krunu. Jedna strana gravure prikazuje heroje borbe protiv Turaka i na njoj se Nikola Zrinski može naći u društvu Ivana Hunyadija, kralja Matije, Györgyja Thuryja i drugih.

U 17. stoljeću sjećanje na Zrinskog bilo je sačuvano zahvaljujući borbama njegova praunuka protiv Turaka 1664.: zimski pohod privukao je međunarodnu pažnju i postao stalna tema na europskim kraljevskim dvorovima, gdje slavni predak nikad nije bio zaboravljen. Protjerivanje Osmanlija krajem 17. stoljeća zaustavilo je međutim europski interes za branitelja Sigeta.

Zrinski je sve više postajao heroj srednje Europe, točnije Habsburške Monarhije. Od mađarskih događaja u ranom modernom razdoblju, opsada Sigeta 1566. druga je najpopularnija tema umjetnosti i književnosti nakon legendarne Bitke kod Mohača 1526., što odražava živo zanimanje za događaje koji se prenose iz jedne generacije u drugu. Znak reputacije Zrinskog jest to što je 1579. nadvojvoda Ferdinand Tirolski (1529. – 1595.), sin Ferdinanda I., pristupio obitelji Zrinski kako bi stekao neke od grofovih osobnih stvari za svoju privatnu zbirku. Na taj su način kaciga i sablja Zrinskog te njegova ukrasna tunika u bijeloj atlas svili s hermelinom došli u nadvojvodin posjed; danas se nalaze u bečkom muzeju *Kunsthistorisches Museum Hofjagd-und Rüstkammer*. Godine 1571. stanoviti Johannes Liubicz, kanonik u Wroclawu, objavio je spomen-raspravu o Zrinskom i prikazao epitaf za dva generala, Petera Farkasicsa i Györgyja Horvátha. Dakle, vijesti o sigetskim junacima doprle su sve do Šleske.

Takozvani *Zrinski album* koji je naručio Juraj Zrinski 1587., pod nazivom *De Zigetio, Hungariae propugnaculo... (O Sigetu, bastionu obrane Ugarske...)*, bez sumnje je imao najveći utjecaj na kult Zrinskog. To je uključivalo prozne tekstove o opsadi, kao i pjesme, epigrame, gravure i obiteljski grb. Miklósu

Istvánffyju možemo zahvaliti za najdetaljniji opis opsade Sigeta: u svojem *Historiarum de rebus Ungaricis*, objavljenom 1622., on se služi usmenim sjećanjima i pisanim izvorima kako bi konstruirao sliku Zrinskog koja opstaje do danas u spomen na mađarske i hrvatske junake pale u borbi. Preko tih književnih djela obrazovana javnost na Zapadu postala je svjesna imena Zrinskih i Sigeta koja su postala sinonim za herojsko žrtvovanje samog sebe.

U 18. stoljeću u prvom su redu habsburški dvor i mađarska Katolička crkva prihvatili njegovanje te herojske mađarske prošlosti. Wencel Pohl napravio je niz slika na mađarske teme za Marije Terezije, dok je u Ugarskoj, osim bitaka kod Svetog Gottharda, Mohača i Nagyharsányja, István Dorfmeister naslikao pad i osvajanje Sigeta, što se može vidjeti na stropu župne crkve sv. Roka u Szigetváru.

U 19. je stoljeću kult junaka Zrinskog iznova procvao i tome moramo zahvaliti za brojna djela i njegove prikaze. Prvi je od njih slika Petera Kraffta iz 1825., inspirirana habsburškim carskim patriotizmom koji je doživio preporod tijekom letargije napoleonskih ratova. Književni ekvivalent bila je drama Carla Theodora Körnera *Zrinski* napisana 1812., koja je, u pruskoj i njemačkoj tradiciji, Habsburškoj Monarhiji ponudila junaka prihvatljivog svima. Žanr nacionalnog romantizma u nastajanju u sljedećem će desetljeću prekinuti takvo sjećanje na Zrinskog, no pretvorit će ga u hrvatskog i/ili mađarskog nacionalnog junaka koji je dao život za slobodu. Zrinski bi sam bio najviše iznenađen načinom na koji se pojedine generacije koriste njegovim imenom.

U Mađarskoj su Miklós Barabás i Bertalan Székely usredotočeni na junaka koji će umrijeti za svoju domovinu. Katalizator toga u početku će biti nacionalni romantizam, a zatim – nakon neuspjele revolucije 1848.-49. – katarza. U 1860-ima ime Zrinskog ponovno se pojavilo u vezi s približavajućom godišnjicom u akademskom, javnom i političkom diskursu koji se odnosi na hrvatsko-mađarsku suradnju, iako je glavno pitanje bila nacionalnost Zrinskog, odnosno njegov mađarski identitet. To će se nastaviti čak i unatoč slikarstvu Tivadara Kosztké Csontváryja i satiričkom romanu Kálmána Mikszátha *Új Zrínyiász (Nova Zrinijada)*, u kojem će se glavni lik, kao rezultat niza čudnih slučajnosti, hrabro boriti u Budimpešti dualističkog razdoblja kako bi junačkom smrću umro u lažnom dvorcu Vajdahunyad u Budimpešti.

Novo štovanje Zrinskog u Hrvatskoj započelo je 1866., kad je, kako bi se proslavila tristota godišnjica njegove junačke smrti, po njemu nazvan

najatraktivniji zagrebački trg. Deset godina kasnije skladatelj Ivan Zajc napisao je operu pod naslovom *Nikola Šubić Zrinski*, u kojoj se Körnerov Zrinski bori u Sigetu kao hrvatski heroj i, kao pravi domoljub, odbacuje ponudu Mehmed-paše Sokolovića da zauzme hrvatsko kraljevsko prijestolje. Iako je u Hrvatskoj bilo pokušaja deheroizacije Zrinskog, njegovo katoličanstvo i žrtvovanje samog sebe nastavili su od njega činiti jednog od najpopularnijih junaka hrvatskog naroda, zajedno s Petrom Zrinskim i Krstom Frankopanom.

Druga polovica 20. stoljeća nije bio povoljna za bilo što u srednjoj Europi što je imalo nacionalni okus. Tako se kult Zrinskog u Mađarskoj povukao u Szigetvár, a u Hrvatskoj u Čakovec, iako su ondje tek 1991. Zrinski potpuno rehabilitirani.

Ipak, ime Zrinskog postalo je nepovratno ukorijenjeno i u mađarskoj i u hrvatskoj nacionalnoj svijesti. Mnoštvo ulica, trgova i ustanova nosi njegovo ime i vjerojatno nema nijedne osobe u obje zemlje koja nije barem čula za njega. To nije mala stvar ako znamo da većina bivših vladara tih zemalja nije ostala upamćena u tolikoj mjeri. Svijest o turskim ratovima široko je rasprostranjena, a i Sulejman je s pravom postao popularan poput Zrinskog i izvan granica svoje uže domovine. Ova regija ima nekoliko pravih junaka čija memorija seže i izvan vlastitog naroda. Zrinski se sa svojim mnogostrukim identitetima i odanošću možda može usporediti samo s Ivanom Hunyadijem u srpskoj i rumunjskoj nacionalnoj svijesti, ali u istom dahu mogu biti spomenuti i srpski knez Lazar i rumunjski Mihai Viteazul. Priča o njegovoj smrti pod zidinama sigetskog dvorca previše je čista, previše univerzalna te kroz Zrinskog istinski pokazuje vlastitu prirodu. Ni brojne temeljite biografije ne mogu osporiti tu sliku, bez obzira na to koliko bi prljavštine savjestan istraživač mogao pokušati iskopati o njemu.

NIKOLA ŠUBIĆ ZRINSKI I OPSADA SIGETA 1566. U HRVATSKOJ HISTORIOGRAFIJI

ŽELJKO HOLJEVAČ

Osmanska opsada Sigeta 1566. i pogibija Nikole Šubića Zrinskoga u borbu iz sigetske utvrde prije 450 godina ostavili su zavidan trag u nizu svjedočanstava, književnih ostvarenja, narodnih pjesama i srodnih priloga, a imali su upečatljivog odjeka i u modernoj i suvremenoj hrvatskoj povjesnici.

Imajući to na umu, svrha je ovoga priopćenja u prigodi 450. obljetnice Sigetske bitke ukratko samo naznačiti neka težišna očišta hrvatske historiografije od sredine 19. do početka 21. stoljeća o Nikoli Šubiću Zrinskom, hrvatskom banu i branitelju Sigeta.

Proslava 300. obljetnice Sigetske bitke u Zagrebu 1866., na koju je došlo slovensko i slovačko izaslanstvo, potaknula je povjesničara Matiju Mesića da napiše knjigu *Život Nikole Zrinjskoga, sigetskoga junaka*. Knjiga je objavljena troškom Matice ilirske, danas Matice hrvatske. Slabljenje kraljevske vlasti u kontekstu vladavine ugarsko-hrvatskih kraljeva iz vladarske kuće Arpadovića omogućilo je jačanje hrvatskih velikaša, a provala Tatara u 13. stoljeću olakšala je uspon dinastičke obitelji Pavla Šubića, bana Hrvata i gospodara Bosne. Bribirski knezovi Šubići doveli su poslije izumrca Arpadovića na prijestolje nove kraljeve iz dinastije Anževinaca, a njihov potomak Nikola Zrinski branio je u 16. stoljeću Hrvatsku od Osmanlija koji su prodrli u Europu. Mesić piše da je Nikola uzeo Katarinu Frankapanku ili Frankopanku za ženu i s njezinim bratom Stjepanom stupio u zajednicu. Postao je hrvatskim banom i dobio Međimurje, a dok se borio s Osmanlijama, stekao je i neka Erdödyjeva dobra. Odrekavši se banske časti, postao je sigetskim zapovjednikom i glavnim kapetanom. Oženio se po drugi put, no izgubio je Krupu i Novi te se odrekao javnoga zvanja.

Osmanlije su 1566. krenuli na Siget pa je Zrinski proglasio ratne odredbe i povukao se u unutarnji dio utvrde, odbijajući osmanske napade i pozive na predaju. Poslije smrti sultana Sulejmana pao je u proboj iz opkoljenog Sigeta, ali je spasio Beč od ponovne osmanske opsade. „Za moju radnju bilo mi je tako kratko vrijeme odmjereno, da nisam mogao postupati poput onoga graditelja, koji hoće da mu zgrada bude čvrsta i oku liepa, te zato najprije osnovu snuje, zatim si gradivo snaša i tad istom zgradu izvadja. Upravo zato, što ja nisam mogao tako raditi, nije mi moglo niti djelo moje izpod ruke takovo izaći, da bi se moglo smatrati dostojnim spomenikom duhu onoga muža, koga je imalo prikazati potomstvu u pravoj njegovoj slici. Neima u njem jedinstva; neima pravoga razmierja, nit ljepote oblika. Nu dočim ono nije moglo zadovoljiti tim višim zahtjevom veće savršenosti, scienim ipak, da nije daleko zaostalo za umjerenijimi zahtjevi“, napisao je Matija Mesić u „Predgovoru“ svojoj knjizi početkom rujna 1866. godine.

Deset godina kasnije, književnik Hugo Badalić napisao je libreto za operu *Nikola Šubić Zrinski*, koju je uglazbio Ivan pl. Zajc, utemeljitelj stalne

hrvatske opere i začetnik orkestralnog muziciranja. Nakon toga je profesor Dane Gruber napisao u Zagrebu o Uskrsu 1879. knjigu *Borba Hrvata sa Turci od pada Sigeta do mira Žitva-Doroškoga (1566.-1606.)*, tiskanu u nakladi Dioničke tiskare. Djelo je posvetio „Miloj uspomeni svoga nezaboravnoga učitelja Matije Mesića, prvoga rektora i profesora hrvatske povijesti na Hrvatskom sveučilištu“, tj. Kr. Sveučilištu Franje Josipa I., danas Sveučilištu u Zagrebu. „Ostaci ostataka nekoć slavnoga Hrvatskog kraljevstva“, podijeljenoga između Habsburgovaca, Osmanlija i Mlečana, završili su u ranome novom vijeku na predziđu kršćanske Europe u dvostoljetnom ratovanju protiv osmanske invazije, zaustavljene pod sisačkim bedemima, odnosno ekspanzije koja je u 16. stoljeću izazvala ili potaknula selidbe Hrvata i Vlaha, nastanak i izdvajanje Vojne krajine, socijalne i vjerske pokrete te mnoge druge nedaće. O padu Sigeta pisao je Rudolf Horvat 1894. u *Viencu zabavi i pouci*, časopisu Matice hrvatske, a sigetska epopeja nije zaboravljena ni u prvoj polovici 20. stoljeća. Tako je u albumu *Hrvatski besmrtnici 910 – 1508 – 1938*, tiskanom uoči Drugoga svjetskog rata u nakladi Dragutina Kolara, portretiran i grof Nikola Zrinski kao „Junak sigetski, gdje je poginuo u borbi s Turcima“.

U povodu 400. obljetnice opsade Sigeta, Muzej Nikole Zrinskoga u Sigetu i Muzej Janusa Pannoniusa u Pečuhu priredili su 1966. prigodne izložbe. Istodobno je u Budimpešti objavljen spomen-zbornik *Szigetvári emlékkönyv* o opsadi Sigeta i mađarskoj borbi za obranu domovine i Europe. Izložba povijesti grada Sigeta u Pečuhu i sigetska bibliografija prikazani su u *Historijskom zborniku*, časopisu Povijesnog društva Hrvatske, danas Društva za hrvatsku povjesnicu. „Na žalost, ova se bibliografija gotovo isključivo ograničava na mađarsku literaturu i umjetnička djela. Od hrvatskih djela unesena su svega tri: knjiga M. Mesića o Nikoli Sigetskom (1866), ‘Adrianskog mora sirena’ Od P. Zrinskog (u izdanju T. Matića, 1957) i opera I. Zajca“, komentirao je Jaroslav Šidak, profesor na Odsjeku za povijest Filozofskoga fakulteta Sveučilišta u Zagrebu. U ožujku 1967. održan je na Filozofskom fakultetu znanstveni skup o Sigetskoj bitci u hrvatskoj povijesti, književnosti i glazbi. Međutim, zbornik radova s tog skupa nije tiskan, a spomenuti Jaroslav Šidak, jedan od sudionika skupa, objavio je svoju raspravu o Nikoli Šubiću Zrinskom 1971. kao pogovor svjedočanstvu Ferenc Črnka o opsadi i osvajanju Sigeta, ponovno priređenom za tisak i objavljenom u vrijeme „hrvatskog proljeća“. U nakladi Instituta za znanost o književnosti Filozofskoga fakulteta u Zagrebu i knjižarsko-izdavačkog poduzeća „Mladost“ u Zagrebu, u seriji reprint iz-

danja Liber croaticus, tiskana su tada tri naslova – *Vazetje Sigeta grada* Brne Karnarutića, *Odiljenje Sigetsko* Pavla Rittersa Vitezovića i *Podsjedanje i osvojenje Sigeta* Ferenc Črnka s popratnim tekstovima.

Dragutin Pavličević 1971. i Agneza Szabo 2008. pisali su o Nikoli Šubiću Zrinskom kao o „hrvatskom Leonidi“ koji je poput antičkoga prauzora do smrti branio Siget. Anđelko Mijatović je 1987. i ponovno 2010. objavio knjigu o obrani Sigeta. Drugo, dopunjeno i prošireno izdanje u povodu 500. obljetnice rođenja zapovjednika Sigeta otisnuto je u nakladi Školske knjige. Mijatović je pristupio Nikoli Šubiću Zrinskomu i raščlambi odjeka sigetskoga heroizma oslanjajući se na svjedočanstva, književna ostvarenja i usmene narodne pjesme. Slovenac Samuel Budina preveo je Črnkovo djelo *Podsjedanje i osvojenje Sigeta 1568.* u Beču na latinski jezik, a zatim je ono prevedeno na njemački i talijanski jezik, zahvaljujući čemu je Sigetska bitka postala glasovita u Europi. Črnkovo je izvješće polazište svih kasnijih književnih i drugih zapisa, npr. *Vazetje Sigeta grada* Brne Karnarutića, *Odiljenje sigetsko* Pavla Rittersa Vitezovića, *Pisma od bana Zrinovića i cara Sulejmana Trećega koji opsidi Siget ugarski i pod njim umri na 1566* fra Andrije Kačića Miošića, *Grof Nikola Zrinski* Theodora Körnera, *Kralj Matija i Zrinović na onom svijetu* Josipa Jelačića, *Zrinska poputnica* Antuna Švarca, *Nikoli Zrinskom* Petra Preradovića i *U boj!* Franje Markovića, ne računajući pjesme iz usmene književnosti, npr. *Ban Mikloš Zrinski u Sigetu gradu*, *Mujo Ljubović pod Sigetom*, *Zrinović i Sulejman*, *Smrt cara Sulejmana* i dr. Mijatović je predstavio i tragove o odjeku sigetskoga junaštva među Osmanlijama, npr. u Pečevijinoj pripovijesti o pohodu na Siget, osvajanju utvrde i preseljenju sultana Sulejmana s ovoga svijeta u vječnost.

U *Književnoj smotri*, časopisu za svjetsku književnost, Seid Serdarević je 1995. obradio slovački povijesni ep o Sigetu, *Piseň o sigetském zámku* (Pjesmu o sigetskoj tvrđi). Među ostalim, analizirao je njegove metričke i stilske osobine, utjecaje slovačke folklorne poezije, moguće autore epa i eventualne utjecaje drugih suvremenih epova o bitci kod Sigeta. U časopisu *Hrvatski sjever* za književnost, kulturu i znanost objavljen je 2006. kratak tekst o Sigetu, koji je napisao László Ravazdi, a s mađarskoga preveo Đuro Franković. Prateći važne obljetnice iz hrvatske povijesti, književnosti i jezikoslovlja, časopis *Gazophylacium* za znanost, umjetnost, gospodarstvo i politiku poklonio je 2008. pozornost 500. obljetnici rođenja Nikole Zrinskoga. Agneza Szabo obradila je bitna obilježja političkih okolnosti u Hrvatskoj u njegovo doba

i junačku obranu Sigeta. Ivica Zvonar komparativno je vrednovao dva neposredna viđenja sigetske tragedije: Črnkovu kroniku *Podsjećanje i osvajanje Sigeta* i slovačku epsku pjesmu *Pesem od Sigeta grada*. Alojz Jembrih povezao je Stjepana Moysesasa i ponovljeno izdanje *Oddiljenja sigetskoga* Pavla Rittera Vitezovića u Zagrebu 1836. godine. O sigetskom velikanu i njegovu kultu u hrvatskoj povijesnoj i kulturnoj baštini pisali su u novije vrijeme i pojedini drugi hrvatski autori, a tema je i dalje, na različite načine, otvorena za sve vrste istraživačkih nastojanja i kritičkih posredovanja.

ODJECI SIGETSKE BITKE U HRVATSKOJ KNJIŽEVNOSTI

JOSIP BRATULIĆ

Hrvatski povjesničar, predsjednik Matice hrvatske, a zatim i Hrvatske akademije znanosti i umjetnosti Tadija Smičiklas napisao je o Sigetskoj bitci ovu tvrdnju: „Smrt Nikole Zrinskoga i Sulejmana zaključuje onu periodu turske povijesti kada je bila na zenitu svoje moći. Smrću Sulejmanovom pogubio je polumjesec i nije mu već bilo Sulejmanova sjaja; smrću Zrinskoga zasvijetli zvijezda Danica kršćanskomu svijetu, pripravljena je mjesto obrambene navalna kršćanska politika. Već suvremenici cijele Europe priznadoše mu da je Leonida svoga vijeka bio...“

Iako je na našem prostoru bilo nekoliko znamenitih obrana i pogibija svih branitelja koji su radije izabrali smrt nego predaju – kao npr. Krupa, Klis, Gvozdansko – ipak je Sigetska bitka ušla na poseban način i u narodnu tradiciju i u pisanu književnost, i kod nas i u Europi. Od prvoga opisa opsade i propasti grada Sigeta („Segeta“), kako ga je opisao Ferenac Črnko na hrvatskom jeziku (preveden na latinski, njemački i talijanski), do velike epopeje njegovih praukunâ Nikole, hrvatskoga bana i mađarskog pjesnika, i Petra, također hrvatskoga bana, prevoditelja spjeva na hrvatski jezik – sigetska epopeja bila je prekretnica u hrvatskoj epskoj književnosti. Petar je pogubljen kao urotnik, nije poginuo od turske ruke kao borac za kršćanske vrijednosti nego mačem apsolutističke politike Dvora, koji nije provodio ni obrambenu ni protursku politiku nego svoju apsolutističku, a apsolutistički vladar nije poslušao ni susjedne kršćanske vladare, ni papu, ni političke subjekte (Sabor, hrvatski i mađarski) da pomiluje buntovnike.

Uz narodne, usmene pjesme koje su pratile sigetske događaje i zbivanja, obrana Sigeta vrlo je rano našla put u hrvatsku književnost: autori su Brne

Karnarutić i Andrija Kačić Miošić, ali i povijest – kroničari: A. Vramec i P. R. Vitezović. Svi oni spominju Siget i njegove branitelje. Pjesnički odgovor na spjevove braće Zrinskih došao je iz Dubrovnika (V. Menčetić, *Trublja slovin-ska*) i Zagreba (P. Ritter Vitezović, *Odiljenje sigetsko*). Upravo je tema Sigetske bitke spajala hrvatski književni sjever i jug. U 19. stoljeću, stoljeću nacionalnih integracija, tema Zrinskoga i obrane nacionalnih posebnosti došla je u središte književnih i društvenih zanimanja: I. Mažuranić, M. Topalović, V. Gaj, I. Zahar, A. Šenoa.

U njemačkoj književnosti Th. Körner, predromantičar, njemački rodoljubni pjesnik, protivnik Napoleonovih osvajanja, svojom je dramom o Nikoli Zrinskom (*Miklos Graf Zrinyoder die Belagerung von Sigeth*, 1812.) prikazao Zrinskoga i njegove suborce kao branitelje slobode i onih vrijednosti koje su postale temelj novih društvenih i političkih vrednota. I u hrvatskoj i u mađarskoj književnosti, glazbi i likovnoj umjetnosti Nikola Zrinski postaje junak vrijedan ugledanja i nasljedovanja. Körnerovom je dramom otvoreno Stankovićevo kazalište u Zagrebu, drama je u hrvatskom prijevodu prikazivana u brojnim hrvatskim gradovima, a prema tom je tekstu H. Badalić napisao libreto za jednu od najpopularnijih hrvatskih opera *Nikola Šubić Zrinski* Ivana pl. Zajca.

Zanimljiva je politička i književno-jezična problematika povezana s proslavom 300. obljetnice Sigetske bitke: 1866. Hrvatski je sabor bio pokrovitelj proslave, na prvoj sjednici biskup Josip Juraj Strossmayer položio je 50.000 forinti za osnutak Jugoslavenskog sveučilišta. Jedini protivnik proslave Zrinskog bio je Ante Starčević tvrdnjom da su Nikola Zrinski, i Jelačić 1848., spašavali Austriju, te im na prvome mjestu nije bila obrana Hrvatske nego neprijateljske Austrije. Austrija je dala pogubiti prave branitelje Hrvatske – Petra Zrinskoga i Frana Krstu Frankopana. Prema tome – Hrvati nemaju razloga slaviti ni Zrinskoga ni Jelačića. Unatoč tome, proslava je održana, ali će od toga vremena i Siget i Bečko Novo Mjesto zauzimati ravnopravno mjesto u našoj političkoj i kulturnoj povijesti. Slava sigetske epopeje nije jenjala, ali joj se pridružila komemoracija tragedije Zrinskih i Frankopana. Mjesto koje je u pučkim pjesmama do tada imao ban Jelačić zauzeo je ban Petar Zrinski. To je bio odgovor i Austriji i Mađarskoj, nakon nagodbi, Austro-ugarske i Hrvatsko-ugarske. Umjesto da se carevina ustrojio kao federalna država, ona je postala dvojna monarhija, na štetu Hrvata i svih Slavena u Monarhiji. Poslije toga neuspjeha, nakon što je otišao u progonstvo, Strossmayer se prestao baviti politikom. Naša je Akademija izdala dokumente o uroti (F. Rački, B. Bo-

gišić), a nakon što je tiskan povijesni roman književnika-pravaša E. Kumičića *Urota zrinsko-frankopanska* (1893.), đaci i studenti nisu išli na nastavu 30. travnja pokazujući i na takav način svoje neslaganje s politikom Beča i Pešte.

Za proslavu tristogodišnjice sigetske epopeje posebice se zauzimala Matica ilirska i njezin predsjednik Matija Mesić, koji je sabrao i tiskom izdao najvažnije dokumente o Nikoli Šubiću Zrinskom, a Matica je izdala i lijepu knjigu – *Zrinska zvijezda* – s književnim priložima – spjevovima o Nikoli Zrinskome i Sigetu (Trnski, Vežić), odnosno o gradu Zrinu (Kukuljević). I kasnije je Matica hrvatska bila otvorena prema proslavi Zrinskih i Frankopana. O Nikoli Zrinskom i Sigetu napisali su pjesme ili spjevove: Petar Preradović, Ivan Dežman, Krsto Pavletić (pod psudonimom Osman-beg Štafić). Drame su napisali Higin Dragošić i Matija Ban.

U karađorđevićevskoj Jugoslaviji nije bilo mjesta ni za Siget ni za Bečko Novo Mjesto, odnosno ni za Nikolu Šubića Zrinskoga, ni za Petra Zrinskoga, ni za Frana Frankopana. Slično i u novoj Jugoslaviji, u kojoj su bili „kolateralne“ žrtve. Znanstveni skup o Sigetu održan je u Matici hrvatskoj uoči Deklaracije, ali radovi nisu objavljeni; 1971. održan je znanstveni skup o uroti, ali radovi nisu objavljeni jer je rad Matice hrvatske bio zabranjen.

Jedna od važnih tema u 19. i u 20. stoljeću bio je odnos između mađarske, Nikoline *Zrinijade* i hrvatskog prijevoda, odnosno preradbe Petrove. Nikola piše za svoje prijatelje, mađarske plemiće, Petar za svoje suborce, prijatelje u ratu i u razdobljima kratkotrajnog mira. U našoj je književnopovijesnoj i povijesnoj znanosti slabije prolazio Petar, jer da je bio slab stihotvorac, upravo nepjesnik, da je izabrao težak stih, dvostrukorimovani dvanaesterac, kojemu nije bio dorastao; da nije bio dobar političar, da se više oslanjao na srce nego na um. Nije se uzimala u obzir činjenica da se dvostrukorimovanim dvanaesticima želio priključiti hrvatskoj tradiciji, od Marulića do svoga doba. Ispalo je kao da su mu neki književni povjesničari zamjerali što se uopće prihvatio prevođenja bratova djela! U društvenoj i političkoj situaciji, kad su umrli ili poginuli glavni nosioci urote, ostao je sam, izdan i od francuskoga kralja i od Mlečana, uhvaćen u mreže onovremene svjetske interesne politike. Tek je novija književnopovijesna znanost dala trijeznu i pravednu ocjenu njegova djela, posebice s obzirom na mađarski izvornik i hrvatski prepjev (Đ. Novalić, P. Pavličić). A i izbor jezika – jezika ozaljskoga jezičnoga kruga – dobio je novu procjenu u povijesti hrvatskoga jezika i djelatnosti književnika i leksikografa toga kruga (S. Težak, J. Vončina).

**„VÍGAN BURITTATOM HAZÁM HAMUJÁVAL...”
 „VESELO SE POKRIVAM PRAHOM DOMA SVOGA...“
 (GRIJEH I MUČENIŠTVO U MAĐARSKOJ ZRINIJADI)**

SÁNDOR BENE

Znanstvenici mnogo raspravljaju o tome koliko se mađarskih i koliko hrvatskih junaka borilo u vojsci Nikole Šubića Zrinskog i je li se sam Zrinski više osjećao Hrvatom ili Mađarom. U tom razdoblju međutim možda je od nacionalnog identiteta čak važniji vjerski identitet. S tim u vezi, u povijesnoj znanosti vlada konsenzus: sigetski junak bio je iznimno tolerantan prema protestantima, njegov sin Juraj Zrinski bio je pak, što je općepoznato, protestant. Pod utjecajem Pétera Pázmánya u sljedećem naraštaju obitelj se ipak vratila na katoličku vjeru, no Jurjev unuk, ban i pjesnik Nikola Zrinski također je bio poznat po svojoj neobičnoj vjerskoj trpeljivosti: mađarski protestanti od njega su se nadali zaštiti na saborima, a portret Martina Luthera i njegove supruge, koji je on naslijedio od djeda, držao je u svojoj biblioteci, uz portrete predaka. Međutim, u mađarskoj historiografiji književnosti mnogo su se godina vodile žustre rasprave o „temeljnoj ideji” *Opsade Sigeta (Obsidio Sigetiana)*: neki su u mučeništvu junaka koji su žrtvovali svoj život vidjeli katoličke mučenike, a neki su isticali: smrt Zrinskoga i njegovih junaka dobiva svoje pravo značenje u okviru protestantskog poimanja „nacionalni grijeh – kolektivno pokajanje”. U izlaganju se ispituje to, do danas neriješeno, pitanje u svjetlu izvora spjeva (i ciklusa *Syrena*).

Na vrhuncu djela *Obsidio Sigetiana*, neposredno prije proboja, čuje se posljednji govor Nikole Zrinskoga, u kojem svoje junake – kroz cijeli spjev provodeći „pedagogiju smrti” – uvjerava u nužnost mučeničke smrti i pokazuje im „lijepu krunu” koju im je izradio Bog, to jest nadu nebeske nagrade. Junaci s radošću primaju njegove riječi i ta gotovo ekstatična sreća ne napušta ih sve do trenutka smrti. Temeljna misao govora: „zbog naših grijeha” (odnosno grijeha naroda koji predstavljaju branitelji utvrde), Bog se više ne srdi na nas, vojnici su otkupili ne samo sebe već i cijeli svoj narod. Govor te „grijehe” spominje općenito, ne razlaže ih – i usporedimo li to s neposrednim izvorom, kratkim spjevom zadarskog pjesnika Brne Karnarutića (*Vazetje Sigeta grada*) – uočljivo je u kojoj mjeri Zrinski preoblikuje nazore militantno katoličkog autora. Karnarutić jednoznačno govori o grijesima protiv „rimske Crkve” i navodi ih kao izvor moralne propasti društva, nedostatak

solidarnosti, zavist, opijanje. Na citiranome mjestu spjeva (15. pjevanje) pjesnik preuzima samo zaključak koji potiče na „dobro raspoloženu smrt“ i stavlja ga u pradjedova usta – dok prvu polovicu nabrojanih moralnih grijeha iskazuje vlastitim riječima, kojima govori o Božjoj srdžbi, grijesima zbog kojih protiv Mađara šalje Turke za kaznu. No i iz tih strofa izostaju retci o rimskoj Crkvi, nabrajaju se samo moralni grijesi (mržnja, rasipništvo, krađa, ubojstva, pijanstvo).

Nikola Zrinski svjesno smješta svoga pretka u imaginarni svijet u kojem se čini kao da se vjerski raskol još nije ni dogodio: kolektivni vjerski zločin (Mađari „izdaju“ Boga) ne interpretira s gledišta vjeroispovijesti, čime odstupa od katoličkih, ali i protestantskih polemičara svojega doba (koji su se međusobno optuživali za vjerski raskol). Za provjeru vrijedi ispitati referentna mjesta prijevoda *Syrene* Petra Zrinskoga: u svakom slučaju nalazimo tendenciozan tekst, Petar u prvo pjevanje ugrađuje strofu koje u izvorniku (u mađarskom spjevu) nema i u kojoj „krijumčari natrag“ Karnarutićeve optužbe o protestantskim zločinima protiv rimske Crkve.

Pitanje je sljedeće: ako je pojam zločina u mađarskom spjevu vjeroispovijesno neutralan, u kakvu se ideološkom okviru može interpretirati mučeništvo pretrpljeno zbog zločina? Odgovor na to daje ciklus *Syrena* u cjelini. „Radnja“ lirske pripovijesti: pjesnik Zrinski prvo u obliku Orfeja simbolično „biva proklet“ zbog grijeha pretjerane ljubavi – potom ponovno uskrisava kao Heraklo i u završnoj pjesmi zbirke, u *Peroratiu*, obećava vlastitu mučeničku smrt za otkupljenje svoga naroda. „Veselo se pokrивam prahom doma moga...“: zgusnuti zaključni redak prisjeća se ne samo pradjeda kojeg namjerava slijediti i šačice vojske mučenika pokopanih pod pepeo Szigetvára nego ide Senekinim tragovima. Junak koji svojom patnjom samog sebe otkupljuje od grijeha i koji prihvaća smrt u plamenu aludira na Heraklovu dramu na Eti (*Hercules Oetaeus*). Dakle mučeništvo mađarske *Zrinijade* izvorna je konstrukcija: kristijanizirano stoičko mučeništvo, s protestantskim elementima – dok se hrvatska *Zrinijada* vraća poznatoj i domaćoj tradiciji, protureformacijskom, katoličkom poimanju mučeništva.

SJEĆANJE NA OPSADU SIGETA I NIKOLU ŠUBIĆA ZRINSKOG U MAĐARSKOJ KNJIŽEVNOJ TRADICIJI (18. – 19. STOLJEĆE)

GÁBOR TŰSKÉS

U ovom radu pošao sam od činjenice da je sjećanje Sulejmana II. na opsadu Sigeta 1566. i na Nikolu Šubića Zrinskog u biti međunarodni fenomen. To sjećanje ima nekoliko regionalnih i drugih varijanti, međutim treba ih ispitivati iz međunarodne perspektive, interdisciplinarno i pomoću komparativnih metoda. Uzevši u obzir sve razlike, prikaz Sigeta u historiografiji, književnosti, umjetnosti, glazbi, vojnoj i političkoj filozofiji europskih zemalja pokazuje neku vrstu jedinstva. Može se uočiti nekoliko interakcija između različitih nacionalnih tradicija i žanrova, a iz tog razloga djela i dokumenti mogu se samo razumjeti zajedno, u njihovoj ukupnosti.

Sjećanje na opsadu Sigeta 1566., kao i sjećanja na Mohačku bitku iz 1526. i opsadu Egera 1552., zamršeno je i isprepleteno s poviješću 150 godina duge osmanske okupacije Mađarske. Sama opsada jedna je od glavnih tema u književnim obradama borbe protiv Turaka u XVI. i XVII. stoljeću, a traga u mađarskoj, hrvatskoj i njemačkoj književnosti ostavila je i nakon toga. Povijest književnih obrada pokazuje jaku povezanost između mađarske i hrvatske književnosti i njezinu ukorijenjenost u srednjoeuropsku tradiciju.

Glavni cilj ovog rada jest predstaviti mađarsku književnu tradiciju Sigeta i Zrinskog iz vremena s početka XVIII. pa sve do kraja XIX. stoljeća i ocrtati proces izgradnje tog sjećanja i formiranja pojedinoga nacionalnog narativa. Drugi mi je cilj bio osvrnuti se na zaokret, definirati glavne karakteristike i identificirati funkcije sjećanja na Siget. Obazret ću se i na postupak formiranja mita tijekom kojeg se sjećanja iz prošlosti kondenziraju u pričama koje oblikuju iskustvo sadašnjosti i budućnosti. Prije svega istaknut ću one primjere iz književnosti koji su visoke kvalitete i koji se smatraju važnim za povijest književnih tema (*Stoffgeschichte*). Govorit ću o alternativnim oblicima memorije pokušavajući izbjeći perspektivu „herojskog čina – herojske patnje“. Iako tradicija u likovnoj umjetnosti pokazuje nekoliko točaka križanja s književnošću, o tome ovom prilikom neću raspravljati jer sam to učinio na međunarodnoj konferenciji o dvojici Nikola Zrinskih u Budimpešti 2007., s koje je objavljen i zbornik.

Nakon povijesnog epa Nikole Zrinskog *Obsidio Sygethiana* (*Opsada Sigeta*, Beč, 1651.), više od 80 godina u Mađarskoj nije bilo publikacije ili novoga

književnog djela o opsadi Sigeta. Razlog je dvojak: s jedne strane, bilo bi vrlo teško nadmašiti standarde koje je utvrdio Nikola Zrinski. S druge strane, povijesni kontekst nije bio sklon književnoj obradi takvih domoljubnih tema, s obzirom na činjenicu da se radilo o posljednjim desetljećima osmanske okupacije, kad su Habsburgovci nametnuli svoj apsolutizam.

Događaji iz osmanskih ratova Mađarskoj su dali gotovo nepresušan izvor za školske drame u 18. stoljeću. Znamo za 14 isusovačkih predstava s tematikom Zrinskog u razdoblju između 1740. i 1770., postavljenih u više od deset mjesta. U drugom dijelu 18. stoljeća Zrinski se obično predstavljao kao primjer kršćanske vjere, odanosti kralju i domoljublja.

Krajem 18. stoljeća dolazi do evolucije pravoga književnog kulta Zrinskog u sklopu koje je postao simbol nacionalnog otpora, želje za povratkom izgubljene veličine, težnje za neovisnošću, a s druge strane simbol habsburškog carskog domoljublja. Od 1780. pa nadalje sve je više i više mađarskih književnih djela na tu temu, a nakon 1790. ima i monarhističkih i jozefinističkih pisaca njemačkog, austrijskog i mađarskog podrijetla koji simpatiziraju sustav i stavljaju Zrinskog u službu habsburških interesa u svojim njemačkim djelima koja su prevedena na mađarski.

U prvim desetljećima 19. stoljeća dolazi do pravog preporoda te teme: Zrinski je među prvima kanoniziran kao herojski i nacionalni ideal. Tijekom 19. stoljeća Szigetvár je postao poznato spomen-mjesto mađarske nacionalne prošlosti, zajedno s Egerom i Mohačem. Zrinski je pak predstavljen kao simbol moralnih načela utvrđenih za Mađare te je postao sastavni dio nacionalnog identiteta. Namjere i ambicije sadašnjosti bile su u velikoj mjeri projicirane na idealizirane figure prošlosti, uključujući Zrinskog. U prvoj polovici 19. stoljeća zapovjednik Zrinski i epovi iz 17. stoljeća dobili su političku važnost te su tako i interpretirani. U drugoj polovici stoljeća Zrinski je uzdignut na razinu nacionalne kultne osobe koja simbolizira antinjemački i antiaustrijski nacionalizam. Tema je otvorila put za sentimentalnu ekspanziju, razradu tragikomičnih situacija i uvođenje humora u popularne suvremene žanrove. Većina prilagodbi može se opisati kao napetost između povijesne autentičnosti i davanja primjera, stereotipa i individualizacije te normativne evaluacije i narativnih metoda koje potiču simpatije.

Poticajnu moć književne tradicije pokazuje i činjenica da je Zrinski ostao nositelj različitih težnji i složenih značenja sve do kraja stoljeća; u isto vrije-

me njegov lik prošao je postupnu sekularizaciju. Na prijelazu stoljeća postalo je sve više i više praksom spomenuti njegovo ime, dušu ili duh i utkati ih u pjesme u različitim korelacijama. Neki od pokušaja dramatizacije manje su uspješni jer im nedostaje mogućnost razrade lika heroja i drugih likova. Većina autora vratila se istim izvorima, bilo izravno bilo neizravno, te nisu težili izvornoj obradi povijesnog materijala. Sve to dovelo je do toga da su radnja i motivi bili u velikoj mjeri slični.

Vrhunac romantizma, točnije tijekom 1820-ih i 1830-ih godina, bilo je razdoblje kad je nekoliko pjesama tretiralo likove obojice zapovjednika i pjesnika Zrinskih, paralelno s jačanjem otpora plemstva (usmjerenog na stjecanje neovisnosti o Austriji) i s komemoracijama u Szigetváru započetima 1833. Većina tih pjesama predstavlja različite verzije domoljubne poezije. U 1840-ima pjesnici, kritizirajući tadašnje stanje i austrijsko ugnjetavanje, dižu svoj glas više nego ikad prije. U 1850-ima svjedočimo isticanju romantičnih elemenata u književnim obradama teme, a poznati aspekti odanosti kralju i vjeri nakratko dobivaju istaknuto mjesto.

Tragovi drugačije perspektive, zajedno s novim motivima, mogu se otkriti u tragediji u stihu *Sigetski mučenici* (*A szigetvári vértanúk*, 1860.) Móra Jókaija te u romanu *Nova Zrinijada* (*Új Zrínyiász*) Kálmána Mikszátha iz 1898. Jókai počinje demontirati paradigmu herojskog sjećanja, a Mikszáth završava taj proces. Obojica vode prema modernom načinu komemorativnog razmišljanja. Jókaiju je glavni cilj kritizirati one koji su protiv interesa zemlje istovremeno izražavajući nadu da otpadnici mogu nakon svega biti dobri domoljubi. Osim toga, igra predstavlja interakciju različitih književnih trenutaka osmanske opsade: ljubav između odmetnika i Anne paralelna je s onom Omara i Ide u Vörösmartyjevu epu *Eger* (1827.). Austrijska cenzura dozvolila je gostovanje Jókaijeve drame tek nakon nekih izmjena, ali i u tom obliku to je bio jedan od komada koji se najčešće igrao tijekom apsolutizma, s funkcijom da poziva duh nacije na buđenje. Desetljećima se djelo smatralo predstavnikom nacionalne drame. Ona je postala dio komemorativnih svečanosti: bila je postavljena kao gala predstava na 300. obljetnicu smrti Zrinskog, kao i tijekom proslave milenija 1896.

Mikszáthev roman ismijava lažni nacionalni identitet koji prevladava u posljednjim desetljećima 19. stoljeća, kao i samoobmanjivanje lažima društvenih i političkih zbivanja i načina razmišljanja u tom razdoblju. To je istovremeno važan pokušaj obnove književne tradicije Zrinskog. Mikszáth se

koristi strategijom historiografske metafikcije, a povijesni događaj uzima samo kao polazište; on razvija, ažurira i radi parodiju od toga usmjeravajući ga prema anegdotskom i apsurdnom. Ustvari, on prikazuje Dan posljednjeg suda i smješta uskrsllog Zrinskog i njegove drugove u stvarnost Mađarske kraja 19. stoljeća. Zrinski osigurava samo okvir za autorsku namjeru i postaje protagonist političke satire, a njegov mit alegorijski se projicira u fikciju. U skiciranju njegova lika Mikszáth se mogao osloniti na trenutne historiografske rezultate drugog dijela 19. stoljeća. Ipak, njegov pogled na povijest diferenciraniji je i osjetljiviji od pogleda većine tadašnjih povjesničara. On ne dovodi u pitanje junaštvo, ali povezuje ga s kvalitetama i obrascima ponašanja koji su neprihvatljivi u suvremenom svijetu.

SIGETSKA BITKA U HRVATSKOJ OPERI

SANJA MAJER-BOBETKO

Sigetska bitka, u kojoj je poginuo i Nikola Zrinski, jedno je od mitskih mjesta hrvatske povijesti. Stoga ne čudi da je u domoljubnom 19. stoljeću našla odjeka i na glazbenoj sceni. Međutim, kako je poznato, ta je bitka bila sudbinska za budućnost Europe uopće, pa nije bila inspirativna samo hrvatskim umjetnicima.

O drami Zriny Theodora Körnera

Ishodišna točka budućih glazbeno-scenskih uprizorenja bila je drama *Zriny* njemačkoga romantičkoga pisca Theodora Körnera (1791. – 1813.), koji je pripadao krugu *pjesnika ratova za oslobođenje*, odnosno ratova protiv Napoleona (1813. i 1814), te je u njima, ne napunivši ni 22 godine, i poginuo.

Tragediju (*Trauerspiel*) *Zriny* u pet činova napisao je 1812. godine. Koliko je poznato, u Zagrebu je u razdoblju 1832. – 1834. izvedena u izvornom obliku, dakle na njemačkom jeziku, tri puta. Druga izvedba od 4. listopada 1834. posebno se ističe u povijesti hrvatskoga kazališta jer je njome obilježeno otvorenje nove kazališne zgrade, tzv. Stankovićeva kazališta na Markovu trgu. Tijekom 19. stoljeća izvedena je u raznim hrvatskim prijevodima (S. Marjanović Brođanin, Špiro Dimitrović Kotoranin) još sedam puta u Zagrebu i tri puta u Sisku.

O glazbenoscenskim uprizorenjima Körnerove drame Zriny

Koliko je dosad poznato, Körnerova drama potakla je šestoricu autora na skladanje glazbenoscenskih djela: Franza Xavera Kleinheinza (1765. – 1832.), Franza Josepha (Františka Josefa) Gläsera (1798. – 1861.), Alberta de Vleeshouwera (1863. – ?), Kurta Weilla (1900. – 1950.), Augusta Adelburga Abramovića (1830. – 1873.) i Ivana pl. Zajca (1832. – 1814.). Za hrvatski kulturnološki prostor vezane su dvije opere: Abramovićev *Zrinyi*, odnosno *Zrinjski*, i Zajčev *Nikola Šubić Zrinjski*, te se u izlaganju posebna pozornost posvećuje upravo tim dvjema operama, od skladateljskih i libretističkih postupaka do scenskih uprizorenja.

O operi Zrinyi Augusta Adelburga Abramovića

Violinist i skladatelj hrvatsko-talijanskog podrijetla te libretist vlastitih glazbenoscenskih djela (*Zrinyi*, *Martinuzzi* i *Wallenstein*) August Adelburg Abramović skladao je svoju operu *Zrinyi* najprije na njemački tekst, potom ga je preveo na hrvatski, a nakraju i na mađarski. Razvidno je također da je skladana u povodu 300. obljetnice Sigetske bitke jer ju je 1866. najprije predložio za izvođenje u Zagrebu. Međutim, institucionalizirane zagrebačke opere još nije bilo, pa ni odgovarajućeg izvedbenog sastava za njegovu operu u pet činova s 12 opernih solista, baletom, golemim orkestrom i zborom, te je prijedlog odbijen.

Razumljivo odlučan u namjeri da njegova „povijesna dramska glazbena freska u pet činova“, kako sam naziva svoju operu, zaživi na sceni, Adelburg je nudi peštanskoj operi, udovoljava zahtjevima uprave; prevodi libreto na mađarski i u glazbenu strukturu inkorporira elemente mađarskoga glazbenog folklora. Tako prerađena te uz još neke preinake, poglavito stanovita i prijeko potrebna kraćenja, opera je praižvedena 23. lipnja 1868. u Pešti. Zahvaljujući temi i mađarskom jeziku libreta, dočekana je s oduševljenjem i u redovima glazbenih kritičara. Oni međutim Adelburgovu operu nisu ocijenili visoko samo s motrišta nacionalnog već i umjetničkog kriterija.

Opera *Zrinyi* pala je međutim u zaborav našavši svoje mjesto u rijetkim novinskim napisima, a u hrvatskoj glazbenoj historiografiji tek kao povijesna činjenica u nekim glazbenopovijesnim sintezama. Pokušaj njezine revitalizacije u zagrebačkoj operi, što ga je devedesetih godina prošlog stoljeća inicirao romanopisac, zaljubljenik u operu i glazbeni kritičar Nedjeljko Fabrio, nije urodio plodom.

O operi Nikola Šubić Zrinski Ivana pl. Zajca

Kako je dobro znano, potpuno je drukčija sudbina *Nikole Šubića Zrinjskog* Ivana pl. Zajca. Naime, za razliku od Adelburgove opere, Zajčevo se djelo trajno zadržalo na repertoaru svih hrvatskih opernih kuća. Nakon prai-zvedbe 4. studenoga 1876. u zagrebačkoj Operi, *Nikola Šubić Zrinski* premijerno je izveden u HNK u Osijeku 1908., u HNK u Splitu 1941. te napokon po završetku Drugoga svjetskog rata 1946. u Rijeci. Zaredale su brojne izvedbe, nova redateljska čitanja i nove postave u svim hrvatskim operama, a plejada najistaknutijih hrvatskih dirigenata, počevši od samog Ivana pl. Zajca, ravnala je izvedbama u kojima su nastupale sve generacije pjevača tijekom duge izvedbene povijesti. *Zrinjski* je jednostavno postao dijelom standardnog repertoara i još uvijek, kako je istaknuo Stanislav Tuksar, funkcionira kao „hrvatski Nabucco“ predstavljajući herojski patriotizam kao *omen* hrvatske pobjede.

Libreto je prema Körnerovoj drami napisao Hugo Badalić (1851. – 1900.). Premda je Badalićev libretto zamjetno bliži Körnerovu izvorniku od Adelburgova, on je također skratio radnju, izbacio pojedine likove te skratio stih s jedanaesterca uglavnom na šesterce i osmerce, što se pokazalo sretnijim rješenjem za uglazbljivanje, ali i na deseterce, poglavito u pojedinim zbornim ulomcima. Usto deseterački stih izravno asocira na narodnu epsku poeziju, što je Badaliću i bila namjera. Najčešće se kao primjer ističe zbor *Tako nama Boga velikoga* u *Zakletvi Zrinjskoga*, gdje apostrofiranje stiha *Tako meni/nama Boga velikoga* jasno pokazuje vezu sa stalnim formulama iz epskih pjesama.

U konačnici Zajčeva opera ima tri čina s osam slika i 32 prizora. Međutim, valja istaknuti da je završni zbor *U boj!* nastao još za Zajčevih bečkih godina. Skladan je naime 10 godina ranije na tekst Franje Markovića u povodu obilježavanja 300. obljetnice bitke između hrvatsko-ugarskih i osmanlijskih snaga kod Sigeta, a prai-zvelo ga je u Beču 1866. Akademsko društvo Velebit. Kuriozum u vezi s tim zborom jest njegova velika popularnost u Japanu, gdje njegov repertoar muški zborovi pjevaju na hrvatskom jeziku.

Na razini glazbenog izričaja Zajcu su se, uz brojne pohvale, općenito ipak upućivali dvojaki prigovori: s pozicija zagovornika nacionalnog smjera, kojima Zajčeva glazba nije dovoljno nacionalna, s jedne strane, i s pozicija zagovornika *moderne*, kojima je Zajčeva glazba bila nadiđena i konzervativna, s druge. Međutim, Zajc je u *Zrinjskom*, uz uobičajenu belcantističku maniru, uspio realizirati i pojedine ulomke folklornog ozračja i modernije strukture.

Potonje se poglavito očituje u sporadičnim glazbenim simpatijama za Wagnerovu koncepciju. Kao potpuni *novum* valja istaknuti sekvencu Jelenina sna s pjevom vila, koji se na sceni vizualizira, što je uopće rijetka pojava u europskoj operi. A *novum* na hrvatskoj sceni jest i sama pojava plesnih ulomaka, pa se 4. studenoga 1876. drži početkom djelovanja zagrebačkoga baletnog ansambla.

Valja istaknuti i da *Zrinski* nije stekao svoju golemu popularnost samo na temelju rodoljubnog herojstva već i na temelju svojih autentičnih umjetničkih vrijednosti. U njemu se sjajno isprepliću drama i lirika, snažna dinamika masovnih scena i dramski psihološki razrađeni momenti. A sve to čini ga Zajčevim remek-djelom.

Kako je razvidno, u okviru Zajčeva opusa, koji broji oko 1.000 djela, *Nikoli Šubiću Zrinjskom* pripada posebno mjesto. Takvo mjesto zauzima i u okviru hrvatskoga kulturološkog okružja među umjetničkim djelima kojima je legendarna Sigetska bitka bila inspiracijom. Ta je najuspjelija opera hrvatskog romantizma postala naime legendarna kao i bitka sama.

SUMMARIES

THE EXPANSION OF THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE FROM SOUTHEAST EUROPE TOWARDS CENTRAL EUROPE FROM THE SECOND HALF OF THE 14TH CENTURY TO THE LATE 16TH CENTURY: AIMS AND RESULTS

PÁL FODOR

After 1453, Hungary would come to take centre stage in the Ottoman Turkish conquest plans, if at the time this was still shared with some Mediterranean and Near East targets. But as these latter areas would gradually come under Ottoman control, so would Hungary rise up the list of countries to be conquered, until it was top of the list. The reasons for this were manifold.

Foreign policy factors: from the end of the 15th century, the Ottomans could see with increasing clarity the opportunities afforded by the division in the Western world left by the decline of the crusader spirit and the political capital of the Papacy that had stood behind it. It was also reassuring to the Ottoman Porte that, from the turn of the century onwards, the European powers saw her not only as a religious enemy but as a potential ally, as one of the players in Europe's power struggles, and actively sought her friendship. *Economic factors:* the greater part of the Ottoman state's resources and income originated from the Balkans, and although, following the conquest of the Near East, the significance of this area would diminish, it retained its primary role. The Ottomans had thoroughly explored and were fully informed about the Central European lands, and assumed that their acquisition would be financially advantageous (or at least not be disadvantageous). *Factors relating to domestic politics:* the most important would seem to be the pressure exerted by the troops stationed in Rumelia. By all accounts, there did exist a 'Rumelian lobby' whose demands and methods were not unlike those of the Ottoman military élite in Bosnia and Hungary in the years prior to the Long War of 1593–1606. In both cases many decades had passed since any great imperial campaigns had been launched against Hungary or Croatia. Soldiers, desirous of prebends and loot, and whose numbers were inflated by the presence of volunteers, were ever more impatiently waiting for new occupations of territory from where to extend their raids to more and more new areas fresh for exploitation. Suleyman's turn to the West was also inspired by the public mood in Ottoman society. His subjects were sick

and tired of decades of wars against Muslims; his soldiers wished to fight on European territories that promised richer pickings. *Ideological reasons*: Jihad, the order to holy war, was not even the first of these, though ever more evidence suggests that Suleyman felt this to be a personal obligation. Since the turn of the 15th century, the Ottoman sultans had considered themselves to be descendants of the conqueror Alexander the Great and this conviction had gradually become state ideology. But the Byzantine legacy would become even more significant. With the occupation of Constantinople in 1453, the sultans became the heirs of the Byzantine (Roman) emperors, and they claimed that, as 'Turkish-Roman padishahs', they were the sole rulers of the world, just as the Roman and Eastern Roman emperors had once been. Thus Suleyman had from the first moment set his sights on Italy and on Charles V, who also desired to acquire her; his imagination was transfixed by the conquest of Italy and world dominance. This is why Suleyman would also consider it his obligation, once in control of the imperial city (*sedes imperii*) to restore the Roman Empire and to establish the third Rome.

But on the path to Italy, to Rome or to Vienna there stood a frustratingly stubborn country referred to as *Ungurus*, which for more than a century had not only resisted, but even struck back quite forcefully. For this reason, Hungary occupied a special place in Ottoman politics and imagination. It became a mortal enemy in the same way that the Ottoman Empire itself had become an archenemy of Hungary in the early 15th century. According to the Ottomans, as organizers of the Crusades, the Hungarians were constantly striving for the elimination of the empire and of Islam. In their eyes, that is, neighbouring Hungary, as the only power capable of resistance, became a symbol of the whole Christian world, and from 1453 it took on the role previously played by Byzantium. Thus, the defeat of Hungary was a prerequisite for the conquest of Rome and attaining world dominance.

It is evident that an attack on Hungary in 1521 was part of this global grand strategy. If one is aware of the Central European military actions carried out by the Ottomans in the first half of the 16th century and of the imperial ideologies that lay behind them, one would have to be blind not to see that, unlike the three other fronts (Iran, the Indian Ocean, the Mediterranean), the Ottoman leadership considered the Hungarian 'front' to be the most important. It seems Suleyman judged that he had the economic and military strength with which to attack the Latin world in the hope of success.

The breakthrough into the West did indeed begin in promising fashion. The occupation of Buda did not succeed at first, but that of Belgrade did. Despite unexpected domestic difficulties, by the end of 1524 the Sultan had ordered a new Hungarian campaign to be arranged (but delayed because of the long sojourn in Ibrahim pasha in Egypt). The triumph at Mohács dispelled any doubts, but also thoroughly misled the ruler. It led him to believe that henceforth nothing and no one would be able to stand in his way, and this in turn led him ever more often to read the situation incorrectly. Even the failure of the two sieges of Vienna (1529, 1532) and the growing need for reinforcements on the other fronts would only temporarily distract him from returning to the implementation of his grand plan. It would take him many years to understand that he had made a miscalculation, and had overestimated his strength. After gaining victories in the 1530s on the Iranian front as well as on the Mediterranean front against Emperor Charles V, Süleyman again headed towards Central Europe. In 1541 he occupied Buda, and established the first Ottoman province in Hungary in order to bring his supply lines closer to Vienna. He had originally planned to incorporate the Szapolyai-run part of the country in full, and to capture the leaders of the pro-Turkish party, but after acquiring the Hungarian capital his intentions changed. He passed over control of Tiszántúl and Transylvania nominally to John Sigismund Szapolyai and his guardians. King Ferdinand would also express an interest in the eastern part of Hungary, believing as he did that, as Hungary's legitimately elected ruler, everything pertaining to the Holy Crown was rightly his. As such, the future of Tiszántúl and Transylvania depended on the result of the inevitable clash between the two great powers – a clash that would also serve to decide the fate of the whole of Central Europe.

The first act of the struggle took place in 1542. German imperial troops besieged Ottoman Pest, but would suffer a humiliating defeat. In the following year, the sultan again marched against Vienna. Although he would make significant gains during his campaign, he did not manage to get as far as his chief target of Vienna. This did not curb his enthusiasm, however, and in the second half of 1544 he set about preparing for a historic campaign greater than those before it. Yet, on 12 April 1545, he halted these protracted and very costly preparations, determining that the campaign be 'adjourned'. It is still not entirely clear why he brought this decision. At any rate,

in summer 1547 Suleyman signed a treaty with the Habsburg brothers, in which he insisted on including the fiction that all of Hungary belonged to him, though he accepted Ferdinand's *de facto* authority in the areas which were really under his control. Suleyman's 'great plan', namely the conquest of Hungary and the West, had already failed on the battlefield many years before, perhaps at the end of the 1520s or the beginning of the 1530s; now he was merely stamping this failure with his official seal. When he set off on his last Hungarian campaign in 1566, his only objective can have been damage limitation: with the occupation of Szigetvár and Gyula, he attempted to stabilize the Principality of Transylvania he had created in 1553–56, on the one hand, and the Ottoman dominion in Hungary and Croatia, on the other. He was successful, but this was as far a cry from his original intentions. This is why I am of the opinion that both the sultan's final victory in 1566 and the fortress of Szigetvár itself, can be seen as symbols of the failure of Ottoman ambitions to attain universal rule.

CROATIA AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE FROM MID-15TH CENTURY TO THE END OF THE 16TH CENTURY

NENAD MOAČANIN

The effects of the attacks in the 15th century were for Croatian lands more severe than the conquest itself. It needs pointing out that the notion that ravages automatically play the role of an introduction to conquest is not completely true. It used to be true. Invasions nevertheless took place rather frequently even at times when – at the highest level of military-political planning – conquering of a certain area was not considered. The main motive thereby was of economic nature (exceptionally important role of the war booty, slaves in particular). On the other hand, there was ideological foundation for it in the Islamic code (non-Islamic, even heretic countries as *the house of war*, *darülharb*). Plunder invasion is commonly referred to as *gaza*, a term originating from old-Arabic pre-Islamic age. The term *gaza* is sometimes mistaken for the term *jihad* (*cihad*), yet in the strict sense of the word, *jihad* means defence war and hence requests general mobilisation (*nefir-i 'am*), which is not the case with *gaza* (which can, yet does not have to precede the conquest).

In practice, the model of ravaging / conquering was based on the unwritten rule stating that, if a certain territory had been devastated to such an extent that it no longer made any major profit, it should be permanently occupied in order to become re-colonised and capable of bringing another kind of profit, now in the form of tribute owed to landowners – a portion of agricultural production. Even in this context, the matter in question was more often pressure from the landowners' *lobby* (Rumelian concretely) than a direct decision made at the highest hierarchical level. This mainly applied to Pannonian and peri-Pannonian parts in the context of general conflict with Hungary. In Adriatic hinterland the situation was less complicated, considering major role of trans-humane cattle breeding, and due to the fact that demographic and economic capacities of the Vlachs, such as they were, were neither swiftly not easily spent. However, the newly established Ottoman-Bosnian class of warriors, which also included Croatian converts, rather inventively managed to profit even in partly unfavourable circumstances (by usurping the best land and reallocating the tribute in money to landowners instead to the state treasury).

1. Consequently, regarding all the aforementioned, even the greatest war conflict with far-reaching effects – the battle of Krbava in 1493 – took place in the context of *gaza*-like actions. It is possible that one of the effects thereof was that in 1494, the presence of a *Croatian delegation* was recorded in Edirne; the delegation came there at the same time as Hungarian one, but separately. At that moment, no conquest was planned in the northwestern border area, and no territorial-political changes were made. Moreover, neither the otherwise frequent sequence of events followed – the power-holders and the population in the affected area did not state they would submit to the sultan. The latter, however, marked the first phase of the expansion of the Empire in Croatian Southeast, i.e. Ottoman expansion in the area between the rivers Neretva and Cetina (1470–1516). The attack was not particularly encouraged; yet, as local Croatian military-political factors became weaker in relation to the pressure, Ottoman powers managed to conquer certain bases. In the ages of Bayezid II (1481–1512) and Selim I (1512–1520), an almost spontaneous expansion at the local level (major role of mainly pro-Turkish oriented Vlachs; destruction of Croatian tampon-zone to Venetian possessions in the context of frequent Venetian-Turkish wars) took place. A longer-term stabilisation of the border, which followed in 1537, was a consequence of the liqui-

dition of the remains of royal bases in the Adriatic hinterland as the aimed conquest within the wider framework of Suleiman's warfare in Hungary. Around 1525, temporary organisational unit named Croatian Vilayet with the seat in Sinj or (more probably) Drniš was formed; it was subsequently, after the fall of the Klis fort, incorporated into the newly established Klis Sanjak. Until 1500, the territory between Livno and Kamengrad, where there had been no strictly defined authority for decades, had been conquered in a similar fashion.

2. Typologically alike, yet *belated*, expansion took place in the central borderline sector between the rivers Una and Kupa. Following the stabilisation of the borderline between the rivers Drava and Sava in the early 1550s, conquests in this territory continued up to the 1590s. Croatian nobility was no longer in the position to successfully defend their estates, and they wished not to surrender their fortifications to the king. Bosnian *lobby* expected new estates. However, the Ottomans could not re-colonise the major part of the newly conquered territory due to the fact that the Habsburg system of military border grew ever stronger; the area remained therefore no man's land for the most part. Members of the ruling class managed, nevertheless, to usurp arable land, which fact disabled the introduction of a regular system. Finally, the majority of the *lobbyists* lost their lives in the battle of Sisak in 1593, which in a paradoxical way reinforced the position of the local elite (inheritable family land possessions as an element in the direction of feudalisation). In this area, it had for a long while been endeavoured to establish a military administrative unit – first in Ostrožac, then in Petrinja, and later – in 1594 – briefly even in Sisak; eventually, Bihać became the seat of the sanjak.

3. After the fall of the Jajce Banovina, another vilayet was probably established in the territory of the present northwest Bosnia; this assumption is based upon the fact that Banja Luka had not been mentioned in documents until ca 1540, when the seat of Bosnian Sanjak was moved there. It may be possible that the captain of Gradiška, who – in 1540 – presented himself as *Croatię et portu Zawoy dominus*, was in command of the whole area (the military district was formed in 1535). It was not automatically needed to immediately form even a temporary administrative unit such as vilayet in an utterly devastated area, with the enemy withdrawn, if no preconditions – such as at least partial presence of population or major strategic importance

– existed for such an action to be carried out. After the fall of the Srebrenica Banovina in 1512, that territory remained a kind of *no man's land* for a long time.

4. In Pannonian region among the rivers Sava, Drava and Danube, the rhythm of ravaging / conquering / turning into administrative units was mostly *regular*, as already mentioned in connection with the attack on Hungary during the early years of the reign of Suleiman I the Magnificent. The international political-strategic situation offered strong support to the interests of the *Rumelian lobby*, since the situation seemed exceptionally favourable (France; Protestantism) for successfully confronting the Habsburgs and subjugating the entire Hungary. A specific feature of the conquest of this area is that in the first period (until 1537 at the latest), Ottoman administration was not introduced to the full extent, due to both insecure wartime circumstances and the *reserve* option that at least a part of the territory was supposed to be given to King John Szapolyai. Until the beginning of the 1540s, the Vilayet of Srijem, even the Vilayet of Srijem (including the district of Osijek) and Požega are mentioned in the sources. It is indicative that in the insecure circumstances, profit was not yet allocated to the landowners, but belonged in the full amount to the bey. Same as in the case of the occupied Hungarian Transdanubia and the area up to the river Tisa, these administrative units were considered *unprofitable*. In addition to the pressure exercised by the class of landowners, invasions and conquests after the twenties were motivated by the imperial ideology of dominating the whole world, which imposed expansion in unfavourable circumstances, and lacking a clear strategic vision.

5. In evaluating the overall effects of the events and processes that had occurred between mid 15th century to the end of the 16th century, I feel the need to stress that, despite the impression that changes in all segments of life were spectacular in the negative sense, dramatic and to the most part purely destructive, the nature of these transformations is much more complex. They have primarily opened the path for shaping parameters on a new historical *stage*. These parameters would in the course of the centuries to come enable a new-Age national integration accompanied by new elements in the articulation of Croatian identity.

AT THE PERIPHERY OF THE WORLD OF ISLAM: OTTOMAN POLICY ON THE WESTERN FRONTIER, 1463-1593

FAHD KASUMOVIĆ

Over the last few decades, the centre-periphery paradigm variations often served as an influential conceptual marker in explaining the political, socio-economic and cultural features in the early modern world, as at the level of international relations, so within the different political entities. Many scholars that have been studying the aforesaid topic provided a valuable insight which broadened our understanding of the past and the present. Among the important scholarly achievements which saw the light of the day, one can surely mention the idea that states and societies have centres and peripheries whose relations are asymmetric and, in terms of power, can be described with the dichotomy – domination and subordination.

Taking those ideas as a point of departure, the main goal of this paper is to make a contribution to a better understanding of the dynamics of centre-periphery relations in the historical context of the Ottoman-Islamic civilisation. The complex nature of the mentioned question, as well as the practical reasons, persuaded me to focus my research interest on an important issue within that framework – the policy of the central government towards the frontier periphery at the Western Balkans; namely, towards the *sanjaks* of Bosnia, Herzegovina, Zvornik and Klis, in the period starting with the fall of the Kingdom of Bosnia (1463) and stretching to the Battle of Sisak (1593), when the Ottoman expansion at the north-west was dealt a crucial blow.

The central part of this paper opens with two practical questions: How did the political elites imagine the frontiers and borders? What, in terms of power relations, describes the position of border areas in the political horizons of the central government?

Ottoman imperial decrees and administrative registers designated the frontier as *serhad* (i.e. *serhat*), *uc* or *kenâr*, while the words usually used for borderline were *hadd* (pl. *hudûd*) and *şmur*. As witnessed by primary sources related to the *sanjaks* of the Western Balkans, mentioned terms could be traced during the entire period examined in this research.

The authorities did not usually define the size of the frontier area; consequently, it's not possible to know the exact line where the inland began or

where the borderland ended. But, what can be concluded is – the term of *serhat* is principally found in regions considered relatively close to the border (e.g. in certain parts of the *sanjak* of Bosnia, in the 16th century). Of course, that area was not fixed: it could change through time because of the shift of the border, which happened many times between 1463 and 1593. Besides, the whole territory of a *sanjak* was sometimes recognised as *serhat*, such as the case of the *sanjak* of Požega, for instance.

Regardless of the term used by the administration, centre and periphery stood at the opposite ends of the power relations continuum: the centre enjoyed political domination, while the periphery/frontier was subordinated. However, spatial and political marginality of the frontier did not at the same time mean that those territories were considered insignificant: on the contrary, the frontier society had a key role in defence and offensive campaigns; due to this, it also occupied an important place in the political discourse of the central authorities – although, primarily as an object, and not as a subject of the Ottoman policy.

One implication of the importance ascribed to border regions was the determination of the political actors of the Ottomans to integrate conquered territories into the state/social system of the Ottoman Empire. Because of that, it is necessary to examine the mechanisms by which the centre controlled the periphery, as well as the problems it encountered in achieving the aforementioned goal.

The pivotal feature of the Ottoman strategy of establishing and maintaining political control was unifying the administrative system with the Empire's military organisation. The mentioned assertion is also valid in the historical context of the Western Balkans in the 15th and 16th centuries: for example, we can speak of the social system in which the military class enjoyed important privileges, while positions of the high state officials – such were, for example, provincial governors – simultaneously had administrative, as well as military powers.

Members of the judicial and administrative apparatus (i.e. *kadis*) contributed to maintaining the control over the periphery, whereas administrative competences of Ottoman judges substantially exceeded the modern man's concept of powers compatible with the judicial function.

Also, the control over borderland *sanjaks* would hardly be imaginable without a great number of bureaucratic officials: they played their part in

making possible the military, political and administrative communication between the centre and the periphery.

Meeting the needs of the state apparatus required the establishment of an adequate system of finance. As a step on that road, the government sought ways to control natural resources: consequently, the vast areas of grain-producing land were declared the property of the state.

The endeavours of the centre to introduce the Ottoman vision of law and order in the Western Balkans were not always carried out without problems: it is possible to speak of the state officials' abuses in implementation of the law, the refusal of timariots to join the military campaigns, the evasion of taxes, the avoidance of crops production, depopulation, banditry etc. The documents show that the authorities resorted to different measures in order to prevent such phenomena: apparently, they were considered harmful to the interest of the state; but, in spite of that, their recurring appearance, from decade to decade, testify that it was not possible to eradicate all of such problems. Furthermore, the mentioned data are significant because they support the thesis that oppositions and even conflicts could be identified in the relations between the Ottoman Empire's political centre and its Western Balkans periphery.

Having in mind the aforesaid considerations, it seems appropriate to pose the following questions: Could the actions of the centre be interpreted as flexibility in political decision-making? Is it possible to identify such an approach in imperial orders related to the Empire's western periphery? Did flexibility play a part in maintaining the domination of the centre?

The capability of the Ottomans to adapt to historical circumstances of the Western Balkans is visible at several fields – namely in the sphere of the financial policy. The evidence for that thesis could be observed in the case of *resm-i filûrî* (the ducat tax) of the Vlach population.

For example, in the mid-16th century, the central authorities decided to reduce the amount of tax paid by some Vlach/*Eflâk* households in the *sanjak* of Bosnia. The official explanation of this act is of value to us: the aforesaid groups were not able to endure previously imposed amounts of tax and, as a consequence, fled their homes. Therefore, the authorities stressed it was necessary to make certain concessions, in order to get the mentioned population back to their homes. At the time, that solution was considered to be in the best interest of the state.

The very existence of the *filurî* tax should be interpreted as an act of adaptability of the Ottomans to the local conditions of the Western Balkans: the levy in question represented the peculiarity of some provinces and was not applied in all parts of the Empire.

Also, it is possible to observe the dynamics and the adaptability to the requirements of time/space in the issues of abolishing and reintroducing the *resm-i filûrî*. Following the changes in the state's needs, the authorities attempted to put an end to the mentioned tax in the late 1520s and in the early 1530s. That decision, however, was soon re-examined, mainly because of the occurrence of problems such as the increasing depopulation of the countryside. The *filurî* tax was established again in the headmost *sanjaks* of Bosnia, Hercegovina and Klis, but that was not the case in the *sanjaks* of Zvornik and Smederevo whose strategic importance diminished considerably after new conquests and the shift of the state's borders.

The flexibility thesis is supported as well by the data that the amount of the full *filurî* tax was not at the same level in all parts of the aforesaid provinces after its reintroduction: the tax was somewhat lower in the areas at the extreme frontier by comparison with the inland.

Besides, the mentioned examples show that the political flexibility of the Ottomans can be followed at the synchronic level, i.e. by identifying the simultaneous validity of different rules and regulations for different territories; as well, the research is possible on the diachronic level, which focuses mainly on determining the adaptability to changes and demands of time. Moreover, the flexible approach contributed to the maintenance of the centre's domination over the periphery and it represented an integral part of the Ottoman concept of politics.

At the end, it seems justified to conclude that, in the period between 1463 and 1593, the Western Balkans represented a periphery and a political object in the discourse of the central government: the land and the population were supposed to be ruled, while the chief political actor, the one making the decisions was – the sultan. This rhetoric was constructed in order to strengthen the legitimacy of the ruler. However, in the background, numerous decisions of the authorities were made by the high state officials, which were in the service of the sultan.

The centre-periphery relationship included the possibility of communication and interaction between the government and the population of the

frontier, but that did not produce the change of the official discourse on the position of “the just and benevolent ruler”.

Also, in spite of the old narratives about the inert Orientals, the analysis of primary sources has shown that the political approach of the Ottoman centre towards the periphery at the Western Balkans was characterised by pragmatism and flexibility. That was the result of the decisions made by the political actors within the central authorities in an attempt to stabilise the rule of the state on the strategically important north-western borders – the periphery of the world of Islam.

ANTI-OTTOMAN WRITINGS AND SEEKING HELP AT EUROPEAN COURTS

TOMISLAV RAUKAR

The term *Turkish danger* occurred in the context of the development of Croatian society – primarily in Dalmatian towns – in the second half of the 15th century; in particular after the mediaeval Bosnia became a part of the Ottoman Empire in 1463. Mathias Corvinus endeavoured to oppose Ottoman expansion by establishing the Jajce Banovina and the Srebrenica Banovina (1463/1464); nevertheless, towards the end of the 1460s, Turkish pressure in Croatian territory grew stronger by the day.

Endangerment caused by Turkish invasions of the territories of Dalmatian towns in the second half of the 15th century has in their development been expressed primarily in literary creations in Latin and Croatian. The collection of poems entitled *Elegiae et carmina* by George Šižgorić of Šibenik, published in Venice in 1477, includes the poem *Elegia de Sibenicensis agri vastatione* [Elegy on the devastation of the District of Šibenik], which was written towards the end of the 1460s and expresses how deep the antagonism between the communal world and Turkish aggressor was. A while later, most probably towards the end of the 15th century, Marko Marulić composed his *Molitva suprotiva Turkom* [Prayer against the Turks], in which he stressed that the citizens *suffered everyday mischief from Turkish hand*. It thereby needs pointing out that, since the basis for Šižgorić’s and Marulić’s verses were their personal impressions regarding the devastation of towns during Turkish attacks, they were not of programmatic nature, i.e. they did not include any precise political connotations.

Serious breaking point in the comprehension of Turkish danger happened only after Croatian nobility army had suffered crushing defeat at the hands of the Ottomans at the Krbava Field on 9 September 1493. Though the preserved sources contain very diverse and contradictory assessments regarding the number of victims among Croatian nobility and other members of Croatian army, it may still be concluded that human losses were of such proportion that the capabilities of Croatian Kingdom to put up resistance decreased. After it had suffered defeat at the Krbava Field, Croatian Kingdom was left unprotected from the powerful Ottoman Empire; this conclusion is substantiated by the fact that two weak and inefficient monarchs from the Jagiellon dynasty – Wladislas II and Louis II – ruled Croatia-Hungary at that time. In such circumstances, in the period between the end of the 15th century to mid 16th century, political documents (letters and speeches held at European courts by distinguished Croatian persons) seeking help for Croatia, which was endangered by the Turks, were composed. Both anti-Turkish writings and Šižgorić's and Marulić's poetry reflect, naturally, the authors' personal view regarding serious effects of Turkish attacks; however, the focal point thereof was at that time the fact that Croatia needed help from European rulers.

The majority of anti-Turkish documents and pleas for help were in that period directed to popes, since they were the only ones who disposed of influence that could gather Christian rulers and stimulate them to provide help to Croatia. In this context, on 27 September 1493, i.e. in the same month when the battle of Krbava was fought, George Divnić, Bishop of Nin, wrote a letter to Pope Alexander VI, describing the battle and asking for help for Croatia. He added a European-related element as well, warning the Pope of the fact that the Turks would – should they manage to submit Croatia to their power – have no more difficulties in getting ahead to the West.

As the help provided to Croatia was generally rather modest, except for the help from Pope Leo X, who sent a certain amount of money and war equipment to Croatian Ban Peter Berislavić in 1515 and 1516, and Croatia became increasingly endangered by the Turks, seeking help in the first quarter of the 16th century gradually turned into a threat of Croatia possibly becoming subjected to the Turks. In his speech *De Coruatiae desolatione*, which he held in 1516 in Rome before Pope Leo X, Simon Kožičić Benja, Bishop of Modruš, warned of the fact that *our people are forced to either make peace with the Turks or conclude a pact with them and pay them tribute.*

Similar viewpoints showed other distinguished Croatian persons as well in their efforts to receive help from European courts for Croatia. Thomas Niger from Split, delegate of Ban Peter Berislavić at the court of Pope Leo X, warned the Pope in 1519 that Croatia would – should it receive no help – be forced to submit to the Turks. Furthermore, in his *Letter to Pope Hadrian VI* (1522), Marko Marulić stressed that the Turks would – after they manage to submit Croatia to their power – have an open put towards the West. George Divnić warned of this danger as early as in 1493, following the battle of Krbava.

Attempts made by distinguished Croatian persons to secure – at European courts – help for Croatia via Papal power, and thereby also to open the possibility for opposition to Turkish pressure or for Croatia's survival for that matter, remained to the most part fruitless. Consequently, Croatian nobleman Bernardin Frankapan went in 1522 to German parliament in Nuremberg; there, in front of Archduke Ferdinand of Habsburg, he held his *Oratio pro Croatia*, in which he pleaded for help, but also warned of the fact that the Croats would, should the support fail to come, *either take Turkish offers and thereby become subjected or leave their homeland*. Since neither Marulić's warning in *Letter to Pope Hadrian VI* nor the speech by Bernardin Frankapan in Nuremberg, both dating from 1522, had either any impact on the actions of European rulers or changed Croatia's difficult position, anti-Turkish letters and speeches by distinguished Croatian persons gradually disappeared from political life in Croatia during the first half of the 16th century.

NOBLE REFUGEES DURING OTTOMAN THREAT AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF CROATIAN MEDIEVAL LANDS INTO A UNIFIED KINGDOM

IVAN JURKOVIĆ

Besides the military and economic situation between the warring sides on Croatia's frontier to the Ottoman Empire (1463 onwards), another important factor influencing the capacity of resistance against the Ottomans and facilitating their advance was the nature of relations between Christian powers – in the first place relations between the courts in Vienna and Buda, as well as the relation of both with Venice, yet to a lesser extent. The first

period of the said relations (from the downfall of Bosnia in 1463 until the battle of Mohács in 1526) was marked by tensions between the kings of Hungary-Croatia (Matthias Corvinus and the Jagiellonians) and the Habsburgs laying claim to the control of the territory needed for successful resistance against the Ottomans. Following the extinction of the Jagiellonians, the Habsburgs were finally (in 1527) elected as a new dynasty of Hungary-Croatia as well, but this election was followed by civil war, which further weakened the ability of the kingdom to resist the Ottomans. The situation partly improved following the compromise with the Zapolya family, who ruled over the eastern part of the Hungarian-Croatian Kingdom.

Until the Battle of Mohács, and especially during the Jagiellonian reign, the rulers actually left considerable autonomy in foreign and internal policy to Croatian political representatives (the diet, aristocracy), which led to the fact that different European authorities (secular and ecclesiastical) helped the Croats resist the Ottomans. However, the election of Ferdinand of Habsburg on 1st January 1527 in Cetin was, as far as Ottoman danger was concerned, harmful to a certain extent, because other Christian states automatically accepted that the defence of these areas was solved by, and therefore ought to be left to the care of, the Habsburg kings. The situation was further worsened by the aforementioned civil war, leading to further territorial losses, but Croatia survived because the remnants of the kingdom were now reliant on large territories capable of financing the defence system and ruled by a dynasty capable of organising the defence system on the new grounds. The latter gradually hindered and, finally, brought an end to the advancement of the Ottoman troops.

Despite the fact that the period of Ottoman advancement in Croatian lands was one of the most dramatic episodes in the entire history of Croatia, leading to an almost complete break in continuity with its previous economic and social development, this period was also marked by the coalescence of medieval Croatia and Slavonia in a distinct unit named the Kingdom of Croatia, Dalmatia and Slavonia. This process may be observed at several levels: merging governmental institutions (functions of ban, diet, common military institutions); movement of country's centre; and spreading the name of Croatia on Slavonia.

Merging governmental institutions started as early as in the age of King Matthias Corvinus (1458–1490), when in 1476 the older practice of appointing two separate bans – one for Croatia-Dalmatia and the other for Slavonia –

was exchanged for the practice of appointing one ban for both kingdoms. The Jagiellonian kings combined two possibilities: one of appointing one person and another of appointing two, but simultaneously as bans of both kingdoms and with full jurisdiction over the whole territory. During the rest of the sixteenth century, this possibility became the rule.

Following institutions relevant for this question were diets. During King Matthias' reign, neither the Slavonian nor the Croatian diets was regularly convened. They became more frequent in the Jagiellonian period, but were always held separately. The first joint diet was held in 1533 in Zagreb by Royal Lieutenant Peter Keglević. However, after that time, joint diets still did not become the only way of holding diets. The last separate Croatian diet was held in Steničnjak in 1558, and after that date only joint diets existed.

Military organisation only partially followed the process of unification. Thus, the military border was organised more or less following the traditional division of Croatia and Slavonia, but in certain moments one supreme commander was appointed for both, styled as "captain general of the whole military frontier south of the Drava."

Another change reflecting the process of integration was the move of the country centre after the fall of Knin in 1522. The obvious choice was Bihać, the next royal town still situated in Croatia. However, as early as the 1530s, Zagreb (thus, a city in Slavonia) increasingly became the centre of both Croatia and Slavonia, and remained as such during the following centuries. Zagreb was formally recognised as the capital in the decree of a joint Croatian-Slavonia diet, which styled the city as *metropolis regnorum Croatiae et Slavoniae*.

The last element in the process of integration was that the name of Croatia started to be applied to the territory of medieval Slavonia as well. This was a gradual process, and by the late 1520s and early 1530s, the entire area south of the River Kupa was treated as Croatia (*partes transcolapiane que Croatia dicitur*). In 1544, this was further strengthened by the administrative division of the County of Zagreb in its Slavonian and Croatian parts, with the dividing line at the Kupa river. Parallel with this process was the process of spreading the Glagolitic liturgy towards the north. At a more general level, the documents from the whole of the sixteenth century testify that the name of Slavonia started to lose its position, formerly equal to that of Croatia. A similar process occurred in the case of Croat as an ethnonym, which became usual also for persons originating from Slavonia.

All these elements, which testify to the process of integration of Croatia and Slavonia into a formal unity, are directly connected to migratory processes of the period. Slavonian territories north of the Kupa and Sava rivers were attractive to both Croatian noblemen and commoners from the very beginning of Ottoman threat. Thus, the waves of émigrés, refugees and later defectors appeared in these areas continuously during the second half of the fifteenth and throughout the sixteenth century. These immigrants, particularly members of the displaced nobility, carried with them certain “political” traditions, culture, common customs and linguistic influences. They also carried a strong feeling of their own identity; this, combined with the fact that the population in both kingdoms basically belonged to the same ethnicity, facilitated the integration.

DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES IN PRESENT-DAY AREA OF CROATIA FROM MID-15th TO THE END OF THE 16th CENTURY

ANĐELKO AKRAP

From the second half of the fifteenth century to the first decades of the eighteenth century, the wars of great imperial forces, devastations, forced migrations, captivity, frequent famines and epidemics drastically disturbed streams of development and left deep traces in all components of demographic, social, economic, political and cultural life within Croatian social space. The results of research conducted until now point to the fact that social development from the fifteenth to the end of the seventeenth century was not only halted, but also reversed. Croatian lands were in that period divided between Venice, the Ottomans and the Habsburgs and their interests. Habsburg policy in governing the Military Border left far-reaching consequences, because, besides other disintegrative factors, it placed the newly settled population into the sphere of their interests. Today sparsely settled areas were not such earlier.

Basic demographic, economic and social tendencies before and during long-lasting conflicts in Croatian social territory since the second half of the fifteenth to the beginning of the eighteenth century indicate that it is possible to differentiate between two directions of demographic trends: approxi-

mately up to the second half of the fifteenth century, there was demographic increase, appropriate to that time, and after that followed depopulation or period of population decrease and great exchanges of population. Generally speaking, Europe's population rapidly increased in the sixteenth century, the growth was slowed down by famine, plague and war in the seventeenth century, and rapid increase again followed from mid eighteenth century; however, the total population during that period almost everywhere tripled, and towns grew even faster. Historical demography detected pronounced population growth from 1450 to 1650, and exactly in that period Croatian social space was characterised by the greatest demographic losses.

In the situation where we have estimations of population for Europe and its states, we may compare them with the changes of population in the present-day area of the Republic of Croatia. Economic decline, demographic stagnation and depopulation of particular areas forced migrations within the present-day territory of Croatia and towards Central Europe, colonisation and exchanges of population all together essentially marked histories of Croatian lands from the second half of the fifteenth century, with greater or lesser intensity, to the first decades of the eighteenth century. What does comparison of the population change in Croatia and European countries for the period from 1500 to 1700 show? Starting from the estimation that in the area of the Republic of Croatia, in 1500 there were 1010,000 inhabitants, and in 1700 only 644,500 inhabitants. In that period, in all European countries and geographic areas increase of population was noted, while in the same period population in the present-day area of Croatia decreased for 36,2% (or for 30,5% if we accept the estimation of population for 1500 by V. Stipetić).

By comparison of population of 1500 and of 1700 in the present-day area of Croatia with similar trends in other European countries, we got demographic frames within which total number of emigrants, people taken into captivity, the death toll caused by more frequent famines and epidemics and of those who perished in wars may range. With relative increase of population from 1500 to 1700 characteristic for the group of states in the European East or European West, in the area of the present-day Republic of Croatia, there would be between 750 and 800 thousand denizens more in 1700. However, to that calculation should be included also those who immigrated to Croatia. Namely, the wars since mid seventeenth century, with culminati-

on from the 1680s, resulted in the withdrawal of the Ottomans from the area of present-day Republic of Croatia and with great exchange of population between territories of the present-day Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. So, if there were no immigration to the present-day territory of Croatia, population would be even lesser than 644,5 thousands in 1700.

The issue of what the proportion of immigrants from mid fifteenth to the end of the seventeenth century in the entire population of 1700 was remains unsolved. We believe that it may be estimated that from the entire population of 1700 in the territory of present-day Croatia, at least 30% were immigrants from Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is understandable that losses of population should be augmented by the number of immigrated population. If we subtract that estimated immigrant population, we come to the result that in 1700 in the area of present-day Republic of Croatia, there were at least 1 million of denizens less than the number which should be expected.

By critical evaluation of hitherto published historical research in demographic context, we shall present just an approximate estimation of the factors of decrease of population in present-day Croatia. During the previous analysis, we concentrated on the period from 1500 to 1700, because the earliest reliable estimation of population for territory of present-day Croatia relates to 1500. However, Ottoman raids and conquests and to them connected phenomena started more intensively as early as around mid fifteenth century, so that we shall present estimations of factors of demographic retardation since 1450. Demographic losses created particularly during the second half of the fifteenth century cannot be neglected, even though they are not included in our estimation of total demographic losses from 1500 to 1700. The most intensive emigration and taking of population into captivity happened since mid fifteenth to the end of the sixteenth century, even though very dynamic migration movements connected to Ottoman territorial losses from the second half of the seventeenth century to the first decades of the eighteenth century. Total demographic losses "above the European average" from 1500 to 1700 are quantified according to particular components for the period from 1500 to 1600. On the basis of previously presented hypotheses, we shall present rough estimates on factors of Croatian population decrease with a remark that they fit into the demographic framework. We estimate that from the end of the fifteenth to the end of the sixteenth century from Croatia emigrated around 500,000 persons: ca. 100,000 to Burgenland

and Moravia; ca. 100,000 to the territory of present-day Slovenia (Carniola, Styria, Carinthia), that is Austrian lands and Inner Austrian provinces; ca 300,000 to Italy (ca 200.000 to the western Adriatic coast from Friuli in the North to Brindisi in the South). At the first glance, the estimations of the number of emigrants might seem exaggerated; however, more recent research indicates a relatively big emigration towards the western Adriatic coast. Besides that, comparing these numbers with the estimation of those who emigrated from Croatia to overseas countries at the end of the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century when emigrated between 400 and 500 thousand persons, during only thirty and peaceful years, the previous estimation seems more acceptable, especially because in that case it was much longer and moreover period of incessant war. By critical evaluation of available data on people taken into captivity during the period under research, we may estimate that from the territory of present-day Croatia, between 250,000 and 300,000 persons were taken into captivity.

Based on the available/published historical sources for the period under research, it is not possible to make even approximate estimations of the number of those who died from frequent epidemics and years of famine caused by wars in relation to European average. Also, it is not possible to make even approximate estimations of number of persons who perished in wars. By comparative approach, we confirmed conclusions of older and newer Croatian historiography that this period is for Croatia characteristic because of great demographic losses. If seen from European special and demographic context, such great demographic retardation, in relation to the development in all other European countries, may be understood only if we have in mind that it was the case of relatively small area where big and "small wars" were waged almost intermittently. In short: On the small piece of European space, which we reduced to the term of Croatian social space, great demographic losses occurred from the second half of the fifteenth century to the beginning of the eighteenth century, caused by the conflicts between three great imperial forces – the Ottoman Empire, the Republic of Venice, the Habsburg Monarchy – and wars between them and to these wars appertaining phenomena.

MIGRATIONS AND DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES IN CROATIAN LANDS IN THE 16th CENTURY: EXAMPLE OF THE SANJAKS OF KLIS AND KRKA

KORNELIJA JURIN STARČEVIĆ

The areas of Croatian lands, which in the sixteenth century comprised the Sanjaks of Klis and Krka (meaning the territory between Zrmanja and Cetina and present-day Lika), had permanently been conquered between 1520 and 1537. The aforementioned areas experienced extensive demographic changes, not only in the period of *akinici* attacks and Ottoman conquest in the fifteenth century and in the beginning of the sixteenth century, but also in the course of the whole period of Ottoman rule. First and foremost, these changes were reflected in the intensive migrations of indigenous Catholic population and re-colonization of depopulated area with an entirely new population, less Ottoman military, and more Vlach Orthodox, which caused the alteration of socio-cultural and ethno-confessional structure of the area, in comparison to its late medieval surroundings. After the stabilisation of Ottoman rule, even the number of Catholic Vlach population increased in the course of the sixteenth century, especially in the area of Zagora, which experienced the previous stronger presence of domicile population.

On the basis of information of Ottoman tax records, extant for the Sanjaks of Klis and Krka (dated 1528/1530, 1540, 1559 and 1604) and information of the Ottoman *mühimme deftera* kept in the main Ottoman Archive in Istanbul (*Başbakanlık Osmanlı Arşivi*), the paper reconstructs the demographic situation in the nahiyes (administrative-judicial units) in the aforementioned sanjaks in the course of the sixteenth century to track the changes of demographic movements between the years of censuses. Furthermore, the paper tries to explore main directions of migrations on the basis of marginal notes of tax records and other relevant sources. Special attention is placed on the characteristics of Ottoman re-colonization policy, the efforts the government put to re-populate the area, and final effects of these entrepreneur measures. The main hypothesis given is that the Ottomans were enforcing systematic re-colonization of populating the Sanjaks of Klis and Krka as borderline areas towards Venice and Habsburg Monarchy to stabilise its rule in military, economic and political-administrative senses. State initiated migrations of population from the further Ottoman hinterland towards the borderline

areas of the aforementioned sanjaks are visible in the course of the entire sixteenth century. While doing so, the Ottoman authorities extensively used Vlach population, which was very suitable for living in the restless borderline, because of its military organisation of *jamia* or *katun*, orientation to transhumant cattle breeding and great mobility. Ottoman authorities gave special tax exemptions to Vlach population in these borderline areas, and Vlach elders got fiefs (*timar*), thus stimulating them to re-populate devastated and restless areas. In addition to that, the Ottomans were enforcing the policy of the re-population of inhabitants from the adversarial territories (the policy of granting "guarantee" or *istimalet*). Ottoman authorities were persuading subjects from these territories to move and accept their rule, with a guarantee to receive certain rights, as were paying the tax of the *filurî*, some fiscal relief for conducting some semi-military duties and self-government. The research of tax records has shown that in this manner, reversible migrations of population had occurred in these areas before the Ottomans. Although the consequence of the establishment of Ottoman rule in this area was an extreme decline of population in number, it was not of the same extent for the whole area. This can be concluded on the basis of the first Ottoman tax record, which started in 1528 and finished in 1530. The greatest de-population was in the area north-western from the river Zrmanja (nahiye of Lika), while the area between Krka and Cetina sustained a lot of the continuity of population from the pre-Ottoman period, characterised in many common features of indigenous population.

Lika was almost completely deserted until mid-sixteenth century. There were multiple reasons for it, the most important being constant insecurity because of adversarial military raids, as well as of the Uskoks from Senj, which were supposed to prevent the Ottomans in keeping the invaded territory. Only two castles were functioning in Lika – Udbina and Gračac, which held Ottoman military population, due to a low number of soldiers make it hard to impose efficient government over the vast area of nahiyes. The remaining castles from pre-Ottoman period were destroyed and deteriorated, which is explicitly stated in the records. The other, permanently inhabited, population was not present, since there were no market-places below the castle. The central government tried to populate Lika between 1550 and 1575, in the period of esteemed sanjak-beys of Bosnia and Klis, namely Malkoč-beg Karaosmanović and Ferhad-beg Sokolović. The mandate given to

Ferhad-beg of Klis in the month of Rajab of 967 (March-April 1560) states that the Ottoman court ordered to populate and revive 70 wrecked castles situated in the nahiye of Lika and Krbava. Such measures gave results, since the detailed tax list from the early seventeenth century listed in the area of Lika and Krbava around 720 houses as tax units – 600 in Lika and 120 in Krbava, dispersed in approximately seventy villages. Finally, when the area experienced demographic and economic recovery, the new Sanjak of Krka was founded (1580). The newlyinhabited population was primarily of Vlach provenance, most frequently originating from the sanjaks of Hercegovina, which presented the migrational departure point of the Vlachs to the West.

In comparison to Lika, the demographic image was more favourable in the southern parts between the rivers of Zrmanja and Lika. There lived, according to the tax list of 1528-1530, the so-called “Vlachs of the land of Istria (*Eflakan-i vilayet-i Istra*).” It is not entirely known when they came from Istria, but it is possible that it was at the beginning of Ottoman rule. In all likelihood, this community of refugees migrated to Istria in the period of akinci raids and conquests, together with other Croatian population, and then returned under Ottoman power because of non-favourable conditions in Istria. The same list mentions a number of villages which were not inhabited by the Vlachs of Istria, although this was certainly Vlach population. For a part of this population, we can claim with certainty that they came from *nahiye* of Uskoplje, Srb and Unac on the other side of Dinara. The newly inhabited population was mixed with the remaining indigenous, predominantly Catholic, population. The Vlachs of Istria were a very inconstant factor in Ottoman demographic policy of the re-population of borderline territories, because on multiple occasions, they were coming and going to Ottoman territory, then to that of Venice and Habsburg Monarchy, leaving an empty space for the re-population of new inhabitants. These newcomers were mostly Orthodox, because in this period, two Orthodox monasteries were found in the aforementioned area (those of Krka and Krupa). The peaceful period after the war of Cyprus had a positive reflection on the demographic growth, causing a substantial increase in the population of the nahiyes between Zrmanja and Krka, and the foundation of first urban communities with the statuses of towns, namely Skradin, Vrana, Velin, Nadin, Karin, Ostrovica, Obrovac, Zemunik.

The most southern part of Croatian space in the Sanjak of Klis, in the area between the rivers Krka and Cetina, was the area containing the greatest

st number of domicile population, with plenty continuity with the pre-Ottoman period. Five nahiyes listed in the *icmal* defter from 1528-1530 mentioned 44 villages with 1,189 tax units. These were all larger villages, whose population was primarily cultivating land. This fact supports the theory about indigenous population, because the newcomers were mostly occupied with pastoral economy. The re-population of the area was increasing in the course of the sixteenth century. Early-seventeenth-century Ottoman list mentioned 266 villages and approximately 3,700 tax houses in the area. Classic Ottoman administration in the form of the *timar-sipahi* system was completely stabilised there. Furthermore, several important urban centres (*kasbah*), as Sinj, Vrlika, Drniš, Klis, Hrvace were founded; they were inhabited by Muslim civil population. A large number of Muslim population in rural milieu has been recorded. The process of Islamisation was stronger in the area around Cetina and Vrlika, in addition to the area surrounding Klis, where villages with substantial number of Muslim population have been listed.

OTTOMAN CHALLENGE AND VENETIAN RESPONSE IN DALMATIA IN THE AGE OF THE BATTLE OF SZIGETVÁR

JOSIP VRANDEČIĆ

By conquering Dalmatia in the course of the 15th century, the Venetians achieved two major geo-strategic goals in the Adriatic: they secured marine communication in the direction of Levant, and seized communal knots needed for a commercial breakthrough into the Balkans, where they were competing with the Florentines and the people of Dubrovnik. After Venice had succeeded in these endeavours at the beginning of the 16th century, it found itself confronted with Ottoman threat in the hinterland of Dalmatian communes. The fall of Knin, Skradin, Ostrovica and Klis raised the awareness of the sensitive defence-related character of Dalmatian communal societies, which became victims of Ottoman expansion from the outside and Venetian passive attitude from the inside. After the county had been conquered in early 15th century, Venetian pragmatic functionalism deprived the previously rich communal elite of its role in profitable sectors, such as salt works and shipbuilding, which had raised Dalmatian communes during the Anjura era, and redirected their activity towards almost non-profitable agriculture, which had lost its production potential due to Ottoman conquests. In the

Adriatic, Venice always inclined to the colonial model of having a number of marine commercial stations, a model preferred by the Portuguese as well, contrary to the Spanish and the Ottomans, whose intention was territorial conquest. With the arrival of the Ottomans, this Venetian colonial model of an *empire of commercial stations* additionally exposed Dalmatian towns to the danger of a high level of urbanisation, in which town population formed over 50 percent of the total population, whereas this figure had in all pre-modern societies – from England to China – amounted to ca 80 percent of village population. At the beginning of the 16th century, approximately 100,000 people lived in Dalmatia and Venetian Albania. This figure however decreased to the lowest ever recorded minimum of only 60,000 inhabitants after the War of the Holy League.

Venetian colonial model of commercial stations caused a crisis of military policy in Dalmatia. The defensive strategy arose from the political model of aristocratic democracy that imposed the fight between diverse fractions, out of which – in general – the poor inclined to war, whilst the rich inclined to peace. The strategic crisis further arose from the character of the aristocratic republic, which – apart from the commerce-related interests – could not find any more adequate model of proto-national or religious integration as requested by pre-modern European countries.

Confronted with Ottoman challenge during the 16th century, the Venetians took up the demanding process of military revolution, which was particularly manifested in the rebuilding of Dalmatian city walls *alla moderna*. The mentioned bastion transition based on the *trace italienne* principle enabled efficient modern town planning and managed to save Dalmatian towns from falling under Ottoman rule. Military revolution was further expressed in other protection sectors as well: the firearms – especially the artillery, the organisation of professional and local military units, the modernisation of the fleet, and war tactics. Military revolution was the most important Dalmatian and European process in the early New Age, which prevented Ottoman invasion to the West; Malta and Szigetvár witness thereto most evidently. The said military reform reflected itself moreover on the transformation of the society, which became more dependant than its administrative and military headquarters.

Though the fruits of military revolution in Dalmatia were not visible before the outburst of the War of Candia, its beginnings date back to the time

of the War of the Holy League (1537–1540), when the Republic decided upon its priorities regarding town planning. The fall of Nadin and Vrana in 1538 confirmed successful Ottoman strategy of pushing the Venetians back to the remaining Adriatic ports. Hence, famous army engineer Michele Sanmichele from Verona began – as early as in 1537, still during the war – to build the pentagonal bastion Ponton in Zadar along the main city gate of *terraferma*; furthermore, towards the end of his life, in 1555, he erected wall linen in front of the land. He moreover drafted and erected the fortress of St. Nicholas at the entrance into the Channel of Šibenik. This fortress offered Šibenik defence from the sea. Sforza Pallavicino, Sanmichele's energetic successor, levelled in the period between 1567 and 1569 in Zadar the suburb called Varoš in front of the city gate on land and built a separate urbanistic island of Forte, which protected the land by its massive stone jaws. These famous Italian army engineers, same as their predecessors, perceived bastion architecture as an exact science that included mathematical, and in particular ballistic knowledge, which enabled such planning that would facilitate profound defence and crossfire intended to keep the enemy the farthest possible from the defensive wall.

By the erection of this spacious island in front of the town core, encircled by parallel channels between the port and the side of the sea, a new phase in Venetian-Ottoman conflict had begun – it was the fight between the whale and the elephant – the most powerful creatures in divided territories. This modern stone island offered refuge to Venetian fleet on its way to Levant. Ottoman powers were subsequently – both in Dalmatia and in Pannonia – awaited by a second, more demanding phase of attacking new transitional, bastion complexes built in concordance with the principles of military revolution *alla moderna*, which were characterised by low, gravelled and widely-spread defensive walls, and which Ottoman cavalry and infantry could not imperil.

Pallavicino had indebted Zadar not only with the massive Ponton, but also with the far-reaching scorched-earth tactics, which requested that the entire extramural urbanistic infrastructure, except for several principal Dalmatian ports necessary to maintaining communication with Levant, should be demolished in order to avoid being of use to the enemy in case of conquest. In the hinterland of Dalmatian towns, the Ottomans were fortifying the conquered settlements, which they strengthened by manpower and equipment. They stimulated colonisation, building Islamic sacral and secular

infrastructure, and the Islamisation that began to strike root in Dalmatian hinterland. Therefore, in the course of the 16th century, the Venetians had to concentrate only on the said defensive within the framework of broad policy of neutrality, by which they endeavoured to survive from both the Habsburg and Ottoman pressures. This doctrine of Pallavicino's that in Dalmatia only coastal towns were defensible stayed for a long time present in the conscience of Venetian elite, which shrank from covering additional outside areas. Turkish invasion of Cyprus inaugurated even stronger the fortification redesign of Dalmatian towns, as the experience from the attacks on Obrovac and Skradin during the previous war taught them it was untenable. It was only during the War of Candia that military initiative in Dalmatia would cross over to Venetian side.

THE SIEGE OF SZIGETVÁR AND DUBROVNIK

VESNA MIOVIĆ, MLADEN GLAVINA

Several very interesting documents related to the siege of Szigetvár are held in safekeeping of the State Archives in Dubrovnik. Since these documents primarily deal with Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent and his son Selim, the nature of the relations between the Dubrovnik Republic and Ottoman Empire needs to be briefly explained first.

The relations between Dubrovnik and the Ottomans were insofar specific that the people of Dubrovnik enjoyed a high level of freedom despite the fact that they were paying capitation to the Sultan. In Ottoman-Dubrovnik interstate contracts, it was stipulated that anyone was allowed to enter Dubrovnik - either from the land or from the sea; being either a friend or an enemy to the Sultan. Reasons for granting freedom to Ottoman subjects were of pragmatic nature entirely. Ottoman Empire needed skilled and capable tradesmen, such as were those from Dubrovnik. The neutral port of Dubrovnik offered the Ottomans a possibility of trading with the western Christian lands even in the times when they were at war with them. Most importantly, the people of Dubrovnik were excellently informed, and the Empire needed information on the western Christian world. The keyword in this context was *the neutrality of Dubrovnik*, which would have been impossible without granting the people of Dubrovnik freedom.

As concerns the western Christian lands, they were also using the neutral port of Dubrovnik and all the information Dubrovnik disposed of regarding Ottoman Empire. By taking such a position between the East and the West, the people of Dubrovnik profited greatly; their main challenge was to succeed in steadily convincing the world how important their role was. Diplomacy was hence constantly in action.

The so-called *emissaries of the capitation* – two noblemen who once a year brought the capitation to Istanbul and conducted diplomatic and consular tasks there – formed the axis of the Dubrovnik diplomacy in the East. Occasionally, the so-called *emissaries of the present*, who visited the sultans prior to their departure to the battlefield, would also get involved actively. The purpose of these visits was to confirm their loyalty in such delicate moments and reinforce the benevolence of both the sultan and his viziers.

The emissaries of the present visited Sultan Suleiman on all his war campaigns, including in the year 1566. In the Senate session held in June of that year, it was decided that noblemen Junije Pozza and Ivan Palmotta would go to Belgrade and meet Ottoman army there. They received detailed instructions regarding the manner in which they ought to behave in front of the sultan and the members of the imperial council, and concerning what to say and what to give as present to whom.

Pozza and Palmotta brought to Belgrade around thirty silver plates and around fifty pieces of precious textiles, which were usual presents intended for the sultan, the viziers, and other distinguished Ottomans on their way to the battlefield. They stood before Suleiman in Zemun towards the end of June. They gave him as present four plates and twenty-four pieces of atlas and damast, of total length of 140 meters. Exceptionally on that occasion, one more present followed. The emissaries brought to Belgrade twenty large gold-plated candles; forty boxes of hard candies with coriander, muskmelon seeds, pine kernels and aniseed; around seventy kilograms of lemons; 380 kilograms of sweet oranges; 380 kilograms of bitter oranges. Apart from all that, there were twenty bottles of *violepp (gülab)* – sweet refreshing drink made of rose, which was used for medical purposes and drunk instead of wine. A half of all the presents was for the Sultan himself, while the other half was for his viziers and ministers of finance.

The people of Dubrovnik had on no other occasion given citrus fruits, candies or refreshing drinks as presents to the Sultan. They had undoubted-

ly thought of Suleiman's old age in 1566, and of his sensitive health condition. He was sincerely fond of Dubrovnik, and it may be supposed that he was impressed by the fact that he was presented with more than 800 kilograms of citrus fruits from there. It seemed as if the people of Dubrovnik were completely loyal to him; it was, however, exactly at Szigetvár that their usual double standard was dismantled. A letter by Kapudan Pasha (i.e. admiral of Ottoman fleet) Piale Pasha came, containing severe accusations directed against the Dubrovnik Republic. Piale Pasha claimed that his invasion of southern Italy failed to be as successful as he had planned due to the fact that the people of Dubrovnik had previously sent the word of warning to the towns in question of the danger ahead. The Sultan and his viziers reacted rather fiercely. Dubrovnik was warned to cease sending information to the West, and demanded to put at the Ottomans' disposal master builders and the material needed for four ships.

The emissary Mato Stay set immediately on the journey to Szigetvár, in order to do his best to disembarass the Republic. No details as to his mission have been preserved. The only known fact is that he also brought fruits and candies for the Sultan. Stay was a citizen of Dubrovnik, and there is a possibility that he was elected emissary because the authorities chose not to send a nobleman directly to the battlefield. He probably reached his destination around mid September, that means at the time when Sultan Suleiman had already been dead, and the siege of Szigetvár concluded.

Stay found himself undoubtedly at the very source of information, and it was certain that he brought accurate and reliable news to Dubrovnik. It was self-understood that the news would be forwarded to the West - primarily to the Pope and Spanish Viceroy of Naples. This, however, did not happen. The Dubrovnik description of the siege of Szigetvár is greatly missed in this presentation, and the reasons for it are well known. The people of Dubrovnik ceased to send information about the Ottomans for a while due to grave danger that was threatening to destroy Dubrovnik - the danger arose out of strained relations between the Dubrovnik Republic and Kapudan Pasha Piale Pasha.

Following the unsuccessful siege of Malta in the summer of 1565, Piale Pasha continued to make war with Christian fleet in the area between this island and southern Italy. In the summer of 1566, he was sailing in the waters of Dubrovnik from there, he sent the said letter intended against the

people of Dubrovnik to the Szigetvár battlefield. He ravaged several Dubrovnik islands. A state of siege was proclaimed, an attack of revenge was expected, yet it did not happen. The situation was rather difficult to solve, as it was impossible to justify the warning that Dubrovnik had provided to Italian towns. The fact is that it was a certain Vives of Barletta who was at that time bringing news from Dubrovnik to Naples. It is possible that he found himself in Istanbul, where he then became an Islamist and interpreter for Italian, after having been taken prisoner by Piale Pasha. He described in full detail the manner in which the people of Dubrovnik had been providing the Viceroy of Naples with news about the Ottomans.

In late September and early October 1566, the Viceroy of Naples seriously resented the people of Dubrovnik for no longer sending him news, whereby he undoubtedly referred to the siege of Szigetvár and the invasion of Ottoman fleet. The emissary of Dubrovnik immediately set on the journey to Naples, his duty being to explain that the people of Dubrovnik were forced to stop sending information to the West due to excessive danger.

Furthermore, in a secret Senate session, it was decided that the noblemen who would have the impudence to inform the West, i.e. Spain and the Pope, about the Ottomans, would be punished by the loss of rank and a fine in the amount of 1,000 gold pieces. For citizens, capital punishment would follow.

Several days later, the Sultan's head food taster brought the edict (*zafer-nâme*) issued by Selim II to Dubrovnik; the edict included the official notice that Selim had acceded to the throne. This way of public informing, i.e. via edicts issued by the sultan, was in common use. Two months later, the Sultan's interpreter Ibrahim arrived to Dubrovnik with another edict, in which Selim II informed of the circumstances in which he had acceded to the throne, and described in a warlike tone the victories of Ottoman army. This is the only document discovered so far at the State Archives in Dubrovnik, which includes a brief description of the siege of Szigetvár and the death of Nicholas Šubić Zrinski.

THE ORIGINS OF THE ARISTOCRATIC FAMILY OF THE COUNTS OF ZRIN

DAMIR KARBIĆ

The family of the counts of Zrin (Zrinski in Croatian and Zrínyi in Hungarian), to which belonged Nicholas IV, the hero of Szigetvár, played an important role in both Croatian and Hungarian history, particularly in its political, military and cultural sphere during the early modern period. In that time, they belonged to the highest aristocracy of the Kingdom of Hungary-Croatia, in both its Hungarian and Croatian part, substituting in a manner the central authority residing outside the Kingdom, and, being amongst the greatest landowners, they spent substantial financial means in the anti-Ottoman defence and economic and cultural development. Because of the role they played in that period, as their ancestors played during the medieval period, the members of the family also had an exceptional position in the later periods as paragons for forming national and political identity of both countries, and they have been widely discussed by historians.

On the male line, Count Nicholas IV was direct a descendant from an old Croatian aristocratic kindred, the counts of Bribir, stemming from the eleventh century, which in the fourteenth century assumed the kindred name of the Šubići. The family of the counts of Zrin itself started to create its separate identity from 1347, when Count Gregory II of Bribir and Ostrovica in the name of his nephew, Count George IV of Bribir (later Count George I of Zrin), swore allegiance to King Louis I the Great after a long period of disobedience and exchanged with the king their castle of Ostrovica for Zrin in medieval Slavonia. By this act, the counts of Zrin temporarily moved out of their prior political arena, the medieval kingdom of Croatia-Dalmatia, where their ancestors in the thirteenth and the first half of the fourteenth century raised to the almost princely position, and started to built up their status within the policy and society of medieval Slavonia and Hungary. However, the counts of Zrin did not completely break connections either to medieval Croatia and its political life or to the ancestral seat and estates in Bribir. They participated in the dynastic wars between the houses of Angevins and Luxembourg at the end of the fourteenth and at the beginning of the fifteenth century, when they, same as their relatives still residing in Bribir, supported the side of Queen Mary and her husband King Sigismund.

During these events, they also started to increase their remaining possessions in Bribir, by concluding a contract of mutual inheritance with one of their relatives there, Ban James, who belonged to the Banići/Nikolići branch of the Šubić kindred, whose property in Bribir and its county they inherited after James's death in 1456. Even before that moment, the counts of Zrin were present in Bribir and considered as a separate branch of the kindred entitled to take part in the governing of the castle and the county of Bribir together with heads of other branches. Such case appeared in 1451, when Count Paul II of Zrin together with Ban James of the Banići, Count Ugrin of the Ugrinići, Count Peter of the Obradići and Count Paul of the Stojnići and Markovići branches, as representatives of the kindred, protested in front of the chapter of Knin against the attacks of some enemies on their estates and the castle of Bribir itself. Another similar case, the only recorded case when belonging of the counts of Zrin to the Šubić kindred is explicitly stated by some of them, is connected with Count Nicholas III, father of Count Nicholas IV, who in 1514, together with other heads of the kindred branches (George Krivčić, Christopher Krivčić, Stephen Ugrinović, Peter Obradić, George Stojšić *ceterique nobiles de genere Subyich*), promised to continue their support and protection to the Franciscan convent of Bribir and other convents founded by the members of the kindred. This promise was accepted by the general administration of the order, and exactly Count Nicholas III, styled in that letter as Comes Nicolaus Slubyth de Zrin, was in stead of all them informed by a letter of Franciscan general minister in 1517. Belonging to the kindred was otherwise attested also by continuous use of heraldic symbols (eagle wings) of the kindred also by the counts of Zrin.

On his maternal side, Count Nicholas IV belonged to another Croatian aristocratic family, that of the Counts of Krbava of the Gušić kindred, with which family the family of the Counts of Zrin had several recurring marital connections even before (the Counts of Krbava themselves were in female line descendants of the ancestors of the Counts of Zrin and since the transfer of the latter to Slavonia almost each generation had some mutual marriage with the former). Through his maternal line, Count Nicholas IV was also connected to the Frankapani, another Croatian aristocratic family, and the Nelipići, the family of the Counts of Cetina, while on his paternal side, he descended also from the Counts of Blagay (and also again from the Frankapani). All these families, including the family of the Counts of Zrin themself-

ves, belonged to the highest level of Croatian aristocracy and to the top level of the aristocracy of the Kingdom of Hungary-Croatia in general, but their interconnected marital policies still testify to the fact that their principal political and property interests were still limited to the areas of medieval Croatia-Dalmatia and the southern areas of medieval Slavonia. However, this will very much change exactly in the period of Count Nicholas IV, when family the evolves into an aristocratic family of much wider influence and interests, creating also marital connections to Hungarian, Czech and Austrian families of similar standing and interests.

THE CHANGES IN THE SPATIAL ORGANISATION OF ESTATES AND CASTLES OF THE ZRINSKI IN THE 16th AND THE 17th CENTURIES

DRAGUTIN FELETAR

The task of this paper is to enlist the majority of the estates and castles that were under the administration (or in the ownership) of the Zrinski family in the sixteenth and the seventeenth centuries to determine the changes in the spatial arrangement. It was the period when Croatia was reduced to *reliquiae reliquiarum*, because of Ottoman conquests. Thus, the constant state of war and changing of the border affected the dynamics of property relations, with altering activities and positions of the Zrinski in the contemporary society. Considering that the Zrinski owned approximately one fifth of the territory of contemporary Croatia, with substantial estates in Southern Hungary, the changes in their property policy were constant and numerous, both in number and size (importance) of certain estates and castles, and in their spatial arrangement. For this reason, the research was long-suffering and lasting, thus the results presented here are not final, and the number of assumptions cannot be firmly proven. The paper hence relies on the research of Josip Adamček, Geza Palffy, Szabolcs Varga, Nataša Štefanec, Milan Kruhek, Darko Varga, Hrvoje Petrić and Dragutin Feletar.

In the case of the Zrinski, the dynamics of acquiring estates and the changes in the spatial organisation in the area of Dalmatia, Croatia, Slavonia and Hungary can be traced through several characteristic periods. The first stage was that of the kindred of the Šubići of Bribir connected with the estates in Bribir, Ostrovica and the wider hinterland of Šibenik. From counts

Vukil and Marmonja Šubić of Bribir from the early twelfth century until Gregory X Krivčić at the end of the fifteenth century, the Šubić kindred had a great reputation and estates sufficient to place them among the leading families of contemporary Dalmatia and Bosnia – they were counts of Bribir, Trogir, Knin, Split, Klis, even bans of Croatia and Bosnia (the wife of Tvrtko I was a female member of the kindred).

Already in that period started the penetration of power of the Šubići towards central Croatia. The reason was the expansion of influence to the parts of Croatia and Slavonia, and also the start of the Ottoman threat from the east. The crucial step in expansion in the Pounje and surrounding area was taken by George III Šubić (or George I Zrinski), who purchased the castle of Zrin on July 30, 1347. Due to the loss of their Dalmatian estates at the end of the fifteenth century and at the beginning of the sixteenth century, this period (the second stage) can be valued as the period of loss of the central position of the Zrinski in the corpus of Croatian nobility. Still, for the positioning of the Zrinski in contemporary structures of noble families and power, rather significant were the estates in Pounje, where the Zrinski built new and expanded old castles, and forged money in the silver mint in Gvozdansko.

The martyrdom of the estates in Pounje practically ended already in mid sixteenth century, although the Zrinski formally defended the castle of Zrin until 1592. Namely, the Ottomans seized Dubica as early as in 1538, and Kostajnica in 1556, while the border in the Slavonian interamnum was shifted towards the west up to Kloštar Podravski and Čazma. Due to the loss of the estates in Pounje, the kindred was severely threatened, yet dissolution never happened. Then appeared Nicholas IV (1510-1566), who not only raised the kindred from the ashes, but also elevated it to the level of the most powerful noble family of contemporary Croatia and Hungary.

According to the results Nicholas IV provided for his family, he is certainly the most significant member of the kindred in its entire history. His father, Nicholas III, who married Helen Karlović of Corbavia (of the kindred of the Gušići-Kurjakovići), created the basis of this renaissance. On February 20, 1509, Nicholas III signed an agreement with John Karlović about mutual inheritance. It was a clever move, as was written by Hungarian historian Ferenc Salamon, because “at that time, the Zrinski were the second league of regional aristocracy”. It is sufficient to say that in the period of King Matt-

hias Corvinus, at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Karlovići gave 200 fully-equipped soldiers, the Frankopani 100, the Blagajski 50, and the Zrinski only 20 knights. In this period (third stage), in 1531, the Zrinski received the estates of the Karlovići: Medvedgrad, Susedgrad, Lukavec and surroundings, and estates around Vrbovec, Rakovac and Dubrava. It was a solid jumping point for further expansion, skilfully done by Nicholas IV.

Simultaneously, the Zrinski received large estates of the Knights Hospitallers in south-western Slavonia (fourth stage). The estates were held by the Priory of Vrana (the seat of which had until 1312 been Marča), and at the beginning of the sixteenth century, the Zrinski conducted the function of lay administrators. In such manner, in 1528, after the dissolution of Hospitallers, the Zrinski received large estates in Pakrac and surroundings, and Božjakovina. Finally, on January 18, 1541, King Ferdinand gave *in perpetuum* Pakrac to Nicholas IV (however, Pakrac was already by 1543 in the hands of the Ottomans, and the centre of the Sanjak of Pakrac).

The largest expansion of the estates of the Zrinski happened with their connection with the noble Frankopan family of the counts of Krk around mid sixteenth century (fifth stage). Nicholas IV married Catherine Frankopan in 1543 (who bore him 13 children, and seven of their daughters were married to most illustrious Hungarian lords). Already in 1544, Nicholas IV signed a contract of inheritance with Stephen III Frankopan, which was renewed in 1550, when he received the estates around Ozalj, Dubovac, Grobnik, Bakar, Hreljin and so forth. Stephen III died without heirs in 1577, so then George IV received new estates around Ribnik, Severin, Brod na Kupi, Vinodol and surroundings.

Parallel to their expansion to the Frankopan estates, Nicholas IV as successful soldier and organiser of defence against the Ottomans bought new estates or they were granted to him thanks to his military accomplishments or conducting the office of ban and other duties (sixth stage). Foremost, these were estates in Northern Croatia and Southern Hungary. Because of the debts for keeping the army and conducting the defence, the king gave in 1546 to Nicholas IV Međimurje, where he moved his seat after building a great castle in the fort of Čakovec. He also organised the captaincy of Legrad and fortified the border on the river Mura, the line that the Ottomans were not able to permanently penetrate. Nicholas IV and his heirs expanded the lordship of Zrin to the estates in Hungary, especially around Körmend

(with the great estate of Monyorökererek), Csurgó, Berzence, and Szigetvár and Szentlőrinc in the Somogy County and in Baranja.

The expansion of the estates of the Zrinski ended with the last family members in the second half of the seventeenth century (seventh stage). The ground for it was struck by Nicholas IV, who as the captain of Szigetvár administrated large tax districts in Somogy, Baranja and Slavonia. Furthermore, his great-grandson Nicholas III, with big winter campaign once again raised the question of the division of estate in that area. Indeed, the records shed light on the estates of Adam Zrinski (namely his mother Sofia Löbl) until his death in 1691. The estates in question were around Szigetvár, Pécs, Mohács, Beli Manastir and Kneževi Vinogradi, and northeastern Slavonia. The practical usage of these estates by the Zrinski in the final stage of Ottoman occupation should yet to be researched (these areas were liberated mainly around 1690).

Through these seven stages of expansion, the estates of the Zrinski were spreading in almost all areas of Croatia and southern Hungary. Only in the area of *reliquiae reliquiarum* of Croatia, thence after the stabilisation of the borders with the peace of Žitva in 1606, the estates of the Zrinski were expanding on the 3,350 km² (meaning 19.9% of contemporary Croatia, whose surface was only 16,800 km²). The estates of the Zrinski were more densely populated than other parts of Croatia, so it is estimated that there resided approximately 170,000 inhabitants or around 26.6% (the estimation is that at that time, app. 640,000 people lived in Croatia). Zrinski were granted the right that the population of their estates can be moved (to other estates or further), but that they may receive immigrants from other areas as well. This additionally intensified great migrations of population, mostly from the southeast to the northwest, caused by Ottoman conquest. The consequence of these migrations and mixing populations can still be felt until the present.

Large estates of the Zrinski were practically functioning as a round administrative and economic unit (lordship), at one point even with their own money. For contemporary society, the Zrinski organised very modern economic administration. One might even say they were forerunners of mercantilism. The main revenue was not obtained by agrarian production, but by trade. The Zrinski were the greatest tradesmen of livestock and grain, followed by wood, salt and other products. Only from their livestock fairs in Legrad, they led to their own port in Bakar annually 20,000 head of cattle,

and then exported it to Venice. Very often for this traffic they did not have to pay imperial taxes (since the emperor owed them funds to keep military contingents), which caused great tensions. Through the estates of Zrinski was the line of caravan route from Čakovec via Božjakovina, Dubovac, Severin, Brod, Delnice and Lokva to Hreljin and Bakar. The second important income was achieved through mining and metallurgy, previously in Gvozdansko, and then in Medvedgrad and Čabar. The metallurgy of Čabar employed more than 300 blacksmiths, and iron merchandise was exported to Venice. The third source of income came from various tax posts, as well as incomes of rented and pledged estates, mills, boats and ferries, and various trading rights. The fourth place was taken by various tax revenues from their estates, among which the most important one was that of wine (so-called *gornica*).

MIGRATIONS OF THE ZRINSKI FAMILY AND STRATEGIES OF PRESERVING THE LINEAGE IN THE AGE OF NICHOLAS IV ZRINSKI

NATAŠA ŠTEFANEC

After arriving to the area of Pounje and Zrinska gora in mid 14th century, the family of Šubić Bribirski found fertile land, inhabited estates and full mines. A new, exceptionally successful period in the history of this family lineage, which ended in the 1670s, began soon afterwards under a new name. This period may be divided in two phases. In phase one, which lasted up to the 1550s, the seat of the Zrinski was located in Pounje. In phase two, the centre of gravity was moved to the northern Croatian-Slavonian territory (Vinodol, the Ozalj and the Ribnica estates, etc.), as well as to several Hungarian estates, among which, in addition to the Vép and Monyorókerék estates, the most important one proved to be the Čakovec estate, also called Međimurje (*Murinsel*, *Muraköz*).

Phase one: the Zrinski family in Pounje and on the slopes of Zrinska gora up to the 1550s

The Zrinski had very successfully mastered the challenges of moving to Pounje and the slopes of Zrinska gora. Aggravating circumstances of this first major migration, *inter alia* systematic Ottoman threat as of mid 15th century,

were to a high extent surmounted thanks to full mines. In March 1463, King Matthias granted Peter II Zrinski regal for exploiting the mines without having to pay any taxes for this privilege. Petar himself kept guard on Una, as well as did his descendants during the following hundred years. The mines were of utmost importance for them, as they enabled the Zrinski not only to finance a strong private army, but also to gain capital in cash, which subsequently served for securing new positions in the safer North.

Nicholas III Zrinski (†1534) continued his father's policy. With the approval of the Court, he even managed to open his own mint (1529). He was, however, the first one who started making a reserve plan. In mid 1520s, he offered Archduke Ferdinand to take over the defence of some of his fortresses (Novigrad and Dobra Njiva); he moreover endeavoured to exchange some of his estates for safer land in Istria. He concluded separate truces with the Ottomans, who were allowed to cross his land on their plundering marches to other estates. When he was accused of being disloyal to Christianity, he tried to find justification for himself in grave circumstances and endeavours to preserve his lineage. After his death, Ottoman attacks on Pounje were intensified, and Dubica fell as the first fort on Una (1538).

His son Nicholas IV Zrinski (1508–1566) focused entirely on finding a way to leave Pounje. He ceased to act in collusion with the Ottomans. He immediately pledged mines and melting foundries (1534) in order to free himself from complicated business running and to make it possible for himself to receive money in cash. Until the 1550s, he continued to mint his own coins, which had until that time become a routine activity. Since he had assumed the demanding duty of ban (1542–1556), cash was indispensable to him for financing military endeavours, particularly in the times when he was not receiving his salary, which happened frequently. Instead of concentrating on managing and preserving land estates in Pounje and on Zrinska gora, he turned to military activities and attempts to preserve his lineage. Thanks to having taken a sequence of important and far-reaching moves, he had – until the 1550s – succeeded in realising his intentions.

Phase two – distancing from Pounje; acquisition of new estates and social bonds

1. Nicholas accepted the honourable position of ban after the fall of Dubica, when the family had not yet been secured enough in the safer North.

Increased military and protective activity was offered as one of possible solutions for saving the central estates of the Zrinski family in Pounje. In this concrete case, assuming the high service meant that Nicholas Zrinski would not have to defend his estates only by his own private army. As ban, he was in position to use the royal army directly.

2. Following his father's strategy, Nicholas IV engaged strongly in concluding contracts of inheritance with distinguished noble families in the Kingdom. A contract of this type was concluded between Nicholas III and John Karlović of Krbava in 1509 (and 1527). Pursuant to the contractual provision, since he was married to John's sister Helen, the family lineage that was to die out first would legate its land estates to the other family lineage. With the death of Ban John in 1531, the Zrinski got large estates in Pounje and in the central part of Croatia. After his marriage to Catherine Frankopan in 1543, Nicholas IV Zrinski concluded a contract with Catherine's brother Stephen Frankopan of Ozalj at the beginning of February 1544. The first appendix to the contract was added in 1550, when the Zrinski acquired Stephen's estates of Ozalj, Dubovac, Grobnik, Bakar and Hreljin; another appendix followed in 1562. Finally, after Stephen's death in 1577, the Zrinski inherited estates belonging to this rich branch of the Frankopans. Thereby, they secured for themselves a safe base in the northern lands.

3. Nicholas IV disposed of substantial capital in cash, gained thanks to the mines and the mint. He took lease of many estates in the Priory of Vrana and financed his own army. He had for years been financing all his expenses as ban himself, but he managed to collect the debt when King Ferdinand I presented him with the Čakovec estate as compensation for the unpaid salaries (1546). This was – strategically – the most important gain for the Zrinski family.

4. The migration of the Zrinskis northwards was intensified by the exchange of estates with Peter Erdődy, as a result of friendship and the engagement of his son George IV with Peter's daughter Anne (which was later annulled). As a result of a contractual exchange dating from February 1557, Nicholas gained the Monyorókerék estate in the Vas County (*Željezno, Casterferrei*), including towns of Monyorókerék and Vörösvár, as well as the Csurgó estate in the Zala County, including towns of Csurgó, Csatar and Paka. In exchange thereof, he gave his possessions – Medvedgrad in the Za-

greb County and Rakovac in the Križevci County, as well as an enormous amount of 10,000 florins and a mortar valued at 1,000 florins. The exchange had functioned until 1613, when it was proclaimed null and void. Until that time, the Zrinski had already become a highly esteemed, influential family, unavoidable in the political sense in the Kingdom of Hungary.

5. Ottoman attacks on Pounje were additionally intensified in the crucial 1550s. Hence, Zrinski handed all his forts in Pounje and on Zrinska gora to the Crown, whereby he, *de facto*, withdrew of defending them. As of then, they formed a part of the so-called *New Carniolan and Croatian Border from Bihać to Sisak* (according to documents dating from 1559). In the 1560s and the 1570s, they were a part of Croatian Border, but outside military districts, as a segment of the so-called *forts of the Zrinskis*. The fall of the major part of Pounje under the Ottomans, covering the area from Kostajnica (1556) to Lješnica (1558) and Krupa (1565), which followed soon, witnesses to the fact that Nicholas IV had retreated in the very last moment. Only the estates around Zrin and Gvozdansko were defended for a while longer, until the fateful 1577/1578, thanks to the commander of Carniola.

6. In addition to the aforementioned, Nicholas IV Zrinski made another fateful move. He rejected the honourable position of ban (Peter Erdődy succeeded him), and took over the lower-prestige duty of captain of Szigetvár (1561–1566). His son George IV also refused to become ban and – similar to his father – accepted the post of commander of Kaniža and the county of Lower Hungary, defending thereby primarily Međimurje and profitable family estates in Hungarian hinterland.

7. In conclusion: Nicholas IV and his son George IV married their many daughters and sisters into prominent families (Batthyány, Nádasdy, Bánffy, Thurzó, Teleky, Perény, Homonay, Thurn, Lenković, Forgách, etc.), and they themselves also married noblewomen from the highest aristocratic circles (Czech family Rožemberk, Austrian family Stubenberg). The establishment of social bonds all across the Kingdom of Hungary and beyond enlarged the power of possession gained through complex migration of the family towards the safer North.

NICHOLAS ZRINSKI, CROATIAN BAN AND DEFENDER OF THE FORTRESS OF SZIGETVÁR IN 1566

ANĐELKO MIJATOVIĆ

Count Nicholas of Zrin, a descendant of one of the oldest and for centuries well known Croatian aristocratic kindred – the one of the Šubići of Bribir – and of a more than a century-old magnate kindred of the Zrinski; ban of Croatia (1543-1556); famous warrior and experienced anti-Ottoman strategist; secret royal counsellor; captain of Szigetvár and supreme captain of Transdanubia in the South-Western Hungary; master of royal chamberlains (*magister tavernicorum regalium*) of Hungary and member of Imperial War Council (*Hofkriegsrat*), was one of the most prominent Croatian aristocrats, one of the most famous historical persons in Croatian and Hungarian political and military history of the Middle Ages and the Modern period, and one of the most notable men of his time in the Habsburg Monarchy. This particularly significant historical person may be analysed from a number of starting points, and on this occasion will be discussed only from the viewpoint of his role in organising resistance against Ottoman conquests.

He was born in the first half of 1508 as son of Nicholas and Helen in Zrin in Pounje, where the Šubić counts of Bribir had built their new aristocratic identity since 1347, actively influencing the development of Croatian history, under the name of the counts of Zrin. Many members of the kindred had lost their lives through centuries in the defence of the country, or were executed while defending its interests.

When Nicholas Zrinski was born, Croatian lands, existing within the scope of the lands of the Crown of St Stephen since 1102, were defended on Cetina, in the valley of Vrba and on the Spreča and the Banate of Macsó (Mačva). He grew up and operated in the most difficult period of Croatian history, in the period of Croatian retreat from the aforementioned defensive positions to Virovitica and Čazma in 1552, when the Ottomans conquered large areas of Croatian territory; this was in his case felt even stronger by the personal losses of his ancestral estates, which were also falling to the Ottomans.

At the moment of the search for new ruler, after the death of King Louis II of Hungary-Croatia and Bohemia in the battle of Mohács of 1526, Nicholas III of Zrin, father of Nicholas IV of Szigetvár, was one of the electors of Archduke Ferdinand Habsburg of Austria for the king of Croatia on 1st January

1527 in Cetin. In the same year, aged around 20, Nicholas IV of Zrin was mentioned as supporter of King Ferdinand, fighting enthusiastically together with his older brother John against the supporters of King John Szapolyai of Hungary-Croatia (1527-1540). Two years later, in 1529, aged 22, during the first Ottoman siege of Vienna, he excelled himself in fighting against the Ottomans and was rewarded by Charles V of Habsburg, Emperor of the Holy Roman Empire and King of Spain, with a horse and gold. As warrior, military commander and strategist of fighting in Croatia of his time, Nicholas Zrinski of Szigetvár affirmed himself through almost four decades in the defence of Croatian and Hungarian lands from Ottoman conquests.

He led active defence against the Ottomans and answered to their devastation of his estates by attacking and devastating areas under their rule. On the top of his power, he commanded castles and estates from Bakar in the Littoral to Pounje, present-day Western Slavonija, Međimurje (Muraköz) and Transdanubia. In his time, the Zrinski kindred became aristocratic kindred of utmost importance in the Kingdom of Croatia, the Kingdom of Hungary and the Habsburg Monarchy, all to the final destruction of the kindred in the second half of the seventeenth century.

At the end of 1542, Nicholas Zrinski, aged 34, already an experienced warrior and at that time the only male member of his kindred was appointed ban of Dalmatia-Croatia-Slavonia in, for Croatia, the most difficult period of the sixteenth century. Until then, the Ottomans had occupied the areas of Southern Velebit, Krbava (1527) and Lika (1528), up to the area of Pounje in the Kingdom of Croatia, and areas of the Kingdom of Slavonia including Osijek, Našice, Požega, Cernik and Novska. While the Ottomans were attacking with thousands and tens of thousands of warriors, Croatian and royal forces usually numbered in hundreds, and rarely in thousands. Count Nicholas particularly worked on establishing the defence of Croatian lands, initiated the building and repairing of fortifications, manned them with troops and provision, etc. He did not receive the promised royal financial support, he bore the costs of defence and warfare alone for years, and he offered his resignation on the ban's honour committed to him on several occasions.

The more notable fights of Nicholas Zrinski against the Ottomans were those for Zrin (1540) and Pest (1542), near Somoly (1543), Konjšćina (1544), Varaždin (1553), for Szigetvár and Babócsa and Korotna (1556). During fighting of 1556, the Ottomans conquered two castles of Zrinski: Kostajnica

(16 July), "the main door of Croatia," as it was called in the contemporary period, and Novi in Pounje, committed to the defence of royal forces. Injured by such adverse development and loss of his estates in Pounje, the fact that he was not receiving appurtenant support for the defence, and willing to dedicate more time and forces to his northern estates, Zrinski finally resigned at the end of 1556 the position of the ban after having held this office for 14 years, and the ruler accepted it on Christmas of the same year. As the ban of Croatia-Dalmatia-Slavonia (1543-1556), Zrinski defended and saved the remnants of Croatian lands from the final Ottoman conquest in extremely unfavourable circumstances.

After his withdrawal from ban's office, Zrinski spent more time on his northern estates in Međimurje and Transdanubia. He was entrusted with the rebuilding and provision of Szigetvár with food, weaponry and other things needed for defence; this task was not easy due to permanently present Ottoman danger. Even though he surrendered command over the fortress to the new commander in February 1557, he still considered Szigetvár as fortress in his own care, with different tasks to do. He particularly worked on the renovation of the fortification ring around Szigetvár. All that contributed a lot to his very intense inclusion into the political life of the Kingdom of Hungary. In autumn 1557, he became master of royal chamberlains of Hungary. In October 1561, he became captain of Szigetvár, and in 1563, supreme captain of Transdanubia. As captain of Szigetvár, he took particular care of the renovation and provision of the fortress. Troops of the surrounding forts of Babócsa, Berzence, Barcs, Vizvár and Csurgó were also placed under his command. In order to prevent building an Ottoman fortress in Podravska Moslavina, Zrinski crossed Drava near Martinac in March 1526 with some other captains, and defeated the Ottomans near Podravska Moslavina, destroying the fortifications built until then and capturing a lot of heavy weaponry and other booty.

By his appointment as supreme commander of Transdanubia (1563), Zrinski united in his person the honours of captain of Szigetvár and supreme captain of Transdanubia, commanding thereby the whole territory between Lake Balaton and Drava, with authorities of supreme military commander in the area entrusted to his care. Zrinski successfully used all his authority and means at his disposal to finish the started building of the fortress of Szigetvár in accordance with contemporary military standards and acquired means for its upkeep.

Zrinski sealed his patriotic life work with the determinant defence of Szigetvár in 1566, one of the turning points in Ottoman conquests in Europe and the world. Even though he might have delegated the command to someone other, he did not do that, but rather, as an experienced military commander, took all the means necessary for defending the fortress entrusted to him. He supplied Szigetvár with weapons and food sufficient for four months, hoping that King Maximilian II would come to his help with a larger army. The Ottomans under the command of Sultan Süleiman and Grand-Vizier Mehmed Pasha Sokollu were attacking Szigetvár with overwhelming forces of ca 90-100,000 men and 200-300 cannons for around forty days. The fortress was defended by relatively small group of defenders, around 2,300 and few more men, as was recorded by his secretary Ferenac Črnko; the majority of defenders were Croats, denizens of his estates in Croatia and Transdanubia, and together with townsmen of Szigetvár, 4,300 persons were there in the fortress. Zrinski took all possible measures that a military commander should take on such an occasion, proclaimed martial law, and gave the necessary instructions to the crew. The attacks on Szigetvár started on 31st July, and were continued with lesser intensity until its fall on 7 September. After they had receded from the defence of the New Town on 9 August, the defenders held up in the Old Town until 19 August, inflicting great losses to the attackers, but also suffering great losses themselves, when they finally – with enormous losses – withdraw to the oldest part of Szigetvár fortress – the castle. They continued to resist there until 7 September, when they, with the still living Szigetvár townsmen, wounded and exhausted, without any food or water, rejected summons to surrender and, together with their commander Zrinski, undertook sortie from the fortress and perished all except seven, while the remaining civilians were taken into captivity.

In fighting for Szigetvár, a great number of soldiers of the Ottoman army perished, among whom there were 25,000 members of particular military branches of sipahis and janissaries, main carriers of Ottoman conquests, and in the last days of the defence, Sultan Süleiman died as well. Because of that and great logistic losses, Ottoman army was not any more capable of advancing towards Central Europe, but withdrew to its garrisons. It was the first turning point in Ottoman conquests, and the self-sacrifice of Nicholas Zrinski and other defenders of Szigetvár contributed to it greatly. This, the most famous, episode in the older Croatian and Hungarian history, when

the defenders of Szigetvár rejected all summons to surrender and rather chose death, became an epopee and left deep traces in all aspects of social activity and life of the Croats and other nations threatened by Ottoman conquests. The central figure of all these events and manifestations was the commander of Szigetvár – Nicholas Zrinski, the most famous warrior of Croatian history, an example and paragon of patriotism not only for Croats and Hungarians, but also for other nations.

THE 1566 SIEGE OF SZIGETVÁR – THE INTELLIGENCE SERVICE OF NICHOLAS IV ZRINSKI AND THE SPIRIT OF THE TIME

KREŠIMIR KUŽIĆ

The siege of the fortress of Szigetvár and the death in the battle of Count Nicholas IV of Zrin (1508-1566), the commander of the defence of the fortress, are events that have been attracting the attention of not only historians, writers and artists for 450 years. However, among topics that still lacks further elaboration, there are still the role of intelligence and Count Nicholas's assessments of the situation during the defence of Szigetvár. In contrast to that, astrological works covering the period around 1566 have been somewhat more analysed.

The impression of Count Nicholas as prudent military commander aware of the importance of reporting on enemy activities on time is evident already from the first sentences of the diary of Ferenac Črnko. There is no doubt that Nicholas IV continued upkeeping the intelligence network inherited from previous commanders. His spies operated in Pécs and Osijek, and also in Sarajevo and Belgrade, and besides them, he had his informers also among the Ottomans. Even this list of places reveals how wide the area of his interests was. From the early period of his military career, we know that he had a spy network, and that he used the same intelligence techniques when he held the office of the ban of Croatia (1542-1556). Even though involving in such activities was life-threatening, there always existed persons interested in collecting information on the other side of the border for money.

The fact that Nicholas IV was a wise commander and organiser of intelligence service may be seen from another detail, too. Namely, neither in the aforementioned diary, nor in any other writing with his signature, not single name of any spy or informer who was a member of that intelligence network

or hints on their origin can be found. From that fact, it may be concluded that his spies operated for longer periods and consequently needed long-lasting conspiracy, and in the end, it means that they were well remunerated. The reward in money for all perils such persons were exposed to was exactly the most delicate part in the construction of intelligence support for military activities. Being aware of that, Zrinski correctly suggested that salary to the soldiers should be diminished for soldiers, but that for the spies should be augmented.

Military action towards Siklós is an excellent example of intelligence preparations and determinant way of commanding, and it is at the same time also a classic example of an action directed in the first place to distracting enemies from their main target of attack. Through his spies operating in Ottoman territory and his own reconnaissance units, Zrinski had at his disposal the precise assesment of conditions and conduct of newly come Ottoman units and did not miss the oportunity to inflict a painful blow to Süleiman's forces. By this event, he did not only achieve excellent tactical success, but had directly influence at strategic level, and turned enemy activities in direction that provided time for the Imperial forces to assemble the bulk of their army.

Ptolemy already differentiated between two kinds of astrology: *astrologia naturalis (doctrinalis)* and *astrologia divinatrix (iudiciaria)*. The first studied types and movements of celestial bodies, while the second studied their influence on the Earth and the living creatures, including men, in both direct and indirect senses.

Traditional belief that the appearance of comets is a very strong portent cannot be disregarded either when assessing the psychological climate of the period. In 1566, several comets have been observed in the sky, which immediately spread rumours of misfortunes for the humanity inevitably bound to follow. Even earlier, M. de Notre Dame considered the eclipse of the moon of November 1565 as the foretoken and the announcement of misfortunes in 1566. Certain phenomena around the Sun have been noticed in Alsace, and immediately connected to the stay of Ottoman army under Szigetvár.

To which extent did astrologists succeed in "foretelling" all events connected to Szigetvár? F. Giuntini, an established astrologist, had apparently prophesised Süleiman's death. On the other side of Europe, T. Brahe, based on the eclipse of the moon of 28 October 1566, announced the im-

pending death of the sultan, not knowing that he had already died a week before. Similarly, poet D. Venier and mathematician E. Ausonio made a horoscope for Süleiman. According to their conclusions, the year 1566 would be particularly harmful for the Sultan.

Was Nicholas of Zrin a supporter of divinising astrology? This question follows directly from the research of H. Rantzau. However, all particular details of his biography, and particularly Črnko's diary, reduce that possibility to the least possible measure. A whole sequence of his decisions and actions tells that they were deeply well thought and eventually rational. They were neither of a passing character nor were they passive, that is to say, they were not only answers to his enemies' activities. Prior to all, he conducted all measures of logistic preparation, and within the scope of preparation of fighting moral, he openly exposed to the members of his crew all the facts they had to know, yet in a way that did not influence the level of their motivation.

The main guilt for the death of Zrinski and the suffering of the military contingent in the fortress of Szigetvár belongs to Emperor Maximilian II. His capacity for leading the state and supreme command of the imperial army forces were completely undermined by his indecisiveness and incompetence in taking rational responsibility, as well as his stubborn rejection of benevolent advices of main military, political and ecclesiastical leaders of the countries he ruled or which were allied to him. Whether prophecies, horoscopes and other irrational products of educated members of renaissance intellectual society reflected on the Emperor's decisions, I cannot decisively state, because I did not find any document with such content. However, as already mentioned, some "prophecies" suggestively "forewarned" on dire consequences that might befall an unnamed ruler of Vienna in the year of 1566. For the description of that ruler, Maximilian II, and all his life and death, Spanish ambassador marquis de Almazanu needed only a few words: the unfortunate man died as he lived ... – indecisive, insecure and stubborn. On the other hand, a member of the intelligence network of Szigetvár stated for Zrinski: *... until the world would exist, his honour would be praised ...*

THE IMPACT OF SIEGE WARFARE IN OTTOMAN EXPANSION TOWARDS CENTRAL EUROPE: THE CASE OF THE SIEGE OF SZIGETVÁR

KAHRAMAN ŞAKUL

This paper analyses the role of Ottoman expertise in siege warfare in the expansion towards Central Europe through the case of the siege of Szigetvár in 1566. Ottoman expertise in siege craft was indispensable to the acquisition of new territories in the region. The Ottomans had a good record of successful sieges in the new age of firepower since the conquest of Constantinople. However, Ottoman siege craft was not characterized by an unbroken series of victories. Failed sieges of Belgrade and Rhodes in the era of Mehmed the Conqueror, defeat at the sieges of Vienna and Malta in the period of Süleyman the Magnificent are the most renowned examples of Ottoman blunders in siege warfare.

Apparently, the Ottomans learnt much from these failures as they constantly sharpened their skills in siege craft. The Ottomans no doubt perfected their siege techniques in the Long War with the Habsburgs (1593-1606), the sieges of Baghdad (1638-39), Candia (1648-69), Uyvar (1663), Kamanets-Podolski, and later on, Chyhyryn (1677-78). The Ottomans used incendiary bombs as early as in the siege of Rhodes (1520) to terrorize the defenders. They readily adopted grapeshot and perfected parallels and zigzag with the addition of redoubts to parallels during the siege of Candia. We will try to place the siege of Szigetvár in the evolution of the Ottoman siege warfare.

Szigetvár played an important defensive role in years 1541-1566. After the fall of Esztergom in 1543, its main role was to threaten the Ottoman communications with Buda along the Danube, the East of which was occupied by the Ottomans. Realizing its geostrategic significance, the Ottomans laid two sieges to the fortress subsequently. In 1555, Toygun Pasha besieged Szigetvár with no success. The next year, Hadım Ali Pasha, pasha of Buda, could not take it either after a 45-day siege. While these sieges were unsuccessful, they proved to be guidance for the imperial army led by Süleyman the Magnificent in the ultimate siege in 1566. For instance, the aforementioned Ai Pasha unwittingly pitched his tent within the gun range of the defending guns and faced the danger of death. Thus, Semilihov Hill was chosen for Süleyman's royal tent as it was out of gun range of the garrison fire.

An analysis of the phases of the Ottoman siege of Szigetvár offers us a fresh opportunity to make a case for comparative study of Ottoman siege craft in the long run. We will compare and contrast the siege of Szigetvár (1566) to the sieges of the Long War (1594-1606), Uyvar (Érsekújvár; Nové Zámky, Kamanets-Podolskii (1672), and Chyryn (1678) in order to understand its place and importance for Ottoman long-term expansion.

In the presentation, we will define the stages of the siege as (1) the investing of the fortress; (2) the battering of the walls and mining; (3) passing the ditch; and (4) storming the fortifications. The focus will again be to evaluate the proper place of the siege of Szigetvár in Ottoman siege warfare. One obvious result of such a comparison is the difference that a determined fortress garrison could make in Ottoman sieges. Ottomans found strong garrisons at Malta, Szigetvár, and Nicosia in the years 1565-1571. Not only were they strong, but also quite determined to give a resolute fight until the end. Thus, such sieges were costly to the Ottomans in terms of casualty rates, time, and equipment. In the case of Szigetvár, the sheer factor of Miklos Zrinyi was a significant factor that contributed to the epic defense of the fortress. Count Zrinyi had lost his ancient allodia in Croatia in the wars with the Ottomans, so he had to acquire new ones in Hungary. As he knew that Szigetvár was indispensable to the protection of his estates, he had himself appointed the commander of the whole Transdanubian (western Hungarian) frontier in 1561. Therefore, what was at stake in 1566 for him was not so much the defence of the Habsburg territories as the protection of his own estates against an ever-expanding enemy.

This not only explains his uncompromising resistance against the Ottoman siege, but also the strength of the fortification, which was another element that determined the fate of an Ottoman siege. Szigetvár was surely a strong fortification owing to physical features of the region. Modern fortifications were costly to maintain. Thus, the maintenance of Szigetvár, like others, was managed through a cooperation of the center and the local resources. However, Zrinyi's reinforcement of the fortifications was also crucial in the long resistance against the Ottoman siege machine. Personal interests at stake made the realities of the frontier life such as ransoming of the prisoners, mutual antagonisms, and mercenaries a complex issue in this siege.

Finally, a siege operation could not be reduced to its military/technical aspects. The demonstration of political power (military parade, military mu-

sic, show of banners, etc.), military ruses and espionage, as well as negotiations, were also part of a proper siege. Thus, we will give due scope to these aspects of the siege of Szigetvár in this presentation.

THE 1566 SIEGE OF SZIGETVÁR ACCORDING TO OTTOMAN CAMPAIGN NARRATIVES

GÜNHAN BÖREKÇİ

The Ottoman siege and capture of Szigetvár in 1566 has been subject to numerous academic studies. This paper aims to contribute to this scholarly corpus by examining a set of contemporary Ottoman campaign narratives, conventionally known as the *Sigetvarnâmes*. These historical sources, some of which have been only recently published, reveal important information not only on the Ottoman imperial army's campaign preparations and war-strategy against Szigetvár, but also on the death of Sultan Süleyman I during the last days of the siege and the succession of his son, Sultan Selim II. Besides, these very accounts provide some critical details about the prisoners of war, a topic which no doubt awaits further research. Overall, the *Sigetvarnâmes*, especially the ones written by authors present at this campaign, are indispensable sources for the study of Ottoman military and political history in the sixteenth century in general, and the details of the capture of Szigetvár by the Ottomans in particular.

To begin with, Feridun Ahmed Bey's *Nüzhet-i Esrârü'l-Ahyâr der-Ahbâr-ı Sefer-i Sigetvar* (*Pleasures of the Secrets of Auspicious Men from the News of the Szigetvár Campaign*) holds an exceptional place among the *Sigetvarnâmes* for its rich contents and illustrations. Adorned with nineteen exquisite miniatures, which are attributed to the court artist Nakkaş Osman, this voluminous work of 305 folios was written most probably by the author's own hand, and completed on January 1, 1569; hence it ranks as the earliest and the most detailed eye-witness accounts of the war. Its author, Feridun Ahmed, had served in the campaign as the private secretary of Grand Vizier Sokollu Mehmed Pasha (d. 1579) and it is quite clear that he had written this work for his patron Sokollu Mehmed Pasha, given the text of *Nüzhet-i Esrâr* constantly accords place of primacy to the grand vizier rather than Sultan Süleyman or Sultan Selim II, addressing him each time in highly flattering language.

The author presents Sokollu Mehmed Pasha not only as an outstanding commander and statesman, but also as a political genius of high influence, virtually a “king-maker.” The grand vizier, after all, was the real commander-in-chief during the Szigetvár Campaign, ably leading the army and the siege. Moreover, he distinguished himself as a loyal and skillful statesman by the measures he took immediately after the death of Sultan Süleyman. For a period of forty-eight days, he carefully paved the way for the heir-apparent, Prince Selim, to come from his princely province (*sancak*) and assume the Ottoman throne in an almost seamless process. As such, Sokollu was the sole figure in the continuation of the Ottoman dynastic establishment at its most critical moment. It is striking that Feridun Ahmed shows no hesitation in defining him as “the possessor of majesty and felicity” (*sâhib-i devlet ü sa’âdet*), an expression exclusively reserved for the Ottoman sultans, or in depicting him issuing *fermans* as if he were the sultan of the realm.

Another critical feature of *Nüzhet-i Esrâr* is that it covers the events of the period 1558-1568. Below is the thematic extent of the work, which can be summarized in four sections:

1) The Szigetvár Campaign of 1566

The text opens with an explanation of the diplomatic background of the siege of Szigetvár. Named as the main considerations lying behind the declaration of war are the violation of the Ottoman-Habsburg Treaty of 1562 by the Habsburgs, and the failure to end the clashes along the frontier zone between the two empires. The narration of the campaign, including all its stages, occupies approximately half of the text of *Nüzhet-i Esrâr*.

The topics and events of this section include: unresolved border disputes with the Habsburgs during the term of grand vizier Semiz Ali Pasha and the failure of Emperor Maximilian – who had succeeded Ferdinand in 1564 and reigned until 1574 – to forward the tribute to Istanbul in a timely fashion; Sokollu Mehmed Pasha’s succession to Semiz Ali Pasha upon the death of the latter and the decision to go to war against Royal Hungary; the departure of the sultan from Istanbul in a procession after the completion of war preparations; the stopovers between Istanbul and Szigetvár along with the military, political, and daily events during the march; the reason for the choice of the fortress of Szigetvár as the object of the campaign; breaking news from Hungary; the siege of the fortress of Szigetvár comprising four bastions, de-

fended by forces under the command of Nikola Šubić Zrinski; the sultan's demise the night before the fall of the citadel; the measures taken by Sokollu Mehmed Pasha to keep the news secret; the situation of the army and the ruling elite; letters sent to Selim by messenger; Selim's arrival in Istanbul, his first enthronement ceremony, and his coming to Belgrade; the last prayer for Sultan Süleyman in Belgrade; the return of the new sultan to Istanbul with the army upon the pledge of allegiance by the ruling elite to Sultan Selim; and the mutiny within the army caused by a dispute over the succession bonus. The rich content makes *Nüzhet-i Esrâr* an indispensable source for the study of Ottoman political and military history in the sixteenth century in general, and the history of the Szigetvár Campaign in particular.

2) The Bayezid Incident

In this section, Feridun Ahmed Bey names all the campaigns of Sultan Süleyman one by one and reviews them in flashback, turning to an event that he could never forget. Coined "the Bayezid Incident," this was the last princely war of succession in Ottoman history and was observed by Feridun Ahmed on the battlefield, standing at the side of Sokollu Mehmed Pasha. He recounts the event in as much detail as the campaign on Szigetvár, including both the events he witnessed and the official correspondence he penned as scribe. The uniqueness of this section is beyond question for the wealth of information it provides on a tumultuous affair.

3) The Reception of the Embassies from the Habsburgs and the Safavids:

This section records under separate headings the reception of the Habsburg embassy – sent by Emperor Maximilian II to negotiate a new peace treaty – by Sokollu Mehmed Pasha and the sultan, as well as the relevant correspondence and negotiations. In addition, it chronicles in great detail the reception of the Safavid envoy Şahkulu in Edirne and Istanbul; Şahkulu had brought Shah Tahmasb's message of condolences for the loss of Süleyman and congratulation for the succession of Selim. Of particular significance is the recording of the gifts and letters presented by the embassies, as well as the dinners given in honour of the envoys. The grand vizier's reception of the Venetian embassy sent for official congratulations is also mentioned in passing. This section is especially essential for studies of Ottoman political and diplomatic history.

4) Affairs in Irak and the Arabian Peninsula:

In this section, Feridun Ahmed narrates the organization of military campaigns to suppress the rebellions in these provinces, and the measures taken to this effect by Sokollu Mehmed Pasha and İskender Pasha – Governor-General of Baghdad and commander-in-chief of these campaigns. Previously, Ulyanoğlu, the governor of *Irak-ı Arab*, and his supporters had risen in rebellion, viewing the succession of Selim II as a political opportunity for their cause. Feridun Bey describes in detail the halting stations and towns lying along the banks of the Euphrates wherein the army of İskender Pasha rested during the prolonged march. The author also gives due attention to the split of Yemen into two governor-generalships (*beylerbeyilik*). Feridun Ahmed states that he based his account on the oral testimony of an eyewitness to the campaign. The thematic sections of the text close with the conclusion of İskender Pasha's campaign. Next come short explanations by Feridun Ahmed as to why he wrote the book and for what reason he entitled it the way he did. The book ends with a colophon (*ferağ kaydı*).

In short, *Nüzhet-i Esrâr* embodies the accounts of events witnessed by Feridun Bey in the first three sections, and of events related by an eyewitness to Feridun Bey in the last section.

Like Feridun Ahmed Bey's *Nüzhet-i Esrâr*, there are other contemporary Ottoman works on the campaign against Szigetvár either sponsored by Sokollu or dedicated to him. One such work belongs to Agehî Mansur Çelebi, who was a veteran of this war and who presented his *Fetihnâme-i Kal'a-i Sigetvar*, a chronicle of the campaign in prose, to Sokollu Mehmed Pasha. Besides some of the events not covered by Feridun Ahmed Bey, Agehî's work is especially important inasmuch that it also covers the Ottoman capture of Siklos. Among works dedicated to Sokollu, one may also cite *Sigetvar Fetihnâmesi* by Seyfî of Istanbul, a work written in verse and prose which is now lost, as well as Merâhî's *Fetihnâme-i Sefer-i Sigetvar*. The *Heft Meclis* of Gelibolulu Mustafa Âli was also dedicated to the grand vizier. Mustafa Âli had not participated in the campaign, a fact that accounts for his focus on stylistics rather than on the factual representation of the war. Writing at a time of financial and professional distress (around 1573), he loaded his text with eulogies to Sokollu and submitted it to the grand vizier via Şeyh Nureddinzâde Muslihiddin, a member of the Halveti order. Amusingly, Mustafa Âli explicitly expressed his expectation for a scribal post at the palace at the

end of his work. One should mention two other works written in Ottoman Turkish on the campaign of Szigetvár during the grand-vizierate of Sokollu: the anonymous *Heft Dâstân* and Âşık Çelebi's *Sigetvarnâme*.

A recently found work by the prominent 16th-century Ottoman poet Bakî now ranks as the first *Sigetvarnâme*, for it was completed on September 26, 1566. Though it is a short work written in verse and prose, it provides yet another summary of the events leading to the last campaign of Sultan Süleyman and the capture of Szigetvar under the command of Sokollu Mehmed Pasha.

A number of Ottoman authors wrote chronicles of this era during later periods, as witnesses to the siege of Szigetvár as well as the events of the 1560s. Mustafa Selânikî no doubt comes to mind first, as his was probably the most significant in this group of works. Selânikî served in the campaign as a *hâfız* (one who memorized the *Qurân*) from the palace school. His account agrees with that of Feridun Ahmed on such topics as the siege of Szigetvár, the death of Sultan Süleyman, and the succession of Selim II. Nonetheless, he witnessed these events from a different angle, which makes his work noteworthy.

Finally, one should also note *Tarih-i Sultân Süleymân* (Chester Beatty Library, MS T. 413), an illustrated work in verse composed by Şehnâmeçi Seyyid Lokman. This is an official chronicle written in Persian with miniatures from Nakkaş Osman's brush. There are similarities in form and style between these miniatures and those in *Nüzhet-i Esrâr*. Seyyid Lokman was appointed the official chronicler (*şehnâmeçi*) in 1569 on the recommendation of Feridun Bey. Together with his team of artists and under the patronage of Selim II, Seyyid Lokman prepared *Şehnâme-i Selîm Hân* and the second volume of *Hünernâme*, both of which also include sections on the campaign of Szigetvár illustrated with miniatures.

In the final analysis, *Nüzhet-i Esrâr* of Feridun Ahmed Bey appears to be a much more comprehensive work with many details absent in other contemporary and near-contemporary works written on Sultan Süleyman's last campaign.

WHO AND WHAT DO WE CELEBRATE? MIKLÓS ZRINYI AND SZIGETVÁR IN THE HUNGARIAN HISTORICAL MEMORY

SZABOLCS VARGA

Miklós Zrínyi/Nikola Zrinski completed a great journey in the course of his life, but this was nothing compared to what happened after his death. Yet how many brave warriors there are buried all over the world whose name we do not even know. We only have to think of the border guards of countless Hungarian and Croatian castles, and their commanders, who gave their lives in battles against the force of superior numbers. Not so with Zrínyi. Even at the time, people were waiting with excitement for news of the Szigetvár siege, and the journals and engravings about this would within weeks become known across Europe. Residents of German and Italian areas would mostly be interested in the Ottoman Empire's plans and the fate of the ageing sultan, but in the process, the broader public would have become acquainted with the names of Zrínyi and Szigetvár.

The first authentic data on the siege are from the reports of the hero of Sziget's young chamberlain, the Croatian Ferenc Črnko, who survived the siege. Freed from captivity, Črnko wrote the history of the siege in Croatian, which was translated into Latin by Samuel Budina from Laibach (Vienna, 1568). Within the same year, a German version was also available, while in 1569-70, it appeared in two editions in Italian. The other key contemporary report is 'Hungary's History' written by Ferenc Forgách in 1568-1573; the author's hatred for Zrínyi almost leaps out of the pages of the Latin text, and as such it could only become part of the literary canon after it was substantially reworked by his brother Imre Forgách.

Due to constant Ottoman threat, interest in Miklós Zrínyi did not ebb even many years later. The advance of the Turks in Hungary continued to keep the Holy Roman Empire in dread, while their growing presence in both the eastern and western parts of the Mediterranean Sea generated the same fear in the Italians. Zrínyi, made into a hero of Christianity, found his way onto an etching designed to draw German public attention to the adverse situation Hungary was in and to mobilize against the Turks (1582). The work presents Hungary's fate as an allegory, displaying Hungaria as a female figure wearing a crown. One side of the engraving is taken up with

the heroes of the battle against the Turks, where Miklós Zrínyi is to be found in the company of John Hunyadi, King Matthias, György Thury and others.

In the 17th century, the memory of the Zrínyis was preserved by Miklós' great grandson's battles against the Turks in 1664: the winter campaign attracted international attention and would be a constant topic of discussion at Europe's royal courts, in which the glorious ancestor would never be forgotten. The expulsion of the Ottomans at the end of the 17th century would, however, put an end to European interest in the defender of Szigetvár.

Zrínyi would increasingly become a hero for Central Europe, more specifically for the Habsburg Monarchy. Of the Hungarian events in the early modern period, the Siege of Szigetvár in 1566 is the second most popular subject for art and literature after the legendary Battle of Mohács in 1526; this reflects a lively interest in the events, passing from one generation to the next. A sign of Zrínyi's reputation is that in 1579, Archduke Ferdinand of Tyrol (1529-1595), son of Ferdinand I, approached the Zrínyi family to acquire a few of the count's personal belongings for his private collection. This is how Zrínyi's helmet, sabre, and his decorative tunic in white atlas silk with ermine lining all came into the Archduke's possession; today they are to be found in the Kunsthistorisches Museum Hofjagd- und Rüstkammer in Vienna. In 1571, a certain Johannes Liubicz, prebendary in Boroszló (Wrocław), published a memorial treatise on Zrínyi, and an epitaph for his two generals, Péter Farkasics and György Horváth, was also displayed; that is to say, the news of the heroes of Szigetvár reached as far as Silesia.

It was the so-called Zrínyi Album, commissioned by György Zrínyi in 1587, and entitled '*De Zigetho, Hungariae propugnaculo...*' (On Szigetvár, Hungary's Defence Bastion...), which, without doubt, had the greatest influence on the cult of Zrínyi. This included prose texts about the siege, as well as poems, epigrams, engravings, and the family's coat of arms. We have only Miklós Istvánffy for the most detailed description of the siege of Szigetvár: in his '*Historiarum de rebus Ungaricis*' (History of Hungarian Things), published in 1622, he uses verbal recollections and written sources to construct the image of Zrínyi that persists to this day, and to commemorate the Hungarian and Croatian heroes who fell in the battle. It was from these literary works that educated the western public opinion became aware of the name of the Zrínyis and of Szigetvár, which both became synonyms for heroic self-sacrifice.

In the 18th century, it was primarily the Habsburg court and the Hungarian Catholic Church, which embraced the cultivation of this heroic Hungarian past. Wencel Pohl made a number of paintings on Hungarian themes for Maria Theresa, while in Hungary, in addition to the battles of Szentgottárd, Mohács and Nagyharsány, István Dorfmeister would also paint the fall and the recapture of Szigetvár, which can be seen on the ceiling of the parish church of Saint Roch in Szigetvár.

In the 19th century the cult of Zrínyi the hero blossomed anew, and we have this fact to thank for a number of works and depictions of him. The first of these, Peter Krafft's painting of 1825, was inspired by the Habsburg imperial patriotism enjoying a resurgence during the lethargy of the Napoleonic wars. The literary equivalent of this was Carl Theodor Körner's Zrínyi drama written in 1812, which, in the Prussian and German tradition, offered up a hero for the Habsburg Monarchy who was acceptable to all. The genre of national romanticism emerging in the following decade would break up the memory of Zrínyi, however, as he was crafted into a Croatian and/or Hungarian national hero who gave up his life for freedom. Zrínyi himself would have been the most surprised at the ways in which particular generations would use his name.

In Hungary, Miklós Barabás and Bertalan Székely focussed on the hero who would die for his homeland, the catalyst for which would initially be national romanticism, then after the failed revolution of 1848-49, it would instead be catharsis. In the 1860s, Zrínyi's name emerged again with regard to the approaching anniversary and to the academic, public and political discourse concerning Croatian-Hungarian cooperation, though the main issue here was Zrínyi's nationality, that is, his Hungarian identity. This would continue even despite Tivadar Kosztka Csontváry's painting and Kálmán Mikszáth's satirical novel 'Új Zrínyiász' (New Zrínyiad), in which the protagonist, as a result of a series of odd coincidences, would fight bravely in the Budapest of the dualist period only to die a heroic death in Budapest's mock Vajdahunyad Castle.

The newly found respect for Zrínyi in Croatia began in 1866, when, to celebrate the three-hundredth anniversary of his heroic death, Zagreb's most attractive square was named after him. Ten years later, composer Ivan Zajc wrote the opera entitled *Nikola Šubić Zrinjski*, in which Körner's Zrínyi fought as a Croatian hero in Szigetvár, and, as a true patriot, rejected So-

kollu Mehmed's offer for Croatian royal throne. Although there have been attempts in Croatia to deheroize Zrinyi, his Catholicism and self-sacrifice have continued to make him one of the most popular heroes for the Croatian people, along with Péter Zrinyi/Petar Zrinski and Krsto Frankopan.

The second half of the 20th century was not favourable to anything in Central Europe that was national in flavour. So did the cult of Zrinyi of Hungary retreat to Szigetvár and in Croatia to Čakovec, though in the latter, it was only in 1991 that the Zrinyis were fully rehabilitated.

Nevertheless, Zrinyi's name has become irrevocably ingrained in both the Hungarian and Croatian national consciousness. Many streets, squares and institutions bear his name, and one hopes that there is not a single person in either country who would not have a few ideas about him. This is no small feat if we stop to think that, for most of these countries' former rulers, not even this much has remained in public thought. The broad awareness of the Turkish wars and Suleyman has taken Zrinyi's popularity beyond the borders of his homeland in the narrow sense, and right that it has. This region has few real heroes, whose memory rings a bell outside their own nation. Zrinyi, with his multifarious identities and loyalties, can perhaps only be compared in the Serbian and Romanian national consciousness with John Hunyadi, but neither prince Lazar of Serbia, nor the Mihai Viteazul (Vitéz Mihály) of Romania, nor others, can be mentioned in the same breath. The story of his death under the walls of the Szigetvár Castle is too clean, too universal, and one that genuinely shows Zrinyi's own nature. And no number of thorough biographies can challenge this image, no matter how much dirt any conscientious researcher might try to dig up on him.

NIKOLA ŠUBIĆ ZRINSKI AND SZIGETVÁR 1566 IN CROATIAN HISTORIOGRAPHY

ŽELJKO HOLJEVAC

The siege of Szigetvár by the Ottomans in 1566 and the death of Nikola Šubić Zrinski during the breach from the fort of Szigetvár 450 years ago have left a remarkable trace in numerous testimonies, literary works, folk poems and related tributes, as well as in modern and contemporary Croatian historiography. Taking all that into consideration, the purpose of this presentation on the occasion of celebrating the 450th anniversary of the siege of Szigetvár is

to briefly tackle several focal points dealing with Nikola Šubić Zrinski, Croatian ban and defender of Szigetvár in Croatian historiography in the period between mid 19th century and the beginning of the 21st century.

The celebration of the 300th anniversary of the siege of Szigetvár in Zagreb in 1866, to which Slovene and Slovak delegations came, inspired the historian Matija Mesić to write the book *Život Nikole Zrinjskoga, Sigetskoga junaka*. The book was published by *Matica ilirska* (today *Matica hrvatska*). The weakening of the royal power in the context of the reign of Hungarian-Croatian kings from the house of Árpád enabled the strengthening of Croatian nobility, while the invasion of the Tartars in the 13th century facilitated the rise of the dynastic family of Paul Šubić, ban of Croatia and lord of Bosnia. After the Árpád family had died out, the Šubić family – counts of Bribir – brought new kings from the Anjou dynasty to the throne. Nikola Zrinski, descendant of the Šubić family, defended in the 16th century Croatia from the Ottomans, who had made headway to Europe. Mesić wrote that Nikola had married Katarina Frankapan (or Frankopan) and entered into a unity with her brother Stjepan. He became ban of Croatia and acquired Međimurje; whilst he fought against the Ottomans, he further gained some of Erdödy's possessions. Rejecting the honourable position of ban, he became commander of Szigetvár and chief captain. He married for the second time, but lost Krupa and Novi, and waived public profession.

In 1566, the Ottomans advanced on Szigetvár; Zrinski issued wartime edicts and retreated to the interior of the fort, rejecting Ottoman attacks and calls to surrender. After the death of Sultan Suleiman, Zrinski lost his life during the breakthrough from the encircled Szigetvár, but saved Vienna from yet another Ottoman invasion. *For my plot, I have had so little time that I was not able to act as the builder, who wishes his building to be solid and pleasant to look at, so he first imagines the basis, then collects the material, and only then does he erect the building. Since I could not act in this manner, neither was my work able to present itself in such a form that it might be considered a monument worthy of the spirit of the man, whom it was intended to present to the posterity as he indeed was. In it, there is no true unity; no genuine interconnection, no beauty in form. However, though it has not managed to fulfil the higher demands for perfection, I nevertheless hold that it has not remained inferior to any less challenging demands*, wrote Matija Mesić in the *Foreword* to his book at the beginning of September 1866.

Ten years later, Hugo Badalić wrote the libretto for the opera *Nikola Šubić Zrinjski*, composed by Ivan pl. Zajc, founder of standing Croatian opera and pioneer of orchestration. Subsequently, professor Dane Gruber wrote at Easter 1879 in Zagreb the book entitled *Borba Hrvata sa Turci od pada Sigeta do mira Žitva-Dorožkoga (1566.-1606.)*, which was published by *Dionička tiskara*. He dedicated his work *To the loving memory of his unforgettable teacher Matija Mesić, first rector and professor of Croatian history at Croatian University*, i.e. the Royal University of Franz Josef I – the present University of Zagreb. *'Remnants of the remnants of the once great kingdom of Croatia', divided among the Habsburgs, the Ottomans and the Venetians, ended in early New Age at the outer wall of Christian Europe after two centuries of warring against Ottoman invasion that was stopped under the city walls of Sisak, i.e. the expansion that in the 16th century caused or stimulated migrations of the Croats and the Vlachs, the establishment and the separation of the Military Border, social and religious movements, and many other mischief. Rudolf Horvat wrote about the siege of Szigetvár in 1894 in Vienac zabavi i pouci, a journal issued by Matica hrvatska, whilst the Szigetvár epopee was not forgotten in the first half of the 20th century either. Hence, in the album entitled Hrvatski besmrtnici 910 – 1508 – 1938, published on the eve of World War Two by Dragutin Kolar, Count Nikola Zrinski was portrayed as 'The hero of Szigetvár, who fell there fighting the Turks'.*

On the occasion of the 400th anniversary of the siege of Szigetvár in 1966, the Nikola Zrinski Museum in Szigetvár and the Janus Pannonius Museum in Pecs prepared festive exhibitions. At the same time, the memorial anthology entitled *Szigetvári emlékönyv* on the siege of Szigetvár and Hungarian fight for the defence of the homeland and Europe was published in Budapest. The exhibition about the history of the city of Szigetvár in Pecs and the Szigetvár bibliography were presented in *Historijski zbornik*, a journal published by the Croatian Historical Society. *Unfortunately, this bibliography is almost exclusively limited to Hungarian literature and artworks. Only three Croatian have been included: the book by M. Mesić on Nikola Sigetski (1866), 'Adrianskog mora sirena' by P. Zrinski (published by T. Matić, 1957), and the opera by I. Zajc, commented Jaroslav Šidak, professor at the History Division of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences of the University of Zagreb. In March 1967, at the same Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, scientific symposium on the siege of Szigetvár in Croatian history, literature and music was held. Since, however, the proceedings of the symposium were*

not published, the mentioned Jaroslav Šidak, one of the participants, published – in 1971 – his discussion on Nikola Šubić Zrinski as afterword to Ferenc Črnko's testimony on the siege and conquest of Szigetvár, repeatedly published during *Croatian Spring*. The Institute of the Science of Literature of the Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences of the University of Zagreb and the printing house *Mladost* in Zagreb published the following three titles in the series of reprints entitled *Liber croaticus: Vazetje Sigeta grada* by Brne Karnarutić; *Odiljenje Sigetsko* by Pavao Ritter Vitezović; and *Podsjedanje i osvojenje Sigeta* by Ferenc Črnko, with accompanying texts.

Dragutin Pavličević in 1971 and Agneza Szabo in 2008 wrote about Nikola Šubić Zrinski describing him as *Croatian Leonidas*, who, like the archetypal Antiquity hero, defended Szigetvár to his death. Anđelko Mijatović published a book about the defence of Szigetvár in 1987 and again in 2010. The second, supplemented and enlarged edition on the occasion of the 500th anniversary of the birth of the commander of Szigetvár was published by *Školska knjiga*. Mijatović based his writing about Nikola Šubić Zrinski and his analysis of the reflection of the heroism at Szigetvár on testimonies, literary writings, and oral folk poems. In Vienna in 1568, the Slovene Samuel Budina translated Črnko's work *Podsjedanje i osvojenje Sigeta* into Latin; it was subsequently translated into German and Italian, as a result of which the siege of Szigetvár became famous throughout Europe. Črnko's report served as starting point for all the later literary and other writings, for instance *Vazetje Sigeta grada* by Brne Karnarutić; *Odiljenje sigetsko* by Pavao Ritter Vitezović; *Pisma od bana Zrinovića i cara Sulejmana Trećega koji opside Siget ungarški i pod njim umri na 1566.* by Father Andrija Kačić Miošić; *Count Nikola Zrinski* by Theodor Körner; *Kralj Matija i Zrinović na onom svijetu* by Josip Jelačić; *Zrinska poputnica* by Antun Švarc; *Nikoli Zrinjskom* by Petar Preradović; and *U boji!* by Franjo Marković. Additionally, there are poems belonging to oral literature, e.g. *Ban Mikloš Zrinjski u Sigetu gradu*, *Mujo Ljubović pod Sigetom*, *Zrinović i Sulejman*, *Smrt cara Sulejmana*, etc. Mijatović further presented traces of the reflection of heroism at Szigetvár amidst the Ottomans, e.g. in Pečevija's story about the invasion of Szigetvár, the conquest of the fort, and the journey of Sultan Suleiman from this world to the eternity.

In 1995, in the journal *Književna smotra* for world literature, Seid Serdarević discussed *Píseň o sigetském zámku*, Slovak historical epic on Szigetvár. He *inter alia* analysed metrical and stylistic features of the epic, the influence of

Slovak folk poetry, possible authorship of the epic, and potential influences of other contemporary epics tackling the same subject. In 2006, in the journal *Hrvatski sjever* for literature, culture and science, a brief text on Szigetvár was published. The text was written by László Ravazdi, and translated from Hungarian by Đuro Franković. In 2008, writing about major anniversaries in Croatian history, literature and linguistics, the journal *Gazophylacium* for science, arts, economy and politics paid tribute to the 500th anniversary of the birth of Nikola Zrinski. Agneza Szabo analysed the essential features of the political situation in Croatia in his age and his heroic defence of Szigetvár. Ivica Zvonar offered comparison between two direct descriptions of the tragedy of Szigetvár: Črnko's chronicle *Podsjedanje i osvajanje Sigeta* and Slovak epic *Pesem od Sigeta grada*. In Zagreb in 1836, Alojz Jembrih brought into connection Stjepan Moyses and the repeated edition of *Oddiljenje sigetsko* by Pavao Ritter Vitezović. Several other Croatian authors have in the recent times written about the hero of Szigetvár and his cult in Croatian historical and cultural heritage. The topic remains – in various manners – open for further research and critical review.

REFLECTIONS OF THE SIEGE OF SZIGETVÁR IN CROATIAN LITERATURE

JOSIP BRATULIĆ

Tadija Smičiklas – Croatian historian, President of *Matica hrvatska*, and later of the Croatian Academy of Sciences and Arts as well – wrote the following statement regarding the siege of Szigetvár: *The deaths of Nicholas Zrinski and Suleiman concluded the period in Turkish history in which it reached the peak of its power. By the death of Suleiman, the crescent paled and lost Suleiman's glow; by the death of Zrinski, the evening star shone forth to the Christian world, offensive Christian policy was prepared instead of the defensive. Contemporaries from all Europe acknowledged him as Leonidas of his age ...*

Though in our territory, a number of famous defences and deaths of defenders who chose death over surrender have so far taken place – for instance Krupa, Klis, Gvozdansko – the siege of Szigetvár has nevertheless deserved a special place both of folk tradition and of written literature, both in Croatia and in Europe. From the first description of the siege and fall of the fort of Szigetvár (*Seget*) by Ferenac Črnko – in the Croatian language (later

translated into Latin, German and Italian) to the grand epopee of his grand grandsons Nicholas, Croatian ban and Hungarian poet, and Peter, another Croatian ban and translator of the epic into Croatian – the Szigetvár epopee marked a turning point in Croatian epic literature. Petar was executed as a conspirator – he did not die of Turkish hand as a defender of Christian values, but by the sword of the absolutistic policy of the Court, which conducted neither defensive nor anti-Turkish policy, but only its own absolutist one. The absolutist ruler listened neither to neighbouring Christian rulers nor to the Pope or any political subjects (the Parliament – Croatian and Hungarian), and did not relieve the rebels.

Apart from folk, oral poems that described these historic events, the siege of Szigetvár rather early entered Croatian literature – in works by Brne Karnarutić and Andrija Kačić Miošić. It further also entered Croatian history – in chronicles by A. Vramec and P. R. Vitezović. All of them mention Szigetvár and its defenders. The poetic response to the epics by the Zrinski brothers came from Dubrovnik (V. Menčetić, *Trublja slovinska*) and Zagreb (P. Ritter Vitezović, *Odiljenje sigetsko*). It was the very topic of the siege of Szigetvár that created a bond between the literary north and south of Croatia. In the 19th century, a century marked by national integrations, the topic of the Zrinsk and the defence of national values became the focal point of literary and social interest in works by I. Mažuranić, M. Topalović, V. Gaj, I. Zahar, A. Šenoa.

In German literature, Th. Körner – pre-romantic author, German patriotic poet who opposed the Napoleonic conquests – presented in his drama on Nicholas Zrinski (*Miklos Graf Zriny oder die Belagerung von Sigeth*, 1812) the very man and his fellow-fighters as defenders of freedom and of the values that became the fundament of new social and political assets. In Croatian and Hungarian literature, music and visual arts, Nicholas Zrinski has become a hero who deserves to be taken as a role model. Stanković's Theatre in Zagreb was festively opened with the performance of Körner's drama, which was – in Croatian translation – shown in many Croatian cities and towns. Based on this text, H. Badalić wrote the libretto for one of the most popular Croatian operas – *Nikola Šubić Zrinjski* by Ivan pl. Zajc.

It is furthermore interesting to explore the political and the literary-linguistic aspects linked with the celebration of the 300th anniversary of the siege of Szigetvár in 1866. Croatian Parliament was the patron of the celebra-

tion, and in the first parliamentary session, Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer donated 50,000 florins for the founding of Yugoslav university. The only person who opposed to the celebration was Ante Starčević, who claimed that Nikola Zrinski, same as Jelačić in 1848, was rescuing Austria, and that their idea was to defend the enemy Austrian state, not Croatia. Austria executed the genuine defenders of Croatia – Petar Zrinski and Fran Krsto Frankopan. The argument was that there was hence no reason why the Croats should glorify either Nikola Šubić Zrinski or Jelačić. The celebration was nevertheless held; as of then, however, Szigetvár and Wiener Neustadt would share an equally important place in our political and cultural history. The glory of the events at Szigetvár did not fade, but it was joined by the commemoration of the tragedy of the Zrinski and the Frankopani. Ban Peter Zrinski took over the place that up to that point in time was – in folk poems – kept by Ban Jelačić. This was at the same time the answer sent to Austria and Hungary – or, following the settlements, Austro-Hungary and Croatia-Hungary. Instead of the empire being organised as a federal state, it became a dual monarchy – to the damage of the Croats and all the Slavs in the Monarchy. As a result of this failure, and after he had gone to exile, Strossmayer ceased to engage in politics. Our Academy published documents on the conspiracy (F. Rački, B. Bogišić), and after the historical novel authored by E. Kumičić, writer and member of the Croatian Party of Right, entitled *Urota Zrinsko-frankopanska* (1893), was published, pupils and students cut classes on 30 April, expressing thereby their disagreement with the policy of Vienna and Budapest.

Matica ilirska and its President Matija Mesić, who collected and published the most important documents on Nicholas Šubić Zrinski, made a special effort toward marking the 300th anniversary of the Szigetvár battle. *Matica* published the book entitled *Zrinska vojevoda*, a fine edition with literary tributes – epics about Nicholas Zrinski and Szigetvár (Trnski, Vežić), and on the fort of Zrin (Kukuljević). *Matica hrvatska*, which succeeded it, continued being open to the celebration of the Zrinski and the Frankopani. Petar Preradović, Ivan Dežman, Krsto Pavletić (under the pseudonym Osman-beg Štafić) wrote poems or epics about Nicholas Zrinski and Szigetvár. Higin Dragošić and Matija Ban authored dramatic works.

In Yugoslavia during the Karađorđević dynasty, there was room for neither Szigetvár nor Wiener Neustadt; that is to say for neither Nicholas Šubić Zrinski nor Peter Zrinski and Fran Frankopan. A similar situation was

in the new Yugoslavia, where they suffered the fate of *collateral* victims. A scholarly symposium on Szigetvár was held in *Matica hrvatska* prior to the Declaration, yet the papers were not published. In 1971, a scholarly symposium on the topic of the conspiracy was held, yet the papers were again not published, as the activity of *Matica hrvatska* was prohibited.

One of major topics in the 19th and in the 20th centuries was the relationship between Nicholas Zrinski's *The Peril of Szigetvár* in Hungarian original and its Croatian translation, or rather adaptation, authored by Peter Zrinski. Nicholas wrote for his friends – Hungarian noblemen, while Peter writes for his friends and fellow-fighters – in wartime and in brief moments of peace. In our literary-historical and historical science, Peter received worse remarks than Nicholas, as he was supposedly a bad verse-maker, a non-poet, who chose a difficult verse – the double-rhymed decasyllable that he could not master; he was further described as a bad politician, who relied on his heart rather than on his mind. His critics disregarded the fact that by choosing double-rhymed decasyllables, Peter Zrinski had intended to join Croatian tradition ranging from Marulić to his own time. It turned out that certain literary historians held it against him that he had undertaken to translate his brother's work. In the middle of such a social and political situation in which the leading conspirators had either died or been killed, Zrinski was left alone, betrayed both by the French king and by the Venetians, and caught in the net of the then contemporary global interest policy. It was only the newer science of literary history that offered a just and sober evaluation of his work, in particular regarding the original in Hungarian and its translation into Croatian (Đ. Novalić, P. Pavličić). Even the choice of language – Croatian of the Ozalj linguistic circle – was evaluated anew in the context of the history of Croatian language and the activity of writers and lexicographers belonging to this circle (S. Težak, J. Vončina).

**„JOYOUSLY BURIED UNDER THE ASHES OF MY HOMELAND”
(SIN AND MARTYRDOM IN HUNGARIAN ZRÍNYIAD)**

SÁNDOR BENE

In scholarly circles it has long been discussed how many Croatian and how many Hungarian soldiers fought in Miklós („Subich”) Zrínyi/Nikola Šubić Zrinski’s army and whether Zrínyi regarded himself Croatian or Hungarian. At the time, however, another issue, the question of religious identity, was considered even more important than that of national identity. Moreover, over this question there has been a consensus among historians: the hero of Szigetvár was extremely tolerant towards Protestants, his son, György/Juraj Zrínyi was a professed Protestant. Then the following generation of the family, owing to Péter Pázmány’s influence, reconverted to Catholicism, but the grandson of György, Miklós Zrínyi, the ban and poet, was also well-known for his exceptional religious tolerance: Hungarian Protestants sought his support at the diet, and in his library he kept the double portrait of Martin Luther and his wife, which he had inherited from his father, next to the portraits of his ancestors. Literary historians have long debated the theme of *The Peril of Sziget*: some have claimed that the heroes dying a martyr’s death were Catholic heroes, whereas others maintain that the death of Zrínyi and his soldiers only makes sense in a Protestant discourse on „national sin and collective responsibility and penitence”. Our lecture discusses this unresolved question by examining the sources of the epic (and the *Syrena*).

It is at the climax of *The Peril of Sziget*, right before his sortie, that Miklós Zrínyi gives his last speech, in which he convinces his soldiers of the necessity of martyrdom – bringing closure to his pedagogical teachings throughout the epic –, and offers them God’s „beautiful crown”, the possibility of a heavenly reward. The soldiers welcome his words „joyously”, which joy, gradually turning into a form of ecstasy, will not leave them until their death arrives. The main claim of the the speech is that God is no longer displeased with them for their „sins” (i.e. the sins of the nation), the soldiers have redeemed not only themselves but their whole nation as well. The speech refers to these „sins” in general terms only and does not describe them in detail – and when compared to its immediate source, the short epic by the Zaratian poet, Brne Karnaru-

tic (*Vazetje Sigeta grada*), it is striking how Zrínyi has altered the ideas of this militant Catholic author. Karnarutic discusses sins committed against the „Roman Church”, which he uses to describe the moral degradation of society, the lack of solidarity, envy and drunkenness. In his epic (in Part XV) Zrínyi puts only those words into his great-grandfather’s mouth (from the closing of the speech) that propagate a „joyous death”, while he simply paraphrases the opening part of the speech in Part I, where he describes the reasons for the wrath of God’s, elaborates on the sins that God meant to punish Hungary for. However, there is something missing from these stanzas, namely the lines on the Roman Catholic Church, and it is only moral offences that are listed (enmity, fornication, theft, murder and drunkenness).

Miklós Zrínyi has consciously placed his hero in a virtual world in which the schism has not happened yet: the collective sin is not interpreted from a denominational perspective, in this sense he differs from both the Catholic and Protestant polemicists (who accused each other of causing the schism). On examining the Croatian translation of the *Syrena* by Péter Zrínyi, it becomes clear that the differences are systematic: In Part I Péter inserts a stanza which is not part of the original work (the Hungarian epic), and where he uses Karnarutic’s accusations concerning the sins committed against the Roman Catholic Church.

It raises the question: If in the Hungarian epic the notion of sin is denominationally neutral, what ideological framework is to be used to interpret the martyrdom of the soldiers? The answer is given by the „plot” of lyrical epic of the *Syrena*. First, in the figure of Orpheus, the poet Zrínyi is damned for the sin of excessive love, then he is resurrected as Hercules, and then in *Peroratio*, the closing poem of the work, he promises to die a martyr’s death to redeem his nation. „Joyously buried under the ashes of my homeland”: this brief last line alludes not only to the great-grandfather he intended to follow, or to the handful of soldiers actually buried under the ashes of Szigetvár, but also to Seneca, his favourite author. The martyr willing to die in the flames, redeeming himself through suffering is a reference to the self-sacrifice of Hercules on the mountain of Oeta (*Hercules Oetaeus*). Thus the Hungarian Zrínyiad is an original idea: Christianized stoical martyrdom with Protestant elements – while the Croatian Zrínyiad returns to well-known and familiar traditions, the Catholic martyrdom of the Counter-Reformation.

THE MEMORY OF THE 1566 SIEGE OF SZIGETVÁR AND OF MIKLÓS ZRÍNYI/NIKOLA ZRINSKI IN HUNGARIAN LITERARY TRADITION (18TH–19TH CENTURIES)

GÁBOR TŰSKÉS

In the paper, I take as a starting point the fact that the memory of the 1566 siege of Szigetvár, of Suleiman II and Miklós Zrínyi/Nikola Zrinski is an essentially international phenomenon. This remembrance has several regional and other variants; however, their examination ought to be viewed from an international perspective, and carried out within an interdisciplinary framework using comparative methods. With all differences taken into consideration, the depiction of Szigetvár in the historiography, literature, arts, music, military and political philosophy of European countries shows a kind of unity. Several interactions can be observed between different national traditions and genres, and, for this reason, the related works and documents can only be understood together, in their totality.

The memory of the 1566 siege of Szigetvár, together with those of the 1526 battle of Mohács and the 1552 siege of Eger, has been intricately intertwined with the history of the 150-year-long Ottoman occupation of Hungary. The siege itself is one of the major topics of the sixteenth- and seventeenth-century literary adaptations of the battles against the Turks, and it has left its mark in Hungarian, Croatian and German literature afterwards as well. The history of literary adaptations demonstrates the strong link between Hungarian and Croatian literature, and its embeddedness in Central European tradition.

The major aim of the paper is to present the Hungarian literary tradition of Szigetvár and Zrínyi from the beginning of the eighteenth century up to the late nineteenth century, and to outline the process of constructing this memory and forming a particular national narrative. As the second goal, I have set to mark the turning points, define the main characteristics, and identify the functions of the memory of Szigetvár. I shall pay heed to the procedure of myth-forming, in the course of which memories of the past condense into stories shaping the experience of the present and the future. I shall prefer to highlight those examples of literature that represent a high quality and are considered important for the history of literary themes (*Stoffgeschichte*). I shall speak of alternative forms of memory and try to avoid the

perspective of “heroic act – heroic suffering”. Although tradition in fine arts shows several points of intersection with literature, I shall not discuss that on this occasion as I presented it at a 2007 international conference on the two Miklós Zrínyi in Budapest, and the conference volume was subsequently published.

Following Miklós Zrínyi’s heroic epic poem entitled *Obsidio Sygethiana* [The Siege of Szigetvár (Vienna, 1651)], more than 80 years passed in Hungary without the publication of any new literary work on the siege of Szigetvár. The reason behind this is twofold: on the one hand, it would have been extremely difficult to compete with the standards set by Zrínyi. On the other hand, the historical context did not favour the literary treatment of such a patriotic subject, considering that these were the last decades of Ottoman occupation and the Habsburgs imposed absolutism on the country.

The events of Ottoman wars in Hungary provided an almost inexhaustible source to school drama in the eighteenth century. We know of 14 Zrínyi-themed Jesuit performances from the period between 1740 and 1770, staged in more than ten places. In the second part of the eighteenth century, Zrínyi was commonly represented as an example of Christian faith, loyalty to the King, and patriotism.

The late eighteenth century sees the evolution of a real literary Zrínyi-cult, in the frame of which he became a symbol of national resistance, a desire to bring back lost grandeur, aspirations for independence, and, on the other hand, the symbol of Habsburg imperial patriotism. From the 1780s on, there are more and more Hungarian pieces of literature on the subject. The 1790s see the appearance of monarchist and Josephinist writers of German, Austrian and Hungarian origin, who sympathize with the system and put Zrínyi in the service of Habsburg interests in their German-language works, which were also translated into Hungarian.

The decades at the turn of the 1800s witness a real rebirth of the subject: Zrínyi was one of the first to be canonized as a heroic and national ideal. In the course of the nineteenth century, Szigetvár became a famous memorial site of the Hungarian national past, together with Eger and Mohács. Likewise, captain Zrínyi was promoted as the symbol of moral standards set for the Hungarians and became part of the national identity. The intentions and ambitions of the present were to a great extent projected onto idealized figures of the past, including Zrínyi. In the first half of the 1800s, the cap-

tain and the seventeenth-century Zrinyi-epic were considered of political importance, and were interpreted accordingly. In the second half of the century, Zrinyi was elevated to a national cult figure symbolizing anti-German and anti-Austrian nationalism. The topic opened the way for sentimental expansion, the elaboration of tragicomic situations, and the implementation of humour in the popular genres of the age. Most adaptations can be described in terms of tension between historical authenticity and exemplification, stereotyping and individualization, and normative evaluation and narrative methods of triggering sympathy.

The inspirational power of literary tradition is demonstrated by the fact that Zrinyi remained the bearer of different aspirations and complex meanings up until the end of the century; at the same time, his figure underwent gradual secularisation. At the turn of the century, it became more and more the practice to mention his name, soul or spirit, and weave them into poems in different correlations. Some of the attempts of dramatization are less successful, because they lack the possibility of development for the heroes and other characters. The majority of authors went back to the same sources either directly or indirectly, and they did not aspire to an original treatment of the historical material. All this entailed that the action and the motifs were to a great extent similar.

The heyday of Romanticism, or more precisely the 1820s and 30s, was a period when several poems treated the figures of both the captain and the poet Zrinyi, parallel to the strengthening of the nobility's resistance (aiming at independence from Austria) and to the commemorations in Szigetvár starting in 1833. The majority of these poems represent different versions of patriotic poetry that evolved in the Reform Era. In the 1840s, poets criticizing the present day and Austrian oppression raise their voices more than ever before. The 1850s witness the accentuation of romantic elements in the literary treatments of the subject, and the well-known aspects of loyalty to King and religion are given prominence for a short time.

Traces of a different perspective, together with new motifs, can be detected in Mór Jókai's four-act tragedy in verse entitled *The Martyrs of Szigetvár* [A szigetvári vértanúk] (1860) and in Kálmán Mikszáth's *New Zrinyiad* [Új Zrinyiász], an 1898 novel. Jókai begins to dismantle the paradigm of heroic remembrance, and Mikszáth completes this process. Both writers head towards a modern way of commemorative thinking. Jókai's major aim is to

criticize those who turn against the interests of the country, at the same time expressing his hope that turncoats can be good patriots after all. Moreover, the play represents the interaction of different literary treatments on significant Ottoman sieges: the love between the renegade and Ann is parallel to that of Omar and Ida in Vörösmarty's epic poem *Eger* (1827). The Austrian censorship permitted the staging of the drama only after certain omissions, but even in its mutilated form it was one of the most frequently played pieces during absolutism, for its function as a wake-up call to the spirit of the nation. For decades, it was considered a representative national drama. It became part of commemoration ceremonies: it was staged at gala performances on the 300th anniversary of Zrinyi's death and at the millennium.

Mikszáth's novel is persiflage on the fake national identity prevailing in the last decades of the nineteenth century, and on the self-deceiving lies of social and political affairs and modes of thinking in that era. It is simultaneously an important attempt to renew the literary Zrinyi tradition. Mikszáth employs the strategy of historiographic meta-fiction, and uses this event of the past only as a starting point; he develops, updates and makes a parody of it, taking it into the direction of the anecdotic and the absurd. In actual fact, he brings forward the Day of the Last Judgement, and places the resurrected Zrinyi and his companions into the reality of late nineteenth-century Hungary. Zrinyi provides only the frame of the authorial intent and becomes the protagonist of a political satire, his myth allegorically projected onto fiction. In sketching his character, Mikszáth could have relied on the current historiographic results of the second part of the nineteenth century. Nevertheless, his view on history is more differentiated and sensitive than that of most contemporaneous historiographers. He does not question heroism, but associates it with qualities and behavioural patterns, which are unacceptable in the modern world.

THE SIEGE OF SZIGETVÁR IN CROATIAN OPERA

SANJA MAJER-BOBETKO

The siege of Szigetvár, in which Nicholas Zrinski died, is one of the mythical places in Croatian history. It is hence rather understandable that in the patriotic 19th century, it found its reflections on the musical scene as well. However, as it is well known, this battle was fateful for the future of Europe in general; it was hence an inspiration not only to Croatian artists, but to others as well.

On the drama *Zriny* by Theodor Körner

The focal point of future staging was the drama *Zriny* by German romantic author Theodor Körner (1791–1813), who belonged to the circle of the *poets of liberation wars*, i.e. the Napoleonic wars (1813 and 1814). He died in this war turmoil before his 22nd birthday.

The tragedy (*Trauerspiel*) *Zriny* in five acts was written in 1812. According to the available data, it was on three occasions performed in Zagreb in the original – that is to say in German – in the period between 1832 and 1834. The second performance that took place on 4 October 1834 is of particular importance for the history of Croatian theatre, as it marked the opening of the new theatre building – the so-called Stanković's Theatre on Markov trg. During the 19th century, the tragedy was put on stage in various Croatian translations (S. Marjanović Brođanin; Špiro Dimitrović Kotoranin) on another seven occasions in Zagreb, and on three in Sisak.

On the staging of Körner's *Zriny*

As known so far, Körner's drama inspired six authors to compose operatic works: Franz Xaver Kleinheinz (1765–1832), Franz Joseph (František Josef) Gläser (1798–1861), Albert de Vleeshouwer (1863–?), Kurt Weill (1900–1950), August Adelburg Abramović (1830–1873) and Ivan pl. Zajc (1832–1814). Two of them are connected to Croatian cultural space: *Zrinji* (*Zrinjski*) by Abramović and *Nikola Šubić Zrinjski* by Zajc; therefore, the paper pays special attention to these two operas in particular – tackling not only the composers' and libretto procedures, but also the staging.

On the opera *Zriny* by August Adelburg Abramović

August Adelburg Abramović, violinist and composer of Croatian-Italian origin, and librettist of his own operatic works (*Zrinyi*, *Martinuzzi* and *Wallenstein*) composed his opera *Zrinyi* initially to German text, then he translated it to Croatian, and later to Hungarian as well. It was further evident that the opera was composed to mark the 300th anniversary of the siege of Szigetvár, as in 1866, it was suggested it should be performed in Zagreb first. However, opera as an institution had then not yet existed in Zagreb, and consequently, there was no adequate ensemble to perform this opera in five acts with twelve soloists, ballet, huge orchestra and choir. Consequently, the proposal was refused.

Understandably determined to see his “historical dramatic musical fresco in five acts”, as he himself named his opera, put on stage, Adelburg offered it to the Budapest opera house. He fulfilled the propositions of the management translated the libretto into Hungarian, and incorporated elements of Hungarian musical folklore in the musical structure. Thus adjusted, and with several more modifications – primarily certain necessary shortenings – added, the opera was for the first time performed on 23rd June 1868 in Budapest. Thanks to the topic and the libretto in Hungarian, musical critics welcomed it warmly, too. They, however, gave Adelburg’s opera high praises not only from the national, but also from the artistic angle.

Nevertheless, the opera *Zrinyi* was later forgotten; it may rarely be found only in newspaper articles, while in Croatian musical historiography, it is merely mentioned as a fact in some musical-historical syntheses. In the 1990s, novelist, opera lover and musical critic Nedjeljko Fabrio, endeavoured to bring it back to life at the Zagreb opera house; his attempt, however, did not bear fruit.

On the opera *Nikola Šubić Zrinjski* by Ivan pl. Zajc

The opera *Nikola Šubić Zrinjski* by Ivan pl. Zajc, as it is well known, had a very different kind of fate. Unlike Adelburg’s opera, Zajc’s work has managed to become a standing part of the repertoire of all Croatian opera houses. After the premiere on 4 November 1876 at the Zagreb opera house, *Nikola Šubić Zrinjski* had its first performance at the Croatian National Theatre in Osijek in 1908; at the Croatian National Theatre in Split in 1941; and finally,

after the end of World War Two, in Rijeka in 1946. There followed numerous performances, refreshed directors' readings of the work, and new casts in all Croatian opera houses. An eminent group of the most esteemed Croatian conductors, starting with Ivan pl. Zajc himself, have so far conducted performances that included all generations of singers during a long history of this opera being performed. *Zrinjski* has simply become an integral part of the standard repertoire, and it still – as Stanislav Tuksar pointed it out – functions as “Croatian *Nabucco*”, presenting heroic patriotism as an *omen* of Croatian victory.

Hugo Badalić (1851–1900) wrote the libretto based on Körner's drama. Though Badalić's libretto is much closer to Körner's original than Adelburg's, he also made certain cuts to the plot, left a some characters out, and shortened the verse from hendecasyllable mainly to hexameter and octosyllabic verse – which proved to be a good choice for the setting to music, but also to decasyllabic verse – primarily in individual choir parts. Additionally, the decasyllable directly associates to folk epic poetry, which indeed was what Badalić aimed at. The choir *Tako nama Boga velikoga* (So help us the great God) in Zrinjski's *Zakletva* (The Oath), where the repetition of the verse *Tako meni/ nama Boga velikoga* (So help me/us the great God) shows an obvious connection with usual epic formulas, is most often mentioned as an example thereof.

In its final version, the opera by Zajc has three acts consisting of eight images and thirty-two scenes. It is worth pointing out that the final choir, entitled *U boj!*, was written earlier, during Zajc's Viennese days. Zajc composed it ten years before to the text by Franjo Marković and on the occasion of marking the 300th anniversary of the battle fought between Croatian-Hungarian and Ottoman powers at Szigetvár. The Velebit Academic Company gave the first performance thereof in Vienna in 1866. A curious detail in connection with this choir is its huge popularity in Japan, where male choirs perform it in Croatian.

As regards the musical aspect itself, apart from many praises, Zajc was also receiving remarks from two directions – from the position of the advocates of national course, who claimed Zajc's music was insufficiently national; and from the position of the advocates of *modernism*, who held it outgrown and conservative. Nevertheless, in *Zrinjski*, Zajc managed – in addition to using the usual *belcanto* manner – to implement certain folklore fragments and a rather modern structure as well. The latter becomes especi-

ally manifest in sporadic musical inclinations toward Wagner's concept. A complete and important *novum* is *Jelena's dream* with the fairies' song being visualised on stage – a rarity in European opera in general. A further *novum* on Croatian stage was the dance itself; hence, 4 November 1876 is considered the beginning of the activity of the Zagreb ballet ensemble.

It moreover needs pointing out that *Zrinjski* has become so widely popular not only on the grounds of patriotic heroism, but also thanks to its authentic artistic values. Drama and lyricism intertwine beautifully in it, same as do the powerful dynamics of mass scenes and dramatic psychological elements. All that makes it a true masterpiece.

It is thus evident that within Zajc's opus, which numbers around one thousand works, *Nikola Šubić Zrinjski* deserves a special place. It holds a special place in Croatian cultural milieu, among artworks that were inspired by the legendary siege of Szigetvár. This most successful Croatian romantic opera has become as legendary as the battle itself.

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ISBN 978-953-347-113-6